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This ex post facto nonexperimental constructive replication study revisited earlier work 
by Grusky (1961, 1963), Gamson and Scotch (1964), and Gordon and Becker (1964) on 
whether Major League Baseball (MLB) managerial succession reflected scapegoating 
behaviors. Also there was interest in learning if selected independent variables were 
predictive of a team’s won-loss record, termed the productivity index. 
 Nineteen-years of relevant data was collected from 26 of the 30 MLB teams. The 
four excluded were relatively new expansion teams. The dependent variable of team 
efficiency, a productivity index, was the won-loss records during the tenure of a specific 
manager with a given team. Eight independent variables we selected as predictors:  
on-base percentage, on-base plus slugging percentage, walks plus hits per inning pitched, 
stolen-base efficiency, total team salaries, length of manager tenure, average strikeouts 
per nine-innings, and managerial change. 
 The conclusions were: 
1. The two most potent predictors of team efficiency were the on-base plus 
slugging percentage (OBS) and the walks plus hits per inning pitched (WHIP) 
statistics. According to the model studied, those two independent variables 
accounted for 26% of the variance in prediction. Using all eight independent 
variables resulted in a 27% variance. 
2. Capable players who consistently performed up to expectations were the 
determining factor influencing productivity indices.  
3. According to the model studied, managerial succession was not critical for 
improving a team’s productivity index. 
Recommendations on pursuing future research included:  
1. Manager approaches on actions resulting in success or failure, on intangibles 
such as risk-taking and team culture. 
2. Qualitative approaches including interviewing current and former players, 
managers, team management and owners on the relative role and importance 
of a manager. 
3. Mixed method approaches including interviewing media personnel and 
relevant fans on the importance of a manager. 
4. Repeat the study using a longer time period and use other independent 
variables. 
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1 
“We’re very much into marketing the Cubs and Wrigley field as our 
brand. We can never sell the brand strong enough, and we can never 
take anything for granted.” (John McDonough, Cubs vice president, 
cited by Aron Kahn in Knight Ridder Newspapers, July 31, 2004) 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 Management succession frequently has been tied to the success of an 
organization. When events do not materialize favorably there tends to be a change in key 
personnel, with the assumption such modification(s) to an organization will yield more 
desirable results. A critical review of selected and relevant literature on organizational 
performance is addressed in Chapter Two, but at this point it is necessary to state the 
issue of managerial value is questioned in many domains. The point is whether a manager 
serves as a critical decision-maker leading to enhanced performance(s), and implementer 
of policy with limited range for decision-making, or as an obstructionist to success. A 
restating of this issue brings forth the question of whether leadership and management are 
synonymous (Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Hersey & Blanchard, 1988; Kotter, 1990; 
Mintzberg, 1973, 1980), an issue addressed subsequently in this manuscript.  
 Ostensibly there is a clear divide between persons serving as managers for 
professional sporting teams, such as baseball teams, and other types of economically 
driven enterprises, such as conventional corporate businesses. The former presumably 
requires at least some direct experience, insight, knowledge of the profession, and 
intuitive understanding of how to best motivate the actors. The latter apparently relies on 
knowledge of protocol(s), acquired business acumen, grasp of prevailing economic 
2 
currents, understanding of predictive factors, and demonstrated or alleged competency 
with conventional systems for reporting accomplishments.  
Leadership and Organizations 
 A screened discussion on leadership versus management in organizations is 
addressed in Chapter Two, but at this point Kotter’s (1990) explanation is presented 
because it has relevance to the development of this study; leadership results in favorable 
modifications while management is the process of ensuring an operation is done as 
planned. The former was viewed as being responsible for the alignment of resources to 
achieve a goal (vision). The latter was responsible for organizing available resources to 
accomplish the task (mission).  
 Kotter (1990) claimed it was important to distinguish between leadership and 
management. Both were important concepts, but supportive and not synonymous and not 
necessarily performed by a single person. That perspective was reinforced by the Gardner 
and Schermerhorn (1992) third explanation of leadership and management; they were 
complimentary processes. Antonakis, Cianciolo, and Sternberg (2004) commented on the 
apparent dichotomy by pointing out many activities engaged in by high organizational 
officials likely involved concepts of leadership and management, and it should not be 
surprising to realize that a clear distinction between the two might not always be possible, 
nor would it always be desired. 
Competency 
 Horowitz (1994) used economic theory as a vehicle for studying MLB managers, 
and referred to them as principal clerks. His terminology carried a pejorative note as it 
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conveyed the idea such a person was not being entrusted with opportunities to make 
major decisions on the well being of an organization.  
 Citing work by Folger (1993, p. 11) on hiring practices “. . . hiring a manager is 
an act of faith!” Howrowitz’ (1994) reference was that MLB managers came into 
situations with resources and events waiting for them and the extent of impact possible 
was limited. In particular, the idea of expecting superior managerial performance from a 
MLB team, which recently had undergone managerial succession, was more wishful 
hoping than believing in reality. Pointing out that managers generally evidenced a similar 
approach to the game, Horowitz used the analogy of graduate schools of business 
management. He said that managers trained at the Harvard University Business School 
likely would try to recruit personnel from that institution, or persons who presented 
similar characteristics. The implication was likes attracted and when presented 
opportunities for hiring personnel the tendency was to select a person evidencing similar 
preparation, a common background of experiences, and an attitude deemed as being 
compatible. In so doing a new person became like an extension of the person, or 
management team, doing the hiring. Unless there had been a change in persons involved 
with hiring it was reasonable to believe a new manager would present characteristics 
similar to the one replaced. 
 Adding to the argument that a MLB manager was similar to that of a principal 
clerk for a large firm, Horowtiz (1994) explained there were at least two, and perhaps 
three, levels of administration overseeing all actions of a manager. The owner, and 
perhaps senior management team, comprised the source for the economic support. The 
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general manager was the person who usually implemented the wishes of the owner(s) by 
designing and implementing policies, including the allocation of resources given a 
manager. A manager’s role was to use the resources provided and win as many games as 
possible.  
Durocher 
 Operating from that perspective, the author (Horowitz, 1994) claimed that despite 
the recognition of different managerial philosophies, the actions called for at any given 
point during a game, or a season, were such that a limited number of options existed. 
Managers had to address those situations with the resources given to them. Notably, the 
resources reflected the philosophy of the owners and were a part of the implementation 
strategy of the general manager. Referring to a book by Leo Durocher (1975), the 
statement used to explain a manager’s position was “Nobody can take a manger’s job 
while he’s winning, and nobody can save it if he’s not” (p. 114). Following that 
reference, Horowitz (1994) again cited the Durocher (1975) book saying, “If you don’t 
win, you’re going to be fired. If you do win you’ve only put off the day you’re going to 
be fired” (p. 159). The implication of Horowitz’ (1994) work was threefold: selection of a 
manager was done on the basis of the owner’s philosophy; managers truly did not have 
much latitude in terms of what they could do and most managers had few options when 
confronted with decisions; and finally, other managers probably had been confronted by 
similar circumstances when such situations arose so the element of surprise was tainted 
by luck and the ability of the resources. 
5 
Training Ground 
 Business schools profess to have the knowledge required for future managers and 
business leaders, and most such schools are thriving. Whether they provide students with 
the requisite information and skills is an often-debated topic (Hulsart, 2002). Increasingly 
there seems to be a mismatch between what businesses expect and want from new 
graduates, especially those earning the Master of Business Administration Degree, and 
what the schools provide. The former has been increasingly vocal about wanting people 
with expertise in the so-called soft skills: people skills and ability to write. The latter have 
emphasized what have been termed the hard skill: computation, economics, statistics, and 
similar areas. Training programs not producing what consumers (business) want become 
expendable. Some do so sooner than later.  
 In the domain of professional sports, the training school for team managers 
apparently has been on-the-job experience. But the nature and degree of such preparation 
has become a topic for discussion. It is not a foregone conclusion that a type of 
experience, such as hands-on and day-to-day work, in a given sporting arena is 
mandatory for anticipating successful performance. In fact, increasingly it is suspected 
that a sporting team manager is the beneficiary, or victim, of the resources available (i.e., 
personnel on a team). Winning or losing then would depend more on players’ talents and 
efforts than on a manager’s skill, knowledge, insights, or ability to motivate. 
Furthermore, subscribing to the ideas expressed earlier by Antonakis et al. (2004), Bennis 
and Nanus (1985), Gardner and Schermerhorn (1992), Hersey and Blanchard (1988), 
Kotter (1990), and Mintzberg (1973, 1980), the performance of a manager, such as a 
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professional baseball team manager, under such circumstances might be viewed best as 
an organizer of resources provided by the upper administration. Success on a playing 
field, therefore, might not be valid evidence of a manager’s worth as much as a 
confluence of circumstances, such as fortuitous moves or decisions when a superior team 
did not respond so as to mitigate the move, or simply the result of good fortune.  
Baseball Salaries 
 MLB players with at least three-to-five-years of longevity, are paid more than 
Nobel Prize winners, and that is a fact applied to many players with limited abilities. The 
USA Today 12/10/03 Database accessed on 12/28/04 showed the 2004 median MLB 
salaries ranged from $3,100,000 for members of the New York Yankees (Alex Rodriguez 
at the top with $22 million and Bubba Crosby at the bottom with $301,400), to $325,000 
for members of the Cleveland Indians (Omar Visquel and Bob Wickman receiving $6 
million each and Brian Tallet being compensated $301,000) 
(<http://usatoday.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&title=U…>). 
Under a Magnifying Glass 
 Actions of managers, and coaches, of big-time sports increasingly have been 
scrutinized because they stand as the most visible symbol for a performing team. Their 
responsibilities, interestingly, have gone from a time when soft skills were a prevalent 
requirement (being able to interact with players and sometimes be regarded as one of the 
team) to a time when the hard skills (understanding how to use computers to “crunch 
numbers” and relying upon statistical data to support decisions) increasingly have 
become important, but not to the exclusion of being able to effectively interact with 
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others (players, upper management, and the media). The bottom line for such managers is 
they must be able to use player personnel in a manner enabling their team to be 
successful, and that translated into winning games. Also, they must be able to direct their 
teams’ toward winning percentages and ultimately win titles or championships.  
 When such managers were not successful the antidote usually was to replace the 
person; ostensibly because it was the reason why a team was not winning. But with every 
winning team there is losing team and so not all teams can be winners. That means, by 
extrapolation, there were managers who were not as successful, regardless of their 
personal talents and accomplishments, given the player personnel available. Not to be 
ignored is the fact most teams seek to secure players enabling them to have advantages in 
comparison to other teams. Thus the relative value of players retained and obtained needs 
to be kept in perspective to what is done by other teams. Sometimes major resource 
acquisitions become huge liabilities (i.e., Jason Giambi and Kevin Brown of the 2004 
New York Yankees, who together had annual salaries in excess of  
$20 million dollars but were not effective in terms of value added). 
Managerial Change 
 The issue of managerial change with a MLB team is an important topic because it 
can be a seriously disruptive event to an organization. Compounding the unrest is 
whether managerial changes in the presence of inefficient team performances are valid. 
Substantial amounts of money can be involved with the hiring and firing of a manager, 
but the biggest fiscal impact comes from how an interested public perceives such 
changes. In the world of MLB, the financial aspects of a manager’s salary are modest, 
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and sometimes inconsequential, when compared to the revenue-generating potential of a 
successful team. Being aware of the potential as well as the real value added to a baseball 
team by its manager is important to an organization as well as to a consuming public. 
Instant gratification (suddenly a team begins winning) by virtue of a managerial change is 
not likely to be a reasonable expectation. But the extent of the monetary investments in 
professional sports teams frequently overshadows reasonableness when such changes are 
made. Civility and logic rarely are evidenced when huge sums of money are in play. 
Investment Yield 
 On page 3 wk of the December 19, 2004 edition of the New York Times, 
Zimbalest explained how important it was for a professional baseball team to be 
considered attractive to fans. The focus of the article was Pedro Martinez’ decision to 
sign with the New York Mets for a salary reported to be between $53 and $56 million, to 
be paid over a period of four-years. Incidentally, Martinez’ former team, the Boston Red 
Sox were willing to go to $50 million for four-years, and the St. Louis Cardinals also 
were vying for Martinez’ services with a comparable offer. The geneses of the article was 
whether Martinez was worth that sum of money given his history of shoulder problems, 
and the fact at age 33 he might be considered as past his physical prime. Apparently the 
Red Sox and Cardinals believed the added investment (going from $50 to $56 million) 
was beyond the limits of reasonableness for a resource, even a Pedro Martinez. Not 
discussed in any length was the fact Martinez was not always the most collegial nor was 
he the most cooperative member of the Red Sox. Possibly this last issue was influential in 
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why the other two teams (Boston and St. Louis) did not make a final effort to secure his 
services. 
Fan Base 
 Predicating the Mets investment on the pitcher’s attraction to a large Hispanic 
population in the New York City area, it was suggested he might start 16 games at home, 
and for each of those games he would attract at least an additional 15,000 fans. Hedging 
the ticket cost by saying each one would average $25, meant an additional $375,000 in 
just ticket revenues for one game ($25/per additional fan times 15,000 additional 
spectators). For all 16 games it would mean an increase of $6 million.  
 But the revenue stream would continue because it was estimated that each person 
attending a Mets home game generated another $8 due to sales of souvenirs, food, 
parking, and other incidentals. Zimbalest (2004) estimated that Martinez’ direct impact 
on stadium income would be $7.92 million, but if the fan increase dropped to 10,000 
instead of the expected higher number then the increase would amount to $5.28 million. 
Working from a positive premise and extending the value added issue allows for 
including higher fees for advertising in the stadium and from sponsors. Also, attendance 
could be expected to increase at away games, and if the team signed another major 
player, which it did with the signing of Carlos Beltran, then the total attendance might 
climb beyond the predicted 15,000 extra fans per game when Martinez pitched.  
Potential Revenues 
 Playing with figures, that seemed reasonable, Zimbalest (2004) suggested that if 
annual attendance at just home games increased by 18,800 fans it would yield an annual 
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increase of $50.3 million to the Mets. But due to the concept of revenue sharing, about 
40% of the revenue would be shifted to smaller market teams. Yet, there would be added 
income anticipated from the new agreement the team had with Time Warner and 
Comcast, which might be worth up to an additional $250 million per year. The magnitude 
of the money involved with professional sports, such as MLB, makes it imperative that a 
team be attractive to its fan base so the multiple revenue streams can be sought, pursued, 
and exploited. 
Manager’s Dilemma 
 Issues of individuality versus teamwork often become blurred because while 
recognition might be heaped upon a collective, such as the U.S. Olympic Hockey Team 
winning the gold medal in 1980, few remember the team members. Illustrative is the fact 
many followers of sporting events would be hard pressed to identify the 1980 team 
winning the Super Bowl, the World Series, the National Basketball Association 
Championship, or the Stanley Cup, let alone the names of their respective members.  
Who? 
 Yet recognition of some professional athletes from that 1980 era, and earlier, 
readily can be recalled. The names of Bart Starr, Otto Graham, and Jim Brown generally 
are well known to football fans; as are the names of Ted Williams, Joe DiMaggio, and 
Sandy Koufax to baseball fans; the names of Bob Cousey, Bill Russell, and George 
Mikken to basketball fans; and Gordie Howe, Bobby Orr, and Maurice Richard to hockey 
fans. Interestingly, many sports fans might be unable to identify correctly the teams 
winning the National and American League titles during 2003, and even who won the 
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World Series, but most would know of individual “stars,” such as Pudge Roderiguz from 
the Florida Marlins and Derek Jeter from the New York Yankees. And from the Boston 
Red Sox the names of Curt Schilling and Manny Rameriz would be recognized. 
 As commented on earlier, excellence in the sporting arenas seems to hold a 
special attraction for much of the public. The United States public has its sports heroes in 
baseball, football, hockey, and even basketball. Throughout the rest of the world sports 
fans have heroes from different sports, such as soccer, rugby, horse racing, and perhaps 
cricket. The common thread is large fan followings translate into revenue for teams and 
individuals. 
Blending Talent 
 The reward system for athletic excellence is geared to recognize individuals, but 
blending their talents with those of players having lesser skills is critical. The right 
chemistry can produce a winning team, as apparently evidenced by the 2004 Boston Red 
Sox. Conversely, trying to blend a number of highly talented athletes into an effective 
team might not yield the desired outcome, as evidenced by the fact the United States 
Olympic Baseball Team, comprised of minor league professional players, was eliminated 
from further consideration for a medal at the 2004 Olympics by an “amateur” team from 
Cuba, during the American Olympic Qualifying Tournament. And the 2004 USA 
Olympic Basketball team, comprised of professional players from the National 
Basketball Association had to be satisfied with a third-place finish (bronze medal) behind 
Argentina (gold) and Italy (silver). 
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 Melding individual talents, including extraordinary abilities possessed by a select 
few, can be a monumental challenge. Success in creating a unified team while furthering 
the excellence of some is an achievement associated with financial and social rewards, 
but failure to do so quickly leads to replacement of the person entrusted with directing a 
team.  
 The pressure to win is not limited to teams representing particularly high profile 
organizations, but when a team is not successful the inclination is to point accusatory 
fingers. A coach or manager ostensibly is the acceptable target because such individuals 
generally are not viewed as integral to the successful performance of a team. Whether 
such accusations or beliefs have foundation is debatable, but there is foundation for 
critical conversation on the apparent dichotomy between leadership and management, as 
expressed earlier in this chapter. The next section presents definitions pertinent to this 
study. 
Definitions 
Big-time sports—Athletic contests involving one or more persons being pitted 
against a comparable number of opponents with the winner, immediately or eventually, 
being accorded financial remuneration. The compensation generally is of a magnitude 
well exceeding the average income of most workers. Individuals involved in the 
financing of big-time sports typically derive substantial monetary gains for their 
investments. 
Causal-comparative—Borg and Gall (1989) explained it was a process by which 
scientists sought to identify causal links between and among two or more variables. A 
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distinct limitation to this design was the fact its validity is only for exploring apparent 
causal relations and not for justifying relationships. In most uncharted research this 
design is the first one employed because it is the least rigorous and allows for discovering 
whether there is a potential for the presence of one phenomenon to associated with more 
or less of another phenomenon. The primary advantage for using this design is it enables 
a researcher to study suspected cause-and-effect interactions when it is not possible to 
create an experimental design. Additionally, it is appropriate to use when investigating 
relationships in a single study. 
Coach—“A person who trains or directs athletes or athletic teams” (American 
Heritage College Dictionary, 1993, p. 266). 
Inefficient team performance—When a team does not perform in the desired 
manner because of a lack of skill or effort. 
Interim manager—A person who temporarily is in charge of the training and 
performance of an athlete or team. The term manager oftentimes is used synonymously 
with coach, but in selected sports each term (coach or manager) carries a specific 
designation.  
Insider—It connotes a person from within an organization who has been moved 
to the position of coach or manager. Depending upon circumstances it might mean an 
elevated role for someone in an organization or perhaps it reflects a person assuming a 
particular responsibility with apparently less overall authority, or possibly a person who 
has dual roles. 
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League pennant winner—Conventionally it meant a team with the best winning 
percentages, for the American or National Leagues. But, in recent years there has been a 
modification to the idea of a clear pennant winner because there now are three divisions 
within each league and a round-robin form of playoff exists within each league. 
Consequently, it was possible for a team with a less productive record but highly 
successful during the league playoffs to emerge as a league winner and subsequently play 
the winner from the other league in the World Series. The implication is a division 
winner with a markedly poorer record of efficiency, in terms of won versus lost games, 
could be the representative from one of the two major leagues contesting in the World 
Series. 
Low effectiveness—This is a term often used in lieu of the phrase inefficient 
team performance. It conveys the idea of an individual or team not performing at a 
desired or expected level of effectiveness. 
Manager—A person charged with the training and overall performance of an 
individual and/or team. It is used synonymously with the noun /coach/, but in different 
sports the two terms sometimes convey different meanings. In MLB a manager is the 
person charged with directing the fortunes of individuals and the team. 
Managerial succession—This is the process by which one MLB Manager 
replaces a predecessor. Sometimes it is done volitionally, as when a manager elects to 
retire or move to another position. For the purposes of this study the term refers to the 
firing of a manager because of apparent ineptitude with the team being managed. 
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Number one selection—In professional sports parlance it refers to the first player 
selected during a draft of unsigned players. Typically the team with the poorest annual 
performance has the opportunity to secure the number one selection in the following year, 
but sometimes there is a lottery in which the teams presenting the poorest records from 
the prior year have opportunities to win the number one selection. It is important to 
realize securing the number one selection does not always translate into signing the 
person. Expectations are that number one selections will have the greatest potential for 
helping a team improve its performance. 
On-base percentage (OBP)—This term is used in baseball to represent the 
expected frequency a person will reach at least first base safely. It considers base hits and 
bases-on-balls divided by the number of times a player had opportunities to bat a ball. 
This has been an official statistic only since 1984, and recently has become one of the 
most important indicators regarding the relative value of a ballplayer. 
On-base plus slugging (OPS)—This is another of the more recently used 
statistics being used to determine the relative worth of a ballplayer. It is determined by 
adding the OBP to the slugging percentage to convey how information on how often a 
player reaches base and the extent of the “damage” he does when reaching base.  
Operational measures—These are the characteristics or phenomena intended to 
be studied and the manner by which they will be collected.  
Outsider—For the purpose of this study the term /outsider/ refers to an individual 
who was brought into succeed a prior manager and the successor came from outside of an 
organization. 
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Productivity index (PI)—This is a term used to explain the winning versus 
losing percentage of a manager with the team(s) managed. 
Scapegoating—Hebrew Sa’ir La-‘aza’zel (“goat for Azazel”). In the Old 
Testament the ritual of Yom Kippur (Lev. 16:8-10), included a goat symbolically 
burdened with the sins of the Jewish people. Some scholars believed that the animal was 
chosen by Lot to placate Azazel, a wilderness demon. The goat then was thrown over a 
precipice outside Jerusalem to rid the nation of its iniquities. By extension, a scapegoat 
has come to mean any group or individual figuratively thrown over a precipice because of 
symbolically representing sins or evils (American Heritage College Dictionary, 1993). 
Second division—Prior to the expansion of MLB there were eight teams in each 
of the two leagues. Teams presenting won-loss records placing them at or below the fifth 
team in a league were termed as being in the second division. Subsequent to creation of 
three divisions within the American and National Leagues there are fewer than eight 
teams per division. But still it is valid to term a team as being in the second division of a 
given MLB division. It is not done by convention at this time because of the potential for 
confusion between second division with Eastern, Central, and Western Divisions.  
Slump—The American Heritage College Dictionary (1993) defined slump as “to 
fall or sink heavily; collapse; to decline suddenly; an extended period of poor 
performance” (p. 1284). When applied to baseball the term means either a player or a 
team is in the midst of protracted poor performance.  
Star players—In sports parlance they are the players who draw crowds because 
of their demonstrated exceptional abilities in a given sport. Examples of current star 
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baseball players are Pedro Martinez (New York Mets pitcher), Manny Rameriz (Red Sox 
hitter), Roger Clemens (Houston Astros pitcher), Carlos Delgado (Florida Marlins, 
hitter), and Barry Bonds (San Francisco Giants hitter). 
Stolen base percentage (SBP)—This statistic explains how successful baseball 
players have been with their attempts to steal bases. It does not include the actual number 
of bases stolen, but presents only the ratio of attempts to successful steals. 
Strikeouts per nine innings (S9I)—The importance of this item is elevated by 
the fact strikeouts are not dependent upon team defense or luck. The higher the ratio (i.e., 
2:9 (striking out two batters per nine-innings pitched) versus 7:9 (striking out seven 
batters per nine-innings pitched)) the more effective a pitcher is considered to be, because 
of denying hitters a chance to be a base runner. 
Symbols—This material is presented above by the definition for signs. Using the 
idea of symbolism provides the opportunity for saying in some instances the title of coach 
and manager are terms used interchangeably.  
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis generally has been accepted by Ethnolinguists to 
mean that culture influenced language but there has been far less agreement about the 
possibility that language influenced culture. Edward Sapir and his student, Benjamin 
Whorf, suggested that language affected how people perceived their reality, that language 
coerced thought. This is known as the Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis. Simply stated, the Sapir-
Whorf Hypothesis says that the content of a language was directly related to the content 
of a culture and the structure of a language was directly related to the structure of a 
culture. Whorf conceived the idea of how culture influenced language and most linguists 
18 
have agreed to term it the Whorf-Sapir Hypothesis (www.linguistlist.org/topics/sapir-
whorf). 
Team efficiency—This refers to the won-lost ratio of professional sports teams. 
Higher efficiency ratios reflect better team performances. 
Value over replacement player (VORP)—This is relatively new statistic used 
by baseball administration. It was created to reflect the concept of replacement value a 
team might expect from a readily, available and inexpensive player when a starter or key 
player is not available. The statistic is a means for determining how much better the 
starter or key player would be over the replacement. It is predicated on a model termed 
the Marginal Lineup Value rate (MLVr), which reports how many runs a given player 
would add to a hypothetical team comprised of eight other players. 
Rationale for Inquiry 
 MLB teams are a phenomenon with worldwide appeal. Where they are located 
communities usually rally behind them, individuals become ardent fans, and 
organizations make or lose large amounts of money depending on their relative 
successes. Book value of teams generally do reveal the value added to communities by 
virtue of the presence of a team in a given city, but it can be assumed whatever estimates 
there are on the worth of a team, such as the Boston Red Sox having been sold for  
$660 million dollars just two years ago, the real value is considerably greater because of 
the ancillary businesses associated directly or indirectly with a team (i.e., sports 
memorabilia, communication networks, advertising, transportation and parking, food, 
etc.). The New York Yankees regional sports cable market, known as YES, had a 
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reported value of $900 million during 2001, which was estimated to be considerably 
higher than the value of the team. 
Supporting Relationships 
 Most MLB teams are multi-layered enterprises with the professional team being 
just the most visible component of an organization. Success or failure of a team impacts 
not just a parent organization but also an entire community. Consequently the notion of 
managerial succession potentially has far-reaching implications. Borg and Gall (1989) 
pointed out the credibility of hypotheses, such as claiming a manager was important for a 
team’s success, were markedly strengthened if relationships held up after one or more 
constructive replication studies. The key to such studies was in the testing of original 
hypotheses using different operational measures.  
Objective 
 This study was a constructive replication of the work done by Gamson and Scotch 
(1964). The three explanations they presented were considered, but the twin foci were to 
determine if scapegoating was a viable explanation for managerial succession, and to 
learn if selected independent variables were effective predictors of a team’s PI. The 
different operational measures were a critical study of the won-loss records and 
managerial changes of 26 MLB teams between 1985 and 2003.  
 Some disclaimers need to be stated at this point because not all of the major 
league teams were in operation since 1985; four were relatively new. In some instances 
teams moved. In those instances their records were considered using the names from their 
prior locations since the composition of such teams remained fairly constant. The result 
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was there were 30 teams in the population, but four were excluded because they did not 
qualify on the basis of longevity. Twenty-six teams were in the identified pool. From that 
sample, the average number of team managers from 1985–2003 was determined. 
Preliminary Analysis 
 Preliminary analysis done to determine if the study had merit revealed the mean 
number of managerial changes for those 26 teams was 13.45, with a standard deviation of 
3.87. The median was 13.5 with modes of 12 and 15. The range was from 21 (Chicago 
Cubs) down to 6 (Los Angles Dodgers). Four teams had more than 17 managerial 
changes (plus one standard deviation) and three had fewer changes than a standard 
deviation below the mean. Such variability further fueled the controversy ignited by 
Grusky (1961, 1963, 1964), Gordon and Becker (1964), and Gamson and Scotch (1964).  
Grand Tour Statement 
 The overriding question was whether MLB manager succession reflected on-field 
success.  
Research Questions 
 This section supports the study’s overriding question and presents eight 
subquestions that guided the investigation, and also provides cursory comments on how 
the questions were answered. The inquiry was whether organizational leaders, as 
personified by MLB managers, made a sufficiently strong enough impact on 
organizational outcomes to warrant believing their contributions were vital to 
productivity.  
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 The vehicle by which the question was addressed involved studying the impact of 
managerial succession on MLB team efficiency (won/loss records) and selected aspects 
of team efficiency. To accomplish the objective necessitated critically analyzing selected 
independent variables across 26 MLB teams for the period of 1985–2003. The null 
hypothesis was stated as: there is no relationship or causal dependence between 
managerial change and team performance. The eight sub-questions are presented below 
with justification for inclusion, and each is followed by a null hypotheses. 
Eight Subquestions 
1. How does the number of managerial changes impact team efficiency as 
measured by won–lost records? This question related to the issue of team 
efficiency and allowed for a comparison to the earlier studies on managerial 
succession by Grutsky (1961, 1963), Gamson and Scotch (1964), and Roberts 
(1959).  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team efficiency as a consequence of 
managerial changes. 
2. How does managerial tenure impact team efficiency? Does the length of time 
a manager spends with a given team have an impact on team efficiency? 
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team efficiency as a result of the 
duration of a manager’s tenure with a team. 
3. How does team OBP impact team efficiency? This statistic reported how often 
batters were able to reach base, as a result of getting a base hit, a walk, or 
being hit by a pitch. It was the relative worth of hitters versus pitchers. The 
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higher the percentage for all hitters the greater was the presumption of a 
team’s efficiency being higher. Extending this to a meaningful conclusion 
resulted in the likelihood of winning more ballgames with a higher team 
efficiency rating. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in on base percentage as a 
consequence of managerial succession. 
4. How does team OBS impact team efficiency? This statistic revealed how well 
players were able to get on base plus the extent of damage done to an 
opposing team by virtue of getting on base. It was presumed that the higher 
the OBS the greater was the likelihood of a team’s efficiency being higher.  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team on base plus slugging 
percentage as a consequence of managerial succession. 
5. How do S9I impact team efficiency? It has been claimed that strikeouts were 
independent of a team’s ability to play defense, and good fortune, because it 
denied opponents the opportunity to put a ball into play. The higher the ratio 
per nine innings the better was the chance for a team to win a ballgame, 
because it kept opponents off the base paths.  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team strikeouts per nine-innings as 
a consequence of managerial succession. 
6. How walks plus hits allowed per inning pitched impact team efficiency 
(WHIP)? This was the number of times an opponent was able to put players 
on base. The lower the number, the fewer chances there were for another team 
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to score runs. Conversely, the higher the ratio the greater was the likelihood 
for opponents to scores runs.  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team WHIP as a consequence of 
managerial succession.  
7. How does SBP impact team efficiency? This statistic was determined by 
comparing the number of attempts to steal a base with the degree of success 
attained. It was a statement of how successful a player or team had been with 
regard to their attempts. Importantly, it discounted the total number of steals 
because that number was apt to be a misleading figure if there were numerous 
unsuccessful attempts. Instead, it was approached as done by Sheehan (2004) 
of Baseball Prospectus. Sheehan claimed a SBP ratio of fewer than 75% was 
not productive because so many present-day teams relied extensively on 
power games (i.e., moving runners along the base paths by virtue of a base hit, 
preferably involving multiple bases, which was the antithesis to “little ball”).  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team SBP as a consequence of 
managerial succession. 
8. How do total team salaries impact the win-loss records? MLB teams with 
extensive financial resources often use such resources in a bully pulpit 
manner. They sought and oftentimes were successful at securing or retaining 
ballplayers best able to help or ensure continued high team efficiency.  
Null Hypothesis: There is no difference in team performance as a consequence 
of total team salaries.  
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Assumptions 
 Several assumptions were inherent with this study. First was the belief it was 
possible to secure all of the requisite information. Accomplishing that objective depended 
upon the expertise of the investigator, who had extensive experience working with online 
repositories and finding evasive information. Next was the issue of the information found 
being accurate. There was no reason to question the validity of such information but 
random crosschecks were made among the various data sources to ensure the information 
culled was accurate. 
Delimitations 
 The American Heritage College Dictionary (1993) defined the prefix /de/ as 
connoting the opposite or reverse of what commonly was expected. With regard to this 
study the delimitations were issues internal to the study. It was conceivable the 
independent variables selected were not accurate representations of predictive variables 
for team efficiency, and if so then the information studied was questionable. It was 
possible the statistical analyses selected were improper for this investigation or were not 
sensitive enough to identify predictive factors. Additionally, it was possible that the 
model used for this investigation was incomplete because of not identifying more and 
possibly stronger predictors of team efficiency. Finally, it was possible the time period 
designated, 19-years, was too restricted to properly support the conclusions. These 
considerations are re-iterated in the conclusions (Chapter Five) and again in the summary 
(Chapter Six). 
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Limitations 
 The conclusions presented might be limited to both the selected variables 
included in this study and the process by which the data was gathered and analyzed. Care 
was exercised to ensure there was justified generalizability of the conclusions but it needs 
to be acknowledged as a possible limitation. Next, it is acknowledged that the 
interpretations rendered were those of the researcher, and possibly interpreted differently 
from other researchers. Care was exercised to ensure such problems did not surface but it 
is the prerogative of scientists to approach research independently, and also issue 
cautions to other scholars whenever appropriate. To obviate that limitation the design, 
manner of data analysis, and interpretation of derived information was validated 
independently by two research design and analysis experts geographically removed.  
 It is important to acknowledge this research addressed an existing problem, 
controversial explanations regarding managerial succession for MLB managers. Further, 
this investigation provided a useful outcome. The information was based on a 
constructive replication of earlier work, because of ambiguous findings, and as such is a 
useful contribution to the scientific literature. Blau (1962) was an early proponent for 
having replication studies, especially when it was possible to test findings in different 
contexts. He advocated continuously engaging in research and refining knowledge about 
organizations and their environments. It was believed that if the findings validated earlier 
work then it solidified those findings If it negated those earlier findings it encouraged 
continued exploration into a vexing issue. Both options serve as a stepping-stone for 
other types of research on this and similar topics. 
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Summary 
 This initial chapter laid the foundation for the study by covering relevant issues in 
nine major sections. The first was the introduction where the issue of a constructive 
replication was presented. A section followed that explained the problem, and in it 
managerial succession and leadership versus management were addressed. Concluding 
that second section were several quotes from Leo Durocher (1975) on the point of a 
baseball team manager’s job being only as secure as the favorable reaction to a team’s 
winning percentage. 
 The third section gave a perspective on salaries of MLB players and how they 
related to other aspects of society. The fourth section commented on the topic of who 
truly was in charge of a MLB team, the team manager or the team general manager, and 
it was stated the power for major decision-making did not rest with a person called the 
team manager. In section five there was material on the relative challenges of managers 
with regard to blending of talents and how such responsibilities related to investments 
made by a team.  
 The sixth section presented definitions pertinent to this study, and in the next 
section (seven) was the rationale for the inquiry. The next part (eighth) reported the grand 
tour question followed by subquestions with associated null hypotheses, and material on 
a preliminary study of average managerial succession rates among MLB teams. The final 
section (ninth) presented the assumptions, delimitations, limitations, and a chapter 
summary. Chapter Two reviews selected and relevant literature related to this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This chapter presents a review of selected and relevant literature to support the 
two foci explained in Chapter One: managerial succession in MLB typically does not 
result in appreciable positive change in a team’s PI (won-loss ration), and that selected 
variables can be identified to predict a team’s efficiency (success reflected by winning 
ballgames). Both allow for segueing into the third chapter (Methods). Both topics are 
pivotal to the research conducted in this study and provide the theoretical background 
justifying the research and basis upon which the independent and dependent variables 
were selected. 
Bryant (2004) pointed out it was important for a researcher to give readers ample 
information in support of the thesis behind the investigation. In this study the objective 
was to determine if selected relationships existed. Material upon which the study was 
predicated is explained in detail, but since that material was published 40-plus-years-age 
there are a number of more current references included as evidence the problem 
continues to be vexing.  
Sequence 
The initial section of this chapter is an explanation of scapegoating: what it 
is, how it developed, and how it has application to MLB. The second section 
addresses the pivotal articles mentioned in Chapter One (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; 
Gordon & Becker, 1964; Grusky, 1961, 1963, 1964; Roberts, 1959). The third major 
section of this chapter addresses material on leadership, management, and 
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organizations. It is important to recognize this topic was not a focus of the study and 
the literature reviewed was done for the purpose of providing readers with a frame of 
reference as they related to MLB managerial succession. The fourth section is an 
overview of MLB since the expansion era. It is followed by a chapter summary. 
The intent of Chapter Two was to lay the foundation for supporting the specific 
research questions and null hypotheses contained in Chapter Three. In so doing Bryant’s 
(2004) recommendation was heeded about providing sufficient and clear support for the 
thesis advanced. A brief summary of the major topics covered in Chapter Two concludes 
the reading and points to the third chapter (Methods). 
Scapegoating 
 This section begins with a description of the term scapegoat, including an 
explanation of its origins and illustration of its application. Toward the latter part of the 
section a connection is made to athletics and commentary is provided on how the term 
has been used in professional sports.  
Origins 
 In its basest form the idea means to focus blame on a person, or a group of 
individuals, or attribute fault to another ostensibly unable to adequately deflect the 
unjustified hostility. It origins presumably arose in Judaic biblical scripture (Book of 
Leviticus) as Allport (1954) explained: 
On the Day of Atonement a live goat was chosen by Lot. The high priest, 
robed in linen garments, laid both his hands on the goat’s head, and 
confessed over it the inequities of the children of Israel. The sins of the 
people thus symbolically transferred to the beast. It was taken out into the 
wilderness and let go. The people felt purged, and for the time being 
guiltless. (p. 244) 
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 But the term has changed, and actually devolved. It now carries the meaning of 
attributing blame for some action(s), event(s), or belief(s) in order described by Allport 
(1954), has become a vehicle for mitigating or removing societal, group, or individual 
guilt or sin and placing it upon another person or persons (Landes, 1994). The shifting of 
an onus and associated refusal to accept the responsibility presumably is rooted in what 
Landes termed “a defense mechanism of denial through projection” (p. 659). Sagan 
(1991) earlier had supported the notion of projecting guilt, while pointing out it tended to 
have destructive consequences on both a recipient and an accepting or acquiescing 
society. He claimed such behaviors were evident in many societies, but in varying 
degrees, and “The normal, expectable expressions—imperialism, racism, sexism, 
aggressive warfare—are compatible with the democratic societies that have existed thus 
far” (p. 363). 
Role Reversal 
Allowing for the fact scapegoating now is considered a process by which there is 
a reversal of roles, between new and generally convenient victims and the persecutors, 
leads to the need for clarifying whether a scapegoat is identified as an individual or a 
group. When the scapegoat is a group, the negative attributes are affixed to the whole 
group. When successful it essentially raised a barrier between persons identified and the 
rest of a society.  
An article that focused on scapegoating as an ideological weapon, retrieved online 
January 8, 2004, explained how conspiracy theories form the foundation for activities 
initiated by groups wanting to coalesce public support. Such efforts typically began with 
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some element of truth and then became distorted, usually by mixing half-truths and 
myths, so the label and not the person became the focus of the intolerance 
(http://www.publiceye.org/tooclose/scapegoating.htm#P9_34). 
Application to Sports 
Using an explanation palatable to professional sports, Knatz (1994) explained 
scapegoating behaviors were a way for dissipating guilt and releasing bent up hostilities. 
Citing Bermann (1974), Knatz (1994) stated, “. . . it was a process by which the most 
expendable family member is singled out to be the receptacle for all those qualities and 
attributers which family members want to deny in themselves” (p. 2). When extrapolated 
to MLB the most expendable family member commonly has been a team manager. It is 
the person identified by the media as being responsible for the day-to-day success or lack 
of success. It is the person responsible for making decisions regarding which players to 
use and when. So, it stands to reason a team manager would be the person most sought to 
become a scapegoat when events do not materialize as hope. 
Managers presumably are the persons entrusted with directing the players to be 
successful, and when the outcomes are not positive the negative attention is focused on a 
most convenient and readily identifiable individual, the manager. Yet, the work of a team 
manager is constrained by the resources available (players on a team) and the effort(s) 
expended by each of the players. In the absence of competitively talented resources, or 
having resources not making maximal efforts, a manager becomes the personification of 
the unsuccessful team. To change the fortunes of such a team and retain the fan bases of 
interest commonly results in a managerial change. Thus a manager likely is a scapegoat 
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for a team’s failures despite the fact other factors probably contributed to the lack of team 
success. 
 The notion of a scapegoat is particularly useful with team efforts, and often has 
been used. It can be applied to individual sports, such as tennis or golf, but it is with a 
team effort that the concept emerges most readily. Sometimes an individual player is 
singled out because the individual was expected to be almost like a superhero in terms of 
accomplishments, and in the absence of identifiable super efforts a team faltered. 
Scapegoating an individual player might prevent recognition of the fact an individual 
truly had been performing as expected but the rest of the team had not been working up 
to expectations.  
Bill Buckner 
One of the best-known examples of scapegoating in MLB was the error 
committed by Bill Buckner of the Boston Red Sox during the 1986 World Series. 
Buckner was the Sox first baseman. He was playing with ankle injuries that severely 
impaired his mobility, but he was a good hitter, which explained why he was in the 
lineup. The Red Sox were leading in the Series, three games to two against the New York 
Mets, but had “squandered” the lead three times. A win would have given the Red Sox 
the World Series title.  
With the game tied in the bottom of the tenth inning, and two outs, the batter was 
Mookie Wilson, a fast runner who had fouled off about 12 pitches. The Mets had come 
back from a two-run deficit and had a runner on second base (Ray Knight). Wilson 
finally hit a groundball to first base. The instant there was contact between the ball and 
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bat the runner on second base ran toward third. Expectations were that Buckner would 
field the ball and either beat Wilson to the first base for the final out of the inning, or hold 
it and prevent the runner (Knight), who then was on third base, from scoring. But the ball 
took a strange bounce and skipped under Buckner’s glove. As it rolled out into the right 
field area, Knight rounded third and scored the winning run. Two nights later the Mets 
won the seventh and final game of the series. 
The outcome was Bill Buckner was scapegoated because the Red Sox lost the 
World Series, and the incident became known as the “Buckner Ball.” Lost in the 
excitement about the ball rolling between Buckner’s legs was the fact the Red Sox had 
been leading in that sixth game on three occasions. Also lost was that in the bottom of the 
tenth inning, when the infamous error happened, was the fact the Red Sox had a one-run 
lead and changed pitchers (removing Calvin Schiraldi and bringing in Bob Stanley). With 
two outs and runners on first and third, the new pitcher (Stanley) proceeded to throw a 
wild pitch. It enabled the Mets runner on third base to score and the runner on first to 
advance to second. Absent that wild pitch the Mets would have been trailing by a run 
with men on first and third, and two outs. How a different situation might have 
influenced subsequent events is speculative. But the pitching change had been made, the 
wild pitch thrown, the Mets tied the game, and the runner on first base (Ray Knight) had 
moved over to second base.  
Others might have filled the scapegoat role (either of the two Red Sox pitchers, 
especially the one who threw the wild pitch, the Red Sox catcher who missed the ball, or 
even the Red Sox manager for making the decision to change pitchers, allowing the Mets 
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to come back three times during the game, and for having Buckner play first base during 
that time). During a 20-year career as a professional ball player, Buckner played first base 
in 1,555 games and made just 128 errors in 13,901 chances. Despite winning a batting 
title and having an outstanding fielding average (.992), he is remembered as the man who 
let the Mets win the 1986 World Series. Reportedly the ball he missed, which presumably 
cost the Red Sox the game, was sold at an auction for $93,000 (retrieved January 6, 2005 
from www.thebestlinks.com/Scapegoating.html). The manager for the 1986 Red Sox was 
John McNamara, and he continued in his position until the middle of the 1988 season, 
when he was fired for having a PI of just .506 during the first 85 games. 
Ralph Branca 
 Branca was the pitcher for the Brooklyn Dodgers when they lost the 1951 final 
game of the best of the three-game series to the new York Giants. Ahead by a score of  
4–2 in the bottom of the ninth inning, and with two outs, Branca was brought in to relieve 
Don Newcombe. He gave up a home run to Bobby Thompson and the Giants went to the 
World Series representing the National League.  
Why Branca became the scapegoat is not clear because the Dodgers’ Manager 
(Charlie Dressen) made the decision to change pitchers in the bottom of the ninth inning. 
Another possibility for a scapegoat could have been Don Newcombe, who had allowed 
two men to reach base that inning. Possibly the Dodger catcher, Roy Campanella, could 
have been the scapegoat because he called for the pitch when it was widely suspected the 
Giants had been stealing the Dodgers’ signs, and Thompson was known to have good 
success hitting the type of pitch Campanella called. But, Branca was identified by the 
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media as the person who gave up the homerun ball to Bobby Thompson, and has been 
linked as the villain to the “shot heard around the world,” since October 3, 1951.  
Other Sports Examples 
During the XXV Super Bowl, held in January of 1991, the Buffalo Bills were 
trailing the New York Giants, 20–19. With eight seconds left on the game clock, Scott 
Norwood came on the field to kick what seemed to be the winning field goal for the 
Buffalo Bills, but the ball went to right of the goal posts. Norwood was blamed for the 
Bills losing the Super Bowl, despite the fact the Bills had managed to control the ball less 
than 20-minutes during the entire game, and for less than eight-minutes during the second 
half. Nobody pointed a finger at the inept Buffalo defense, at the defensive coordinator, 
or the offensive personnel who had scored 95-points during their two prior playoff games 
(Super Bowl Recaps, 2005). 
Two more examples of scapegoating in sports are worth mentioning. The first was 
the title of an article written by Ben Cutrell and published in the daily Texan–Sports on 
9/15/04. It was entitled “Scapegoating Davis is Austin’s favorite pastime,” and referred to 
the Offensive Coordinator for the University of Texas football team. The basis was the 
University of Texas’ lack of a consistent offense. Another example of scapegoating, and 
one illustrating how it can take ugly turns, was a story about a South American football 
player (soccer). Accidentally the player kicked the ball into the net of his team and thus 
scored a point for the opposition. A disgruntled fan killed him (Cutrell, 2004). 
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Summary 
 The concept of scapegoating revolves around displaced blame. It is a tactic used 
volitionally, as evidenced by the several examples from politics, but sometimes emerges 
in what seems to be a spontaneous manner. But there is little question the media has great 
influence on its development and power. 
Pivotal Studies 
In 1963 Grusky published findings from a comparative organizational analysis of 
managerial succession among 16 MLB teams during two periods of time; 1921–1941 and 
1951–1958. His thesis was clubs with the poorest performances had the greatest amount 
of turnover among team managers. In essence, lack of success on the baseball diamond 
was attributed to apparent ineptitude of respective managers.  
Grusky 
 In 1963, Grusky’s manuscript entitled “Managerial Succession and 
Organizational Effectiveness” was published in the American Journal of Sociology. 
Using ten variables culled from organizational theory, as reported in his 1961 
manuscript (Corporate Size, Bureaucratization, and Managerial Succession) Grusky 
studied the productivity indices (won-lost records) of 16 MLB Teams and their 
respective changes in team managers during two periods of time; 1921–1941 and 
1951–1958. He reported “A negative correlation is found between (1) rates of 
managerial succession and effectiveness and (2) change in succession rate and 
change in organizational effectiveness. . . .” (p. 21). Those points further were 
explained as meaning teams with higher rates of managerial change were the ones 
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with poorer records of performance (i.e., more losses than wins). Extrapolating from 
that position he claimed teams displaying low productivity indices (poor 
effectiveness in terms of winning games) were the ones that should be expected to 
have higher rates of managerial change.  
The Study 
 Prior to embarking upon the study, Grusky (1963) cited published facts about 
rates of managerial succession being positively related to the size of an organization 
(Caplow, 1957; Grusky, 1961) in business organizations, and selected public agencies. A 
stated concern was organizations presenting different authority structures tended to 
respond differently to personnel changes. He identified the need for ensuring the entities 
studied provided “. . . reliable and valid measures of rates of administrative succession 
and organizational effectiveness” (p. 21), and pointed out that MLB teams satisfied those 
requirements. The two hypotheses were framed so as to avoid attributing causality to 
either team effectiveness or managerial succession: (a) there was a negative correlation 
between administrative succession rates and degrees of organizational effectiveness; and 
(b) there was a negative correlation between rates of change in administrative succession 
and an organization’s effectiveness.  
Gathering information from secondary sources, records books and other available 
published data sources; Grusky (1963) analyzed the number of team managerial changes 
during the two time periods with emphasis upon the length of tenure for respective 
managers. His measure for determining organizational success was a team’s won and lost 
record at the end of a season; stated as being analogous to a PI for business. The PI was 
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viewed as a measure of financial success for respective teams, with greater profitability 
associated with higher spectator attendance numbers. (Note the similarity of the PI to the 
material reported earlier in chapter one from Zimbalest’s article on Pedro Martinez (New 
York Times, December 19, 2004)). Of note is Grusky included the St. Louis Browns and 
Baltimore Orioles as one team since the franchise moved from first city to the second 
prior to the 1954 season.  
During the first period of the study, 1921–1941, Grusky (1963) said there was a 
negative correlation of -.40 between managerial succession and final standing for a team. 
During the second period, 1951–1958, the negative correlation was notably greater at  
-.60. Thus changes did not lead to improved team performances but in fact resulted in 
less efficient performances; a poorer PI. The difference between the two time frames was 
not addressed, but it could be presumed during the earlier time there was greater parity 
among teams, particularly since the sport of MLB was barely beyond a period of what 
Grusky termed adolescent development.  
By the time of the second period (1951–1958), and after World War II, MLB had 
emerged into a business involving teams moving because of better markets, television 
was a medium for bringing the game into the homes of many if not most Americans, and 
the pressure for success on the baseball diamond had increased. Another important fact 
was just one person, Connie Mack who also owned the team, managed the Philadelphia 
Athletics of the 1921–1941 era, a consistent second division finisher. After Mack left the 
team there were numerous managerial changes to the Athletics between 1951 and 1958. 
To support the contention about an inverse relationship between successes on the ball 
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field and managerial changes, Grusky pointed out the New York Yankees had been 
successful during both time frames and had few such changes.  
Citing research by Georgopoulos and Tannenbaum (1957) on measures of 
organizational effectiveness being similar among similarly structured entities, Grusky 
(1963) said team standing was a justifiable criterion for determining team effectiveness 
and that it related to a team’s financial profitability. The productivity indicator PI was 
viewed as a measure of financial success for respective teams, with greater profitability 
associated with higher spectator attendance numbers.  
Attendance 
In support of the claim about team effectiveness, team profitability, and fan 
attendance being intimately related, Grusky (1963) reported his study allowed for stating 
there was a strong and positive correlation between a team’s final standing and its annual 
attendance. Using data from the two periods and then combining them, he said for the 
first time frame (1921–1941) the rates of succession using the nonparametric Kendall’s 
tau rank-order correlation was T = .60, p < .0007. For the second time frame (1951–1958) 
the same analysis resulted in a T = .44, p. < .009, and when the two periods were 
combined the finding was T = .58, p < .001. All of the findings were highly significant, 
meaning the PI and annual attendance were related.  
Effectiveness 
Thus the first hypothesis (there was a negative correlation between administrative 
succession rates and degrees of organizational effectiveness) strongly was supported. The 
second hypothesis (there was a negative correlation between rates of change in 
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administrative succession and an organization’s effectiveness) was tested by studying the 
changes in managers between the two periods of time, the tenure of a manager with a 
given team, and a team’s relative efficiency as determined by its won-lost record and 
final standing. Grusky (1963) articulated the issue as one of determining whether teams 
with shorter managerial tenure rates were more or less successful during the respective 
time frames. He said that during the second period, the eight teams with increased rates 
of managerial succession evidenced poorer productivity indices (won-lost ratios), and the 
two teams with lower succession rates improved their efficiency (better won-loss ratios). 
Grusky’s Conclusions 
Grusky’s (1963) conclusions were as follows. Teams displaying a lack of success 
on the ball field had a smaller number of spectators attending games, and their 
profitability indices declined. With recognition for the pressures exerted by an 
organization to have winning records and high seasonal standings, the pressure for 
managerial changes increased because there needed to be a demonstration of taking some 
action to rectify the inefficient team performance, or poor won–lost records. Another 
reason for managerial changes was to demonstrate to spectators there was management 
concern over a team’s performance, or perhaps just to appease the sport fans. Grusky 
included the following personal communication from Brandmeyer as an explanation how 
such actions sometimes were done with an eye toward placating audiences (p. 30).  
Although officially the manager may be held responsible for a team’s poor 
showing, the fact that managers frequently are hired later by other clubs 
would suggest that their alleged ineptness is partly a screen. It is not easy 
for the front office to resist public pressures even if they might feel that 
the decision to replace the manager is unwise. The case of Mike Higgins 
and the Boston Red Sox is instructive, for it is one where the owner really 
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did not want to fire the manager but did so anyway. Yawkey, the owner, 
and Higgins, the manager, were the best of friends. Yet a few years back 
when the Red Sox were doing very poorly, Yawkey gave in to public 
criticism and replaced Higgins. However, he kept Higgins on in the rather 
vague position of “troubleshooter.” When the team still did poorly under 
Billy Jurgens, Higgins was rehired. A new manager at least provides the 
fans with some hope for the coming season. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Grusky (1963) was not looking to identify causality, and 
mentioned that it was not possible to do so considering how the data were analyzed. 
Furthermore, he pointed out there were other factors to consider before any such cause 
and effect might be suggested, such as the differences between home and away games, 
configurations of respective ballparks as they might have influenced the talents of 
players, relative population base where a team played (home and away), gender and age 
of potential fans, and the number of other professional sports teams in the geographic 
area, especially baseball teams. 
Gamson and Scotch 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) contested Grusky’s (1963) report on the grounds he 
did not fully explore alternative explanations for managerial succession, nor did he 
present adequate empirical data to substantiate his claims. The two researchers 
acknowledged Grusky used virtually homogeneous organizations because the respective 
teams were so similar with respect to goals, operation, and administrative structure; 
oftentimes a very difficult point to control in research. But, they claimed the fact Grusky 
did not identify or at least suggest other explanations for managerial succession was a 
simplistic explanation, and encouraged critics to wonder if the study was flawed. In 
support of their critique, Gamson and Scotch (1964) said the Grusky (1963) so-called 
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common sense explanation (baseball teams performing poorly change managers more 
frequently) or one-way causality theory, and another one they posited, were testable with 
little apparent difficulty.  
Supporting the Gamson and Scotch (1964) contention about Grusky’s (1963) 
conclusion was the Gordon and Becker (1964) report in which those latter authors  
re-examined the work published as “Organizational Size and Managerial Succession” 
(Grusky, 1961). As a forerunner, earlier research by Roberts (1959) had studied the 
relationships between an organization’s size and the rate of change among managers 
during a period of three-years. At the time, the Roberts sample was described as 
encompassing the largest companies in the country. When holding selected variables 
constant (age, compensation, and others undefined but presumably important) it was 
claimed there were no apparent relationships between organizational size and rates of 
succession. Thus it was to be construed that large, medium, and small-sized organizations 
engaged in managerial changes for reasons peculiar to their circumstances.  
But Grusky (1961) claimed there was a direct relationship, and provided 
supporting data from a 10-year study on what he termed were 500 of the largest 
companies in the country. Grusky reported on succession rates for the following five 
corporate positions: board chairman, president, secretary, comptroller, and treasurer. He 
stated the frequency of administrative change was directly related to the size of an 
organization. The larger an organization the more frequent were the changes in 
administrative roles. Data for his study was second-hand because he used published 
reports allowing comparisons between and among firms, but was not able to determine 
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the number of changes within a given office. The absence of primary data might have 
been a serious delimitation to Grusky’s work, especially since that was not acknowledged 
as an issue. 
Kriesberg 
Kriesberg (1962) supported Grusky (1961, 1963) using information from his 
research on public health departments and state and local health agencies. He compared 
state-wide agencies with more than 500 employees to those having fewer than 500; a 
specific cut-off figure was not given, and then did the same with local agencies having 
more and less than 30 employees. His conclusion was length of time in a position 
generally was inversely related to an organization’s size; the larger an entity the more 
frequent were the changes in employee roles.  
Kriesberg’s (1962) work was published as a report entitled “Mental Health and 
Public Health Personnel in the Fifty States.” In it he stated local and state agencies tended 
to have different programs, but importantly it was common for both to be components of 
an encompassing state agency. Furthermore, allowing for the requirement persons filling 
CEO positions in various state governmental agencies generally needed to meet certain 
professional criteria, most such positions tended to be filled by political appointments, 
and it was reasonable to expect such appointments to be more itinerant than for persons 
working at “lower” levels of a state organization (i.e., individuals heading local or 
regional offices within a state).  
On that basis, Kriesberg (1962) claimed that individuals heading local (smaller) 
agencies would be expected to have longer tenure in a position than those filled by 
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political appointment, and his results were supportive of that fact. The data he reported 
was that three of every four organizational heads, with 30 or more subordinates, had been 
in their position for less than two-years. In contrast, just one of every nine organizational 
heads from smaller entities presented such a record. Within his conclusions was the 
statement “. . . greater size necessitates increased bureaucratization and this, in turn, 
increases the likelihood that succession will be rationally treated by being routinized”  
(p. 359). With that last statement Kriesberg used earlier work on executive succession by 
Trow (1961) to buttress his claim.  
Trow 
A study by Trow (1960), on “Membership Succession and Team Performance,” 
claimed the average performances from 12 MLB teams with the lowest rates of 
managerial succession were significantly superior to the 12 teams with the highest rates 
of change. Also, Trow claimed that when a team’s rate of managerial succession 
exceeded what was defined as the average rate of variability, the PI decreased. Thus the 
issue of variability in succession rates was important. Grusky (1963) claimed that the 
similarity in findings between Trow’s (1960) and his work reinforced the support of his 
second hypothesis: there was a negative correlation between rates of change in 
administrative succession and an organization’s effectiveness.  
Demarcation 
The line of demarcation had been established with organization size on one side 
and undefined factors on the other. Kriesberg (1965) later replied to Gordon and Becker 
(1964) pointing out those researchers apparent inability to substantiate Grusky’s (1961) 
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earlier conclusions, about organizational size and rates of succession, apparently 
encouraged them to (incorrectly) extrapolate and view his (Kriesberg, 1965) research 
similarly. He then clarified why the findings in his study were valid, but also couched his 
remarks by saying a replication study, using more data, over a longer duration, and with 
better controls might provide useful information and perhaps justify modifications or 
perhaps even contradicting his earlier findings. Also such studies conceivably would 
provide definitive evidence of relationships between agencies or organization size and 
duration of service by a CEO, if they existed.  
Skepticism  
Gordon and Becker (1964) pointed out when there was a re-examination of 
Kriesberg’s (1962) data, according to whether an organization was a mental health or a 
public health agency, it led to different conclusions; highest rates of succession in mental 
health agencies occurred with both the largest and smallest groups but with public health 
agencies the second largest groups had the lowest rate of succession. As a consequence, 
the researchers said they were appropriately skeptical about Kriesberg’s conclusions, but 
were not inclined to discount them totally. They couched their concerns by saying 
potential relationships between organizational size and rates of succession likely should 
be studied over a longer time span. Roberts (1959) had studied succession rates for three 
years and Grutsky (1961) had done it for ten years. Conceivably, definitive evidence of 
relationships, if they existed, would become evident from carefully executed studies 
covering longer periods of time. 
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Faced with apparently contradictory facts from Roberts (1959), Grusky (1961) 
and Kriesberg (1962), Gordon and Becker (1964) critically reviewed the methodology 
and inferences from each of the three researchers. They said the Roberts study was 
without substantive methodological weakness, and tacitly supported his claims, but the 
other two studies (Grusky and Kriesberg) allowed for questioning the conclusions posted.  
After reanalyzing the data from those latter two studies, Gordon and Becker 
(1964) resolved it was not possible to support or refute the claims posited. In an effort to 
clarify the inconsistency between the Roberts (1959) position (no apparent relationship 
between organization size and managerial succession) and those from Grusky (1961) and 
Kriesberg (1962) (a relationship did exist), Gordon and Becker (1964) elected to study 
rates of succession among executives from middle-ranked companies; Forbes 1959 
rankings of companies numbered 54 through 445, using Grusky’s (1961) procedures. 
Gordon and Becker (1964) replicated Grusky’s (1961) study and found small but 
reportedly disturbing differences. The net effect was to raise more questions about the 
validity of the claim of there being a direct relationship between organization size and 
rate of succession among executives. In fact, Gordon and Becker (1964) said executive 
succession rate was not direct nor simply explained by organization size, and then 
claimed the value of their work, in seeking to clarify the Grusky (1961) claims, was to 
refocus future scholars. Grusky (1964) subsequently replied to Gordon and Becker (1964) 
acknowledging limitations in his earlier study and also pointed out how additional 
research might be conducted. 
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Effectiveness Versus Succession 
 Readers of the Grusky (1963) study could consider the important independent 
variable to be either team effectiveness or rate of managerial succession, because it was 
not clarified in the article. Again, it is worthwhile to realize he was careful to avoid 
creating any belief of causality, and reiterated that there was just an association between 
the two. But, Grusky suggested it might be plausible to believe that one of those two 
independent variables, such as rate of succession, could be viewed as both a cause for and 
result of team effectiveness. It was termed a common-sense explanation (a manager was 
fired because a team was not performing acceptably) and considered consistent with the 
finding there was a negative correlation between effectiveness and succession.  
Arguing for consideration of careful empirical testing of the explanation, and for 
reflecting upon other possible explanations (Nagel, 1961), Grusky (1963) admitted 
accepting the common-sense explanation would carry many deficiencies generally 
associated with claims about common knowledge. Primarily, it would lack the scientific 
support required to comfortably generalize the findings.  
Alternative Hypothesis 
To circumvent potential liabilities associated with proclaiming a conclusion 
lacking scientific data, Grusky (1963) presented a rationale for an alternative hypothesis. 
One that related effectiveness and succession and he supported it with earlier published 
research claiming succession indeed influenced effectiveness (Gouldner, 1954; Hamblin, 
1958; Trow, 1962). He analyzed rates of succession and organizational effectiveness with 
a graphic illustration of a network depicting presumed interrelationships creating 
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managerial strain (“Amount of tension with which a person is confronted as a result of 
occupying a particular office in an organization” pp. 26-27). Grusky’s (1963) claim was 
that the degree of strain experienced by a manager would be inversely related to an 
organization’s effectiveness, because the two had a reciprocal effect. Lower stress was 
associated with greater organizational efficiency. Greater organizational efficiency 
translated into successful team performances and because it led to a manager being 
viewed favorably there was less tension on a manager. A reproduction of the model is 
presented in Figure 1.  
But, the diagram provided for considering two interesting options to such 
interrelationships. The first was too little stress could be related to a position with 
minimal challenge, which could be a result of lacking incentive to succeed. The second 
was instances when the managerial strain either was too great or too low and a manager 
volitionally opted to leave. Citing work on managerial strain and degree of supervision, 
(Blau & Scott, 1962), Grusky (1963) said it should be expected that managers 
experiencing greater strain likely would be those being more closely supervised, and such 
organizations likely would experience higher rates of succession. 
Managerial Strain 
The primary sources for managerial strain came from: (a) the apparent 
discrepancy between responsibility and authority, with the latter generally being held for 
a team’s general manager, and (b) the perceptions of a team by its fan base and 
inclination to scapegoat a manager for poor efficiency. Interestingly, Grusky (1963)  
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Figure 1. Organizational factors in team performance 
 
acknowledged the limitations of a manager’s ability to influence team performance when 
he explained, “. . . he depends . . . upon the front office for assistance by providing a 
strong farm system and advantageous trades, and, at all times, upon the quality of 
performance of the lower-level members of the hierarchy, the players. If they perform 
well, his position is secure; if they do not, it is in jeopardy” (p. 27). This point was stated 
earlier, in Chapter One, with the references to Leo Durocher. 
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Extending that explanation, Grusky (1963) pointed out ballplayers, in many ways, 
operated independently from managerial control. Their performances probably dictated 
when a manager inserted them into a lineup but the level of effort expended by each 
player and success enjoyed by a team could and did vary, oftentimes through no 
influence from a manager.  
Thus a ballplayer was viewed as more of an entrepreneur, essentially in business 
for self without upward mobility in the organizational sense. Any upward mobility would 
be in terms of monetary compensation and popularity among fans. Both were issues 
beyond the influence of conventional baseball managers, who were deemed to be more 
like a bureaucrat, working for an administration, and subjected to an administration’s 
apparent capriciousness with regard to tenure. Invariably, players developed relationships 
with managers, sometimes good and sometimes not good, and any change in the role of a 
team manger was apt to disrupt patterns of behavior between and among individuals. 
New organizational interactions were apt to influence how a team operated, which was 
revealed in its performance index.  
Camouflaged 
The difference between baseball team managerial succession and what occurred 
in other managerial domains was the audience, or clientele, normally had greater access 
and generally was more knowledgeable about a baseball team. The corporate world often 
was camouflaged by layers of administration and obscured by marketing and advertising 
to the degree few knew what was happening with a given organization, and the clientele 
usually was not disposed to inquire. But, because a MLB team represented a 
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community/region, it tended to elicit chauvinistic responses from its followers, and teams 
wanted to maintain and increase such responses. Efficiency ratings, as defined by won-
loss ratios, were transparent to most interested persons and it was incumbent upon a 
team’s administration to curry such favor, or risk the loss of fan support, which translated 
into a lack of fiscal support.  
Goode on Role Strain 
 A few years before Grusky (1963/1964) presented the managerial strain 
paradigm, Goode (1960) explained that different societal structures were organized 
according to role relationships, which in turn complied with role transactions. Using 
language suited for sociological and psychological audiences, Goode stated a person 
filling a defined role normally would be expected to make sincere efforts to perform the 
role in a manner to best meet the interests and needs of the society. But there were 
instances when the best efforts and most sincere intentions failed to enable a person to 
adequately serve the society. Sometimes the failure was due to a society’s reluctance to 
give more resources. Sometimes the failure was a consequence of the person in a role not 
having resources that were adequate. Sometimes the failure was due to the person in a 
role not being adequate for the role. 
 Applying Goode’s (1960) ideas to MLB manages, and in particular to 
Grusky’s (1959) ideas on strain, allowed for the following observations. In a 
scenario such as the first condition, society’s unwillingness to give more resources, 
the analogy would be a team’s upper-level management either not being able to 
attract the needed players, or perhaps a decision influenced by the management 
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deciding to redirect financial resources into other directions (i.e., not baseball). 
Conceivably players becoming too expensive to retain or attract could stimulate it. 
For the second condition, not having adequate or sufficient resources, a manager 
might be required to perform duties and discharge responsibilities knowing the 
resources were not comparable to those presented by other teams (i.e., players 
immature or past their prime, or perhaps simply not equal to the best players). In a 
third instance, a person not being equal to the task, a person might be performing in a 
role with professional knowledge or personnel skills too limiting for exacting 
maximum performance from the resources (i.e., players). Each situation could be 
expected to foster strain on a manager, with the result being the society’s 
expectations (i.e., team upper management and fan base) voicing dissatisfaction.  
According to Goode (1960), the social structure determined the degree of 
freedom allowed such a manager, and in most instances it became increasingly 
constrained. A system of interconnected social networks existed beyond the 
immediate relationship of a manager and a team’s administrative hierarchy, “. . . and 
these third parties have both a direct and an indirect interest in their roles 
transaction” (p. 495). Demands from one or more third parties might require 
punishment for failure to perform; with the result being a manager got fired. “Under 
this conception of role interaction the bargains which some individuals make will be 
consistently disadvantageous to them. . . .” Following this line of reasoning led to the 
belief it would be a matter of time before a MLB manager was fired, because of the 
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inability to mitigate strain (Grusky, 1964). Again, reference is drawn to the 
comments from Leo Durocher presented early in Chapter One. 
Grusky’s Earlier Work 
 The research Grusky (1963) cited as the basis for information on 
organizational variables influencing managerial succession was conducted when he 
was a Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow in Business and the Social Sciences. 
He focused on what was termed “studies of the largest and smallest business 
corporations among the top 500” (Grusky, 1961, p. 261). In a series of two 
investigations he studied whether relationships existed between the size of a 
corporation and the degree to which it experienced administrative changes, and then 
he studied the apparent nature of such relationships. 
First Study 
Using secondary sources culled from lists prepared by the 1959 edition of Fortune 
Magazine, Grusky (1961) identified the 26-largest and 27-smallest corporations from the 
list of 500 largest business corporations, determined on the basis of net sales and number 
of employees. He clarified the selection process by pointing out that requisite data was 
not available on three corporations and so he deleted them from his population, and 
subsequently studied 25 in each of the two groups. 
Subjecting his information to statistical analyses, using Chi Square and  
two-tailed tests for statistical significance (nonparametrics), Grusky (1961) said change at 
the top of corporations was done with greater frequency among the larger institutions 
(positions of board chairman, president, treasurer, controller, secretary). Acknowledging 
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that age (significantly related to change, p < .01) likely influenced succession among the 
two top positions, board chairman and president, an attempt was made to control for that 
factor.  
He reported the average ages of board chairmen were slightly greater among the 
smaller corporations but their presidents were notably younger (50.2 versus 54.6 years-
of-age). Median ages distinguished what was termed young and old, which led to four 
groups; older versus younger board chairmen, and older versus younger presidents. 
Despite the relative small numbers in each group, Grusky (1961) claimed consistency in 
terms of succession with older personnel changing more often, and that it was more 
frequent among the larger corporations. Thus age of incumbent and size of institution 
were positively related to the frequency of succession. 
 In an almost parenthetical way, Grusky (1961) mentioned that the position of 
institution vice-president also was examined. He found that the number of such 
persons seemingly was related directly to the size of an entity; more vice-presidents 
with increasing size, and a pronounced growth in such positions occurred during the 
12-year period of time before the study was published. 
Second Study 
 Citing the distinct advantage of using secondary data because of their 
permanency, thus enabling other researchers to re-visit the information, Grusky (1961) 
explained his second study included corporations falling into the next tier of 26-largest 
(numbers 28 through 53 in terms of total size) being compared with those in the next 28 
smallest institutions (numbers 446 through 473 in total size). Reportedly it was necessary 
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to engage in “. . . a watering down of the magnitude of the independent variable” 
(frequency of succession) (p. 264) because the corporations were becoming increasingly 
similar. 
 The findings were claimed as being consistent with those in the first study 
(Grusky, 1961). Ignoring the position of vice-president, there was a higher degree of 
change among the larger corporations than in the smaller ones, and when controlling for 
the age factor among board chairpersons and presidents the results supported the earlier 
work; higher frequency of change among larger entities. Importantly, Grusky said 
statistically significant findings were not found on all analyses but that there was 
consistency in the direction of changes. Allowing for possible influences from 
intervening variables (relatively small sample size, organizational homogeneity, 
correlational bias), he said the findings were to be viewed merely as suggestive. Yet, in 
the next sentence, Grusky stated, “Despite these reservations, the data presented strongly 
support the proposition that frequency of administrative succession is directly related to 
the size of the organization” (p. 263). 
Explanations  
 Citing Blau’s (1956) work on organizations, Grusky (1961) said bureaucracy was 
the feature best distinguishing large from small organizations, and the bigger ones tended 
to rely more upon rules and hierarchical structures to enhance effectiveness. The result 
was increased depersonalization. A citation from Max Weber (1947) was used by Grusky 
to explain potential problems from allowing depersonalization in larger organizations. 
It is this need which gives bureaucracy a crucial role in our 
society as the central element in any kind of large-scale 
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administration. Only by a reversion in every field—political, 
religious, economic, etc.—to small-scale organizations would it 
be possible to any considerable extent to escape its influence. 
(p. 338) 
 
 The size of an organization thus was seen as indicative of the extent to which 
bureaucratization likely occurred, with less being present in smaller entities. But, in such 
circumstances the health of a corporation tended to be synonymous with that of its chief 
executive(s) because much of administration usually was centralized. Among larger 
corporations there was a cushioning effect when succession occurred at the very top 
levels, probably because rules and policies existed and personnel functioned more as 
pieces within a larger whole. Thus pieces could be replaced without disrupting the 
ongoing activities. Grusky referred to Galbriath’s (1958, p. 102) statement: 
In the large organization even the risks associated with the 
selection of leadership are reduced. Organization replaces 
individual authority; no individual is powerful enough to do 
much damage. Were it otherwise, the stock market would pay 
close attention to the retirements, deaths, and replacements in the 
executive ranks of the largest corporations. In fact, it ignores such 
details in tacit recognition that the organization is independent.  
 
 On the basis of prior literature and his findings, Grusky (1961) claimed it was 
appropriate to say succession frequency was related to the size of an organization, and 
extent to which an organization was arranged hierarchically with apportioned 
responsibility, rules and policies. Greater size and more structure were associated with 
more change. But it was important to recognize such circumstances did not create the 
extent of instability often found among smaller institutions, where a CEO was almost a 
personification of an organization. This last comment should not be lost because of how 
readily it can be applied to MLB managers. 
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Pervasiveness 
 Again, using Weber (1947) and Galbriath (1958) as support, Grusky (1961) said 
his data supported the claim institutional effectiveness, as measured by profitability 
between percentages of investments and sales, or gross and net income, was greater for 
the larger corporations. A key issue for Grusky was the possibility the larger 
organizations were able to mitigate disruptions due to succession because they had rules 
and policies in place, and personnel served more as pieces to the whole and were not a 
part of centralized activities. Grusky termed such successions, in the larger entities, as 
“strategic replacements,” and even when a new “team” accompanied top-level changes it 
did not impact most of an organization’s personnel.  
The same was not said for smaller organizations, because a chain-reaction tended 
to result. In those instances, he said, a new CEO likely would want familiar personnel to 
ensure ideas and policies were implemented. In the absence of making such changes a 
new CEO was exposed and vulnerable. The analogy to baseball was the act of replacing a 
manager but not coaches, trainers, or any of the players. 
 To answer the question about extent of change among large and small 
organizations, Grusky (1961) re-examined his data. First he noted the extent of authority 
was appreciable when considering a board chairperson and president. It was not nearly as 
pervasive when considering a secretary, treasurer, and comptroller. Referring to earlier 
literature (Gordon, 1945) on who might represent an institution as its CEO, Grusky 
(1961) declared that succession of board chairpersons or presidents were tantamount to 
major successions, while the other administrators were viewed as reflecting minor 
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successions. His hypothesis was that a positive relationship existed between major and 
minor successions in the smaller organizations but not in the larger ones. 
Extrapolation 
 Using Fisher’s Exact Test (one-tail) Grusky (1961) claimed statistically 
significant levels of probability were found for major and minor succession but only for 
the smaller firms. Thus when a CEO changed at a smaller firm it was likely there would 
be changes also among other top management personnel. Parenthetically, it bears noting 
this information could be extrapolated and applied to MLB teams, because they fit the 
explanation of smaller entities. 
 Grusky (1961) reiterated that his findings were suggestive and not definitive with 
regard to “the potential importance of organizational size as a factor which mediates 
social processes in complex systems” (p. 269). Participants in larger organizations 
apparently learned the rules and policies accompanying a chain of command, and 
modifications in personnel generally had minimal or no consequence to an entity’s 
efficiency and effectiveness. Further, for such organizations to maintain and improve 
their ability and performance, it was necessary they be flexible. It was the flexibility 
aspect that Grusky claimed led to succession, and the existence of a bureaucracy 
minimized or negated any disruptions. Smaller organizations did not enjoy the same 
benefits. Thus they tended to be more vulnerable to disruptions and impaired efficiency. 
Again attention can be drawn to how such thinking applied to MLB managerial 
succession. 
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Gamson and Scotch 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) contested Grusky’s (1963) report on the grounds he 
did not fully explore alternative explanations for managerial succession, nor did he 
present adequate empirical data to substantiate his claims. The two researchers 
acknowledged Grusky used virtually homogeneous organizations (MLB teams) because 
the respective teams were so similar with respect to goals, operation, and administrative 
structure; oftentimes a very difficult point to control in research. But, they claimed the 
fact Grusky had not identified or at least suggested other explanations for managerial 
succession led to the belief he had provided a simplistic explanation for his findings, and 
encouraged critics to wonder if the study was flawed. In support of their critique, Gamson 
and Scotch (1964) said the Grusky (1963) so-called common sense explanation (baseball 
teams performing poorly change managers more frequently) or one-way causality theory, 
and another one they posited were testable with little apparent difficulty.  
Talented 
Two issues identified by Gamson and Scotch (1964), during their discussion of 
the manager’s role led to expanding the job description for a MLB team manager. First 
they claimed it was likely a highly competent manager could be entrusted with the 
development of talented but young players. In such an instance success had to be 
determined by means other than an immediate winning percentage on the playing field. In 
such instances the long-term objective took precedence and future success was sought in 
lieu of an immediate winning percentage. The second issue was to reflect upon the fact 
there was somewhat of a finite pool from which managers were selected; a point made 
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earlier in this chapter with Grusky’s (1963) reference to the Brandmeyer personal 
communication. 
Some managers were people who had been fired by other teams. Others were 
coaches who moved up to the role of manager. The constant among all managers seemed 
to be people experienced with the sport, but the level of experience and extent of major 
league play apparently was not critical. Also not factored into conversation was the 
apparent level of talent on respective baseball teams. Joe Torre of the New York Yankees 
was an excellent example of an eminently successful modern-day baseball manager, but 
he was managing with his fourth team (New York Mets, 1977–81; Atlanta Braves, 1982-
84; St. Louis Cardinals, 1990–95; New York Yankees, 1996–present). The authors stated:  
. . . there is a pool of former managers, frequently employed as coaches by 
various teams, who are usually called upon when changes are to be made. 
Most of these coaches were fired from their positions as managers, 
presumably because they failed to produce winning teams. Such recruiting 
practices strongly suggest the interchangeability of mangers and the 
improbability of explaining variance in team performance by anything the 
field manager does. (Gamson & Scotch, 1964, p. 70) 
 
A Third Explanation 
Using the premise of there being relatively little difference among the talents of 
MLB managers, the Grusky (1963) claim of a correlation existing between managerial 
succession and team performance justifiably became suspect. Grusky’s (1961) earlier 
report on executive succession subsequently was questioned by Gordon and Becker 
(1964), and shown to be wanting. The conclusions claimed were not supported by a re-
examination of both the data and the process used for the study. Consequently, his 
conclusion about MLB managerial changes was deemed vulnerable, especially given the 
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critiques of Gamson and Scotch (1964). Those two authors claimed the firing of a 
manager exemplified the ritual termed scapegoating; an activity presumably engaged in 
to alleviate anxiety despite the realization, by some or many of the participants. The act 
was just a convenient way to place blame on a less fortunate or more convenient member 
of a tribe. It was tantamount to offering a sacrifice in hopes of appeasing mythical gods 
and at least temporarily deflecting attention from a need for internal improvement and/or 
re-organization.  
Questionable Successions 
Gordon and Becker (1964) claimed a limitation in Grusky’s (1961) work was the 
manner by which he studied the successions. Grusky examined four groups, each with 25 
companies, during two studies. The succession comparisons were the largest companies 
to the smallest, and the second largest against the next to smallest companies. He 
regarded each of the two comparisons as independent tests for his hypothesis; rates of 
succession increased with size of an organization. The two authors (Gordon & Becker, 
1964) replicated and re-analyzed the descriptive data from Grusky’s (1961) study on 
“Managerial Succession and Organizational Effectiveness” and found small but 
reportedly disturbing differences. The net effect was to raise more questions about the 
validity of the claim there was a direct relationship between organization size and rate of 
succession among executives. Grusky’s analysis apparently led him to claim a direct 
relationship existed between organization size and rate of succession according to each 
position (board chairman, president, secretary, comptroller, and treasurer). Gordon and 
Becker (1964) concluded when “. . . the rate of succession for each position is examined 
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simultaneously for all four groups . . . it can be seen that there is no direct relationship 
between size of organization and succession for four of the five positions” (p. 216). The 
sole exception was the position of treasurer. The two authors then said the value of their 
work in seeking to clarify the Grusky (1961) claims was to refocus future scholars so 
they would recognize possible limitations to the published material. Grusky (1964) 
replied to Gordon and Becker (1964) acknowledging limitations in his earlier study, and 
also pointed out how additional research might be conducted. 
Meyer 
 An interesting report (Meyer, 1975) on leadership and organizational structure 
claimed there were conditions when organizational stability was affected by change, and 
that some causal relations might be identified as contributing factors. Citing data from a 
study of 215 city, county, and state auditors offices, comptrollers, departments of finance, 
and other similar organizations, Meyer sought to learn if leadership had any bearing on 
the predictability of an organization’s structure. Using a series of correlational analyses 
he said that organizational changes had relatively little, if any, bearing on leadership. But 
there were external factors, which oftentimes impacted leadership in an indirect manner. 
Essentially that part of the study examined whether there was a relationship between 
executive-type turnover and the structural stability of an organization. An analogy would 
be managerial changes in baseball and associated changes in coaches and possibly 
players. The internal modifications would not be seen as the initiator for manager change, 
but there could be third-party expectations, such as a fan base, that exerted indirect 
pressure and exacted a manger change (by not attending ballgames).  
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The conclusions from Meyer’s (1975) study mentioned that when leadership was 
stable over a reasonable period of time (implying leadership was not subjected to whims 
of political appointments) and also somewhat insulated from higher authority, the 
organizational structures could be predicted to be continuous over a period of time. 
Conversely, in instances with changing leadership due to reliance upon an intrusive 
higher authority, the organization’s structure was notably less stable. Extending this 
information to MLB would mean that managerial stability could be expected to lead to 
fewer player and coaching changes. The opposite would be expected when there were 
frequent managerial changes. 
Autonomy 
 A final remark from Meyer (1975) was whether consideration should be given to 
the position identified as one of leadership instead of to the person(s) filling such a role. 
His rationale was the autonomy given a leader was more important than attempting to 
identify characteristics of individual leaders. Again the application to MLB would be to 
not look for special traits presumably associated with successful managers. Instead, the 
interest should be on the nature of the role filled by a person with authority to influence 
the operations of a team on day-to-day bases, and that would likely be a general manager 
who was able to influence resources available to a manager. The expected cautionary 
comment was included at the end of the Meyer manuscript; not generalize his findings to 
all other organizations because of inconsistencies in mission, personnel composition, and 
management structure. In some respects this study provided similar information to what 
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Kriesberg (1964) gave in his reply to Gordon and Becker (1964); organizational size and 
succession seemed to have some relationship but additional study was warranted. 
Grusky’s Reply 
 Grusky (1964) was afforded the opportunity to respond to the Gamson and 
Scotch (1964) critique of his earlier work (Grusky, 1961, 1963) on executive 
succession. He addressed the issue of their research relating to his manuscript on 
MLB manager succession by pointing out those authors studied 22 mid-season 
managerial changes from 1954 to 1961. But the important issue, he claimed, was that 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) used data from a team’s performance during a two-week 
period immediately prior to and after such managerial changes.  
Grusky (1964) said that it was critical to clearly define what was intended by 
the two-week period (Was it exactly 14-days or had it been when a total of 14 games 
had been played?) because when he, and two other researchers used to ensure 
reliable recording of information, re-checked the Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
information they found 23-cases of managerial succession and not the 22 claimed by 
those authors. Furthermore, Grusky (1964) reported the issue of what constituted 
managerial succession was problematic because he actually found 25 instances of 
succession in his replication. 
 Grusky (1964) claimed that Gamson and Scotch (1964) pointed to the fact the 
two-week period leading up to the change in managers was what should be compared 
to the performance index of a team during the remainder of a season, while under the 
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guidance of the new manager. Their rationale was to eliminate the potential bias of a 
slump during the period immediately prior to the dismissal.  
 The Grusky (1964) replication of the Gamson and Scotch (1964) study 
encouraged him to claim the two authors had errors in their study. First, there was 
the question about how many managerial changes truly occurred. He reported 23, 
and possibly as many as 25, while they had said there were 22. Using the two-week 
prior to change period and comparing it with the rest of the season resulted in similar 
results, allowing for the one manager difference; improvement was noted for 13 
changes (Gamson & Scotch, 1964) while he (Gusky, 1964) reported 14. Both studies 
reported nine instances of deteriorating team performance after the managerial 
changes. But Grusky went one step further in his replication and analyzed the data on 
the basis of whether a new manager came from within an organization or was 
external. 
Insider or Outsider 
 Grusky (1964) made an interesting point regarding the apparent extent of 
disruption to respective baseball teams when they experienced managerial succession. 
The issue was whether a replacement manager was selected from within an organization, 
specifically within the existing team composition, or was a person brought in from 
outside the organization. He explained that nine of the 23 managerial changes in his study 
went to people who had been on the team in a coaching position and so those changes 
really were minimal in terms of disruption to the interpersonal relationships. Fourteen 
replacements were deemed as “outsiders” to an organization; despite the fact three were 
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from minor league teams within the same organization, four came from the 
organization’s front office, and one was a broadcaster for the team’s games. Of the 
remaining six, two had been active coaches for different teams, two were managers of 
other teams, and the remaining two had not been associated with baseball at the time they 
were hired (it was not stated whether they were previously in baseball). It was not 
explained whether the remaining 50% involved status quo or improvement records. 
 Grusky (1964) superimposed his replication data upon the information 
reported by Gamson and Scotch (1964), and reported seven of nine teams improved 
when an insider (one immediately associated with a team) was installed as the new 
manager. Thus the change led to improved team efficiency in 77.8% of the time. 
When the replacement manager was an outsider seven of the 14 teams had poorer 
performances (50% decline in efficiency). Grusky (1964) claimed those data 
supported his contention that inside succession was less disruptive to team 
performance, and the type of change made a difference. Fewer disruptions occurred 
with insider succession because personnel knew each other and those relationships 
fostered a team’s harmonious performances. Conversely, managerial succession with 
outsiders was associated with teams having poorer efficiency 50% of the time. 
A Matter of Degree 
 In an apparent effort to clarify the point for low effectiveness (when to discount 
team performance either before or after managerial dismissal) Grusky (1964) pointed out 
the data might be spurious if the period of two-weeks prior and subsequent to dismissal 
were used. To buttress his claim, Grusky explained the possibility of a team performing 
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so poorly a replacement manager only had to produce a few victories to show dramatic 
improvement over a predecessor.  
The Cleveland Indians Baseball team was cited as an example. In 1959, the club 
had a winning percentage of just .125 after several weeks of the season. By May 2nd the 
Team’s Manager was fired. Working from the premise of discounting the two-weeks 
immediately following the change in management, as recommended by Gamson and 
Scotch (1964), would have meant the new manager needed to win only a few games to 
quickly show improvement upon the previous record. To avoid such a possible limitation, 
Grusky (1964) recommended using the won and lost record of managers during the 
preceding year, and pointed out, when using Gamson’s and Scotch’s (1964) data there 
were 19 instances qualifying for consideration, and in 16 a manager had been with a team 
for the entire previous year. The other three had been with respective teams for a good 
portion of the prior year, and the won-lost record for that time period was used for the 
analysis. 
 Using a comparison identical to the Gamson and Scotch (1964) critical test, and 
with their data, except for the fact a manager’s previous season’s record was the base, 
Grusky (1964) said among the 19 teams studied, deterioration (8 cases) or improvement 
(9 cases) occurred at about the same rate; two were considered about the same levels of 
performances. Purportedly this finding supported the Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
contention of managers not being influential, until the data were further studied with 
regard to insider and outsider replacements.  
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Seven of the improving teams had insider managers and all eight of those 
evidencing deterioration were outsiders. The second analysis was similar to the first except 
for allowing a two-week grace period subsequent to a manager change. Thus those  
two-weeks were not considered in the analysis of team performance. Grusky (1964) 
claimed his findings were even more compelling against a common-sense theory or a 
scapegoating belief, because deterioration happened in almost twice as many instances; 
only six of 19 teams performed better under a new manager than it did under the 
predecessor the previous year. Most revealing was Grusky’s claim about the difference 
between insider and outsider managerial changes. Five of six insider managerial changes 
showed improvement while 10 of 11 outsiders were associated with deteriorated team 
performances. 
The positions espoused by Grusky (1963/1964) and Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
were provocatively different. The latter claimed scapegoating as the reason for MLB 
managerial changes. The former (Grusky, 1963, 1964) said managerial changes were 
influential on team efficiency, but of even greater relevance was the nature of such 
succession, whether they were insiders or outsiders.  
Brown 
Brown’s (1982) study on managerial succession in the National Football League 
between 1970 and 1978 allowed him to support the earlier Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
claim about managerial succession in professional sports being a form of ritual 
scapegoating. Brown (1982) was emphatic in identifying a lack of information from 
“front-office” variables as a limitation to most of the earlier studies on managerial 
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succession. His contention was such factors implied a need for considering a much 
broader view of organizational variables, because the on-field leadership (manager or 
coach, depending on the terminology used by a sport) typically had little impact on the 
performance of a team. The Brown study also considered the issue of associated tensions 
when changing managers, which was related to Grusky’s earlier work (1960, 1963, 
1964).  
The results from Brown’s (1982) study encouraged him to claim there was no 
apparent evidence to support a succession effect and the result of such changes was 
tantamount to ritual scapegoating. He supported that statement by referring to the work 
by Thompson (1967) on organizations in action, and said “. . . the scapegoating model 
correctly identifies leaders as the focus of the uncertainties impinging on all organizations 
and shaping their decisions” (p. 3). Another important comment was Brown’s (1982) 
claim that the media frequently was responsible for bringing attention to situations 
leading to changes in mangers and coaches. His explanation was the media brought 
heightened public attention to circumstances and falsely identified a manager or coach as 
the cause for a team’s performance index. Instead, Brown explained, the issue of apparent 
leadership by such persons was distorted. His conclusion cautioned against accepting 
beliefs of leadership inadequacies as justification for such changes.  
Hamblin’s (1958) earlier work on how groups responded to leaders during times 
of crises supported Brown (1982), and parenthetically Gamson and Scotch (1964). 
Hamblin (1958) studied how groups responded to leaders during times of crises, and 
whether they tended to replace a leader if an apparent solution was not provided. He 
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concluded there was no difference in subsequent actions between groups changing or not 
changing their leaders.  
Power of the Purse 
But, the manuscript by Khaire (2004) claimed the ideology of a founder, 
translated into meaning the highest levels of an organization’s management, influenced 
succession and organizational performance. Thus the manager, or coach, of a team would 
be constrained by how superiors viewed the circumstances. Supporting the founder’s 
importance was the work by Scully (1994) on managerial efficiency and survivability in 
professional sports, in which he studied managerial and coach tenure for basketball, 
baseball, and football. Scully’s results supported the claim of managerial survival being 
tied to managerial efficiency, and both were dependent upon the resources available for 
performance.  
Smyth and Smyth (1994) conducted a study on the accuracy of journalists’ 
predictions on how MLB teams would perform for the years 1982-1990. The interesting 
aspect to that study was the emphasis given to relative team salaries as a predictor 
variable. The authors said team salaries was the best single approach to identifying 
winners, and they also inserted the caveat of extreme financial resources, such as 
apparently held by the New York Yankees, being a variable to influence outcomes. 
Inequality Among Equals 
 Before moving to the third section of this literature review chapter it is 
necessary to comment on the paper by Leifer (1990). In it, he said,  
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In competitive arenas success and failure are publicly interpreted in terms 
of the individual attributes of the competitors. Nowhere is this 
individualist interpretations more clearly expressed than in league sports. 
Winning is taken as both a sign of superior team attributes and a 
consequence of those attributes, and the interpretation is reinforced by the 
tendency for current winners to continue winning and losers to continue 
losing. (p. 655) 
 
 The impetus behind Leifer’s (1990) study was the issue of performance 
inequalities, and whether the hypothesis of “winners simply are better” could be 
supported. When considering the recent achievements of the New York Yankees 
baseball team it might appear to support such a claim, but without critically studying 
the issue the claim becomes like an empirical validation; it is just because it is.  
Leifer (1990) referred to work submitted by economists on the issue of 
distributed versus repeated success, and addressed the fact authority and markets 
apparently were prevailing considerations in performance success. He then explained 
how market forces were the impetus for moving highly talented players to different 
markets, and the events of early January 2005 bear out that fact. Carlos Beltran 
signed a $119 million-dollar contract with the New York Mets, and Randy Johnson 
reportedly has signed a $42 million-dollar contract with the New York Yankees. 
New York City is considered the premier market for baseball players.  
In Chapter One there was a section commenting on the Mets signing of Pedro 
Martinez and how the economics were being calculated to justify the signing. Beltran 
also is Hispanic and from Puerto Rico. Randy Johnson simply is Randy Johnson and 
agreed to be traded for monetary and other personal reasons. The point here is the 
two New York teams had the financial resources to expend for securing the services 
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of players considered among the best in the game at the time. If, as Leifer (1990) 
suggested, talent flowed to the teams with high-market value then it is reasonable to 
believe the rich will continuously get richer, in terms of player talent and financial 
resources, while the other teams will do the best they can. Importantly, this article 
cited the earlier ones by Grusky (1963) and Gamson and Scotch (1964) among others 
(Allen, Panian, & Lottz, 1979; Brown, 1982). 
 The paper (Leifer, 1990) addressed season performance data from the entire 
histories of professional sports, up to the time when the study was started (Author, 
1987): American and National Leagues in baseball, the National Football League 
(including the American Football League), the National Basketball Association, and 
the National Hockey League.  
The other principal item of data was the population size of respective team 
locations. Because the length of each sport season varied, the author compensated by 
dividing win proportions in each season for each professional league by what he 
identified as the theoretical standard deviation using his definition of competitive 
equality. Time series data analyses, among other sophisticated statistical tests, were 
described as vehicles for the interpretation of the information. Unfortunately, the 
article used a number of unexplained acronyms and did not clearly present rationales 
for the different tests, nor did it fully explain the results beyond presenting them and 
making some comments while presenting fairly esoteric formulas showing how data 
were manipulated. The article concluded with pointing out how subtle differences, 
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when introduced early, can and do become magnified into points for making 
distinctions at a later time.  
To support his argument, Leifer (1990) explained that apparently 
homogeneous groupings of seventh-grade students begin the process of separation by 
virtue of the courses of study they take during their next six-years of school. Students 
who take one or more foreign languages and seek to study more than the basic course 
are the ones who are subsequently identified as being candidates for higher and 
postsecondary education. Thus what appeared to be a reasonably equal group of 
students becomes one that is unequal. Similarly, professional sport teams might have 
started on a fairly level field but by the process of acquiring more refined talent one 
team begins to emerge as a perennial winner. But, Leifer (1990) pointed out, there 
was a process of democratization, which enabled other teams to periodically emerge 
and defeat the expected winner. If the thesis behind that article had substance it 
would mean that the wealthiest teams, regardless of the sport, should consistently be 
among the best performers. If valid then perhaps the issue of managerial influence 
becomes further marginalized in comparison to the resources available. Those issues 
are addressed in the next section.  
Leadership and Organizations 
Before moving into a discussion of relevant leadership literature, the concept is 
reviewed to ensure the issue is clear for readers. In the opening section is an overview of 
selected commentaries. It is followed by a more critical presentation of work published in 
disciplines from communication, management, academia, and sports. The study of 
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leadership theory as it applies to managing professional sporting teams is relatively 
unexplored. To a large degree the absence of material in the area is due to the ambiguity 
of leadership theory. This study did not seek to resolve that dilemma. Instead, it set the 
stage for others to address the issue of leadership behavior as it might be related to the 
role of a MLB manager. 
Ambiguity 
Stogdill (1974), Barrow (1977), Burns (1978), Bass and Avolio (1994), and 
Kouzes and Posner (1995), among others (Drucker, 1996; Jago, 1982; Kottler, 1998; 
Mintzber, 1998, Senge, 1990; Wheatley, 1994) wrestled with describing leadership. 
Stogdill said it was “the process of influencing the activities of an organized group in its 
efforts toward goal setting and goal achievement” (p. 9). Barrow (1977) claimed it was a 
process whereby an individual influenced others to do what he or she wanted.  
Burns (1978) claimed leadership was evidenced in behaviors “where leaders and 
followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and morality” (p. 20). 
Interestingly, Burns also claimed conflict was indigenous to a model of leadership, 
because the exercising of leadership over others occurred “when persons with certain 
motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, 
political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the 
motives of followers” (p. 18). Interpreting Burns’ statements leads to the position 
successful leadership resulted when both leaders and followers had changed, in a 
direction considered positive relative to circumstances, and the impetus for such activity 
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presumably was an outside force. Further, it can be inferred Burns intended to say the 
impetus was some kind of threat to an existing status quo.  
 The concept of disequilibrium, as explained by Piaget (Flavell & Ross, 1981), fit 
this explanation, because it meant a status quo needed to be altered in order for progress 
to occur. In Piagetian thinking, the concept applied to learning happening only when 
there was motivation for change. In the absence of such motivation a person remained 
static with regard to the acquisition of information, with the result being a relative loss of 
cognitive growth. Extrapolating the idea of equilibrium and disequilibrium to leadership 
explains how it is necessary for “conflict,” between status quo and change, to occur. 
When existing knowledge does not explain events a person if faced with either 
assimilating the information into current concepts, making much broader and possibly 
amorphous concepts, or accommodating to the circumstances by changing to include the 
specifics of the new information. With leadership, continuing as before, perhaps by doing 
more of the same, or making changes reflecting awareness of conditions reveals 
application of the Piagetian idea. The important issue is movement from a status quo 
condition. The success of the change is not important, but the movement from inertia is 
worthy of study. 
Conflict 
 Efforts to shed light on the ambiguity of defining leadership led some to consider 
how leaders were characterized or described by others. The issue of distinguishing 
characteristics surfaced with regard to how others perceived such characteristics and if 
there was any consistency with descriptions. Surprisingly, Kounzes and Posner (1995) 
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said the essence of effective leadership was revealed as “the act of mobilizing others to 
want to struggle for shared aspirations” (p. 30). Their explanation seemingly was in 
concert with Burns (1978), and elicited a position of having believers accept the notion of 
conflict as integral to observing leadership.  
 Extrapolating from the view of conflict being an integral component of 
leadership, leads to accepting the belief leadership can be witnessed only when there is 
some type of confrontation. It does not need to be physical. Instead it can, and often is, 
intellectual. The process is what seems to be the critical aspect of this discussion, and 
success of what is termed leadership usually is determined by the product, or end result. 
Perhaps too often change, as an indication of leadership, is not viewed in positive terms 
unless the result is improvement from a prior status.  
If a goal was achieved the leadership presumably was successful. If not, the 
leadership would come under suspicion. In MLB the goal is to win the games and 
ultimately become the World Series winner. Yet, it needs acknowledging that both leaders 
and followers generally have understandings of how the journey should be accomplished, 
and oftentimes they differ. The genius of leadership, apparently, is when a person is able to 
mobilize others, despite divergent views, on a united course of action. If approved, the 
ideas of motivation (motivating others to action) and choice (convincing them to follow a 
specific road) become critical to defining leadership.  
Business View 
A review of selected business management literature by Hersey and Blanchard 
(1988) reported leadership was “the process of influencing the activities of an individual or 
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a group in efforts toward goal achievement in a given situation” (p. 86). In this model the 
process determined the function of the leader, the follower (or group), and the situation. 
The interactions among all variables (leader behaviors, follower behaviors, and 
environmental situations) affected how the process evolved and the outcome. Still, the 
issue of leader meant one entrusted or having assumed power and being in a position to 
influence the behaviors of others (volitionally and/or by force; covert or overt). Followers, 
regardless of their reasons were motivated to follow a leader. 
Implied with motivation and choice is the issue of trust on the part of followers. It 
is trust in the person serving as a leader, and a belief the vision of the individual will 
enable all involved to accomplish a goal or achieve an objective that is desired by both 
the leader and followers. Also implied is the notion of the person acting in the leadership 
role having power to effect actions. Importantly, the concept of power in leadership is 
variable; ranging from power vested because of designation by an authority body to 
power accorded by mutual understanding and respect. Gradations between the extremes 
also exist.  
Power vested due to authority does not rely upon follower trust because failing to 
comply can result in dire consequences. At the other extreme is power accorded by 
mutual consent and majority agreement. Presumably a democracy operates in such a 
manner, but there are variations on the theme of democracy. Between the two extremes 
are other options. Understanding when they are best adopted is important, but more so is 
grasping how such models of leadership might work and under which situations might 
77 
they be more or less advantageous. In MLB it would seem that the type of leadership 
exercised most commonly would be authoritarian.  
Trait Theory 
Initial leadership study sought to gain insight into the personality of a leader, and 
much has been written about such identifiable traits. Stogdill (1974) wrote a leader was 
characterized by a desire to stay on task, evidenced a high degree of self-confidence, and 
displayed an ability to influence others. Those characteristics presumably were viewed as 
favorable and elicited volitional followers. Stogdill did not comment on leaders with an 
absence of such traits. 
Trait theory dominated early leadership studies, based on the “major assumption 
that leaders possessed universal characteristics which made them leaders. The 
characteristics were seen to be fixed, largely in-born, and applicable across situations” 
(Hollander & Offermann, 1990). Under this belief, people having such traits only needed 
a situation to present itself. The idea was the same traits would surface regardless of 
circumstances and could be employed in a “one style fits all” manner. 
Presumably the absence of those traits, or others so identified, would deny a person 
an opportunity to lead. If true, this would preclude many from ever exhibiting any 
leadership potential. It might also be interpreted to mean leadership characteristics would 
need to be assessed in order to identify capable leaders. If observed a person would be 
dubbed as a leader, or prospective leader. Failing to identify those traits would relegate 
people to the follower category. It seemed to be an “all or none” approach. While certain 
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traits or personality characteristics may help or hinder leadership, research has been unable 
to support the trait theory (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988). 
Following this line of thinking encouraged viewing winning managers as having 
more of the requisite traits than non-winning managers in similar situations. Fiedler (1967) 
argued personality was influenced markedly by early situational experiences, and people 
could be identified as being high in orientation toward tasks or relationships. Fiedler 
claimed it was possible to obtain measures of a person’s personality preferences and such 
information would be useful for determining whether an individual might be successful as a 
leader in specific situations.  
Presumably less successful managers would not be able to overcome their 
limitations when confronted by some circumstances, in which others would be 
successful, which meant it was important to identify the key traits, and only people 
evidencing such traits would be hired as managers. The implication seemed to be some 
people were born leaders (Stogdill, 1974) and there was little to be done in terms of 
helping someone become a leader in the apparent absence of such traits, despite their 
apparent ability to interpret events and understand needs. It was in the translation of facts 
and subsequent implementation of behaviors when some persons might reveal 
vulnerability and fail in their role as a leader. 
A study of available relevant literature addressing personality traits of successful 
managers revealed similarities to the descriptions used when discussing transformational 
leadership. Cardinal and associates (1985), McNab (1983), and Shaw (1991) said 
successful managers operated within proper ethical bounds and were able to convey this 
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quality to athletes. In much the same way, transformational leadership “raises the level of 
human conduct and ethical aspiration of both leader and led” (Burns, 1978, p. 20). 
Despite apparent differences of philosophical perspectives; a necessary characteristic of 
successful managers seemed to be they served as leaders capable of instilling desired 
values. What those values were has been a subject of considerable discussion, and while 
interesting is not a part of this study. 
Undeniably the possession of specific personality traits associated with successful 
leadership, such as charisma (Conger, 1989) might be helpful, but Hersey and Blanchard 
(1988) concluded there was no one set of traits necessary for a person to be a leader, and 
Robinson (1996, p. 32) supported the position by claiming “. . . trait theory seemed 
altogether too simple and static to account for the dynamics of leaderships.”  
A lack of evidence supporting trait theory led to further research on leadership. 
One of the most significant contributions to the early study of leadership came from 
research at Ohio State University during the late 1950s (Hollander & Offermann, 1990). 
Those studies focused on the attitudinal aspect of leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988), 
and researchers developed questionnaires to measure attitudes, or predispositions about 
leader behavior. 
Situational Theory 
Leadership studies at Ohio State University were based on peoples’ 
predispositions toward leader behavior (Hersey & Blanchard, 1988). The situational 
approach to the study of leadership focused on how leaders behaved in given contexts 
and what followers did during those times. The trait theory meant the absence of certain 
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characteristics precluded leadership potential. Situational theory advanced the notion of 
adapting leadership style to various situations.  
The first well-known situational theorist was Fiedler (1967). His “contingency 
model” was constructed so a leader’s style, the nature of the group, and the particular 
situation all combined in affecting the performance and satisfaction of a group. The 
contingency items included all relationships between a leader and the group participants, 
the degree of structure in a task, and the position power held by a leader. There was little 
or no room for change, either on the part of a leader or in the dynamics of a situation. 
According to Fiedler (1967), a leader either was people-oriented or task-oriented. 
People-oriented leaders were concerned with the individuals in a group and their 
development. The similarities to transformational leadership were obvious.  
End Product 
The task-centered leader concentrated solely on an end goal and what it would 
take to get a job done. Fiedler (1967) said situations deemed very favorable or very 
unfavorable to a leader would best be handled in a task-oriented style (transactional 
approach). A situation neither favorable nor unfavorable was best handled in a 
people-oriented style (transformational approach). Under this theory, a non-productive 
group generally led to a change in leadership; as with a baseball team displaying a poor 
PI. The other alternative was to change the dynamics of the situation. In most cases the 
former was easier (manager change). Other situational theorists claimed it was the 
situations, which influenced and subsequently altered leader behaviors, and effectiveness 
hinged on the appropriateness of his or her leadership style.  
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Select Few 
Cleveland (2002) pointed out the notion of leadership has evolved from when it 
was a trait and responsibility entrusted to a select few, who acted in the capacity by virtue 
of birthright, affluence, or power earned on the battlefields of commerce, politics, or 
religion, to where it is considered an earned privilege. He explained the difference as 
moving from a vertical to a horizontal society. The former was a top-down model. Most 
people did not participate in decision-making, and unfortunately most were 
disenfranchised from being an important part of the society. Few had information, and 
those who did controlled the flow and variety of what was available, discussed, planned, 
and ordered.  
The alternative, a horizontal society, came into being because it was difficult for 
any one person to be totally in control while simultaneously affording members 
involvement and influence. The key to a horizontal society rested with an educated 
populace; one knowledgeable and willing to express opinions and also willing to serve 
for the common good. Harnessing such personnel resources while moving toward a 
desired goal was defined as leadership. In Cleveland’s (2002) words, “How do you get 
everybody in on the act and still get things done?” (p. 43). 
The role of a leader in a horizontal society was viewed as being able to create a 
sense of self-worth among those involved while encouraging them to achieve at expected 
and even higher levels of performance. In the arena of MLB, a team manager apparently 
had options for working with the ballplayers: a vertical approach (transactional-like); a 
horizontal approach (transformational-like); almost benign indifference (liaise faire-like); 
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or some combination of two or more methods. But pivotal to the success a manager might 
enjoy, regardless of the managerial style, was the quality and consistency of resources. 
Accepting such a belief means a manager’s modus operandi likely would be of minimal 
consequence. Instead, the resources at his disposal were of paramount importance.  
Contingencies 
A process-oriented approach to the study of leader behavior was advanced during 
the latter part of the twentieth century. In that model there was a contingent reward 
relationship between the leader and follower(s). Hollander and Offermann (1990) explained 
it as being based upon social exchanges with follower perceptions of leader power to grant 
rewards serving as motivation for completing assignments. Under this canopy, 
relationships existed much like those created in operant conditioning paradigms. The power 
of reinforcement was determined by its attractiveness and need. MLB managing, under this 
view, was explained as a process of allocating more or less playing time for selected 
players depending on their efforts and productivity.  
Interestingly, this model tacitly employed punishment by virtue of withholding 
rewards. Punishment, regardless of its form, tends to become associated with emotional 
duress, and a dissipater of energy and ability to focus attention, eventually leading to 
avoidance (Keller, 1963). In situations when a leader’s behaviors were totally predictable, 
the reward-punishment paradigm might have benefits, because players would know 
which leaver to push and where it was located. It would seem the best use of such a 
relationship was during incipient interactions so followers acquired an understanding of 
expectations. Subsequently it would be less advantageous because it became essentially a 
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work-for-pay model. A leader might manipulate contingencies to exact more work but 
there would be a likelihood of simultaneously increasing the anxiety associated with 
tasks.  
As stated earlier (Grusky, 1963, 1964) duress tended to decrease overall 
productivity and did not foster a sense of collegiality or cooperation. It did yield results, 
but the question became one of determining the kind(s) of results sought. This is in line 
with Grusky’s discussion on strain associated with managing. Motivation, long 
considered critical for improving personal performance, implied the reward(s) associated 
with achievement becomes internalized. Moving from a need for external rewards to a 
position of being able to derive internal reinforcement for accomplishments was 
reflective of learning. For some managers the degree of internal reinforcement might 
never be in concert with their external rewards. An example is George Steinbrenner, the 
New York Yankees owner, hired and fired Billy Martin as the team manager five times. 
That was during a period when Martin had led the Yankees to two American League 
Titles and one World Series title. What drove Martin to continuously return to the job 
remains a mystery. 
Organizational Commitment 
McNesse-Smith (1996) sought to learn if it was possible to identify which 
leadership behaviors most impacted followers and how the behaviors affected job 
satisfaction, worker productivity, and organizational commitment. Managers from two 
medium sized hospitals near Seattle, Washington completed the Kouzes and Posner 
(1995) Leadership Practices Inventory–Other (LPI–Other) and an Organizational 
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Commitment Scale created by Porter and others in 1974 (reported by McNesse-Smith, 
1996). Females comprised seventy-six percent of the manager sample (N = 41) and eight-
one percent of the other employees (N = 471). Managers were older and generally better 
educated than other workers, and time in position was not significant.  
The managers rated themselves highest on being able to enable others, but lowest 
on being able to inspire others, which was in agreement with how the employees rated the 
managers. No significant correlations were found between the LPI-Self and LPI-Other, 
but it was reported the managers tended to scores themselves higher on all scales. 
Stepwise regression analysis was used to study leadership practices and outcome 
variables. The greatest amount of variance in productivity occurred with modeling, and 
enabling explained the greatest amount of variance with organizational commitment and 
job satisfaction. From that study it was determined managers had inflated impressions of 
their actions with regard to leading by example and helping workers become the best they 
could. Perhaps that finding could be extrapolated to MLB and be a contributing factor 
when productivity indices were not favorable. 
Gunter 
The 1997 report by Gunter considered leadership practices as an antecedent 
variable when studying organizational commitment. One hundred and forty-one 
employees from a large music company in the southeastern part of the United States 
replied to the LPI-Observer, and also the Organizational Commitment Questionnaire 
(Porter et al., 1974, cited by Gunter, 1997). A majority of employees were college-
educated women with less than three years of service, non-managers and between the 
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ages of 20 and 29. All five leadership practices from the Kouzes and Posner (1995) 
model were significantly related to organizational commitment. Enabling others to act 
had the strongest relationship to job satisfaction while inspiring a shared vision was 
found to have the smallest. Extrapolation would mean the workers might not have 
grasped the organization’s vision, possibly due to it being reserved for more senior 
personnel. But the commitment to the organization was related with leaders displaying 
the five Kouzes and Posner (1995) practices.  
A similar study by Dunn (1999) compared leadership practices as they related to 
organizational commitments in the United States and in Israel. A multiple regression 
analysis revealed each of the five Kouzes and Posner (1995) leadership principles was 
significantly correlated with a commitment to remain with a company, but, surprisingly, 
none of them reached a level of statistical significance with regard to the understanding 
of a companies’ financial investment in an employee. Perhaps a better understanding of a 
company’s investment in its personnel would have made the relationships statistically 
significant. Nation of employment did not have any bearing on employees’ perceptions of 
leaders’ behaviors, which allowed the author to conclude, “. . . this study provides further 
evidence to support the ability to generalize, to different industries and professions, about 
the relationship between leader behavior and employees’ commitment to the 
organization” (p. 103). 
Bell-Roundtree and Westbrook 
Bell-Roundtree and Westbrook (2001) studied job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment and leadership behaviors using the LPI-Observer. The objective was to learn 
86 
the frequency to which managers from four Department of the Army and four private 
organizations employed the five leadership practices from Kouzes and Posner (1995). 
Using a simple linear regression analysis, it was determined all five of the practices had 
significantly positive influences on global job satisfaction. The authors claimed their 
interpretation supported claiming the five leadership practices were important for 
managers to employ consistently, and by doing so they would enhance global job 
satisfaction among employees. The result was extrapolated to the favorable prospects for 
improving worker retention, creating better customer relations, and generally fostering a 
climate of motivating employees to better performances.  
Stonestreet (2002) reported a similar finding after completing an examination of 
perceived leadership behaviors on organizational commitment to a segment of the North 
American automobile industry. Stonestreet reported a statistically significant relationship 
between each of the five leadership practices and organizational commitment. Gender 
was suggested as a moderating variable, but no significant relationships were found for 
women employees. It needs to be recognized the entire sample of 127 participants 
consisted of only 27 females. Given the disproportionate gender ratio perhaps the issue of 
gender should not have been raised as a potential moderator variable. If the author was 
intent on considering it the study should have been designed differently. But, the reported 
finding of the five leadership practices related positively to organizational commitment 
cannot be ignored. 
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Romance of Relationships 
A number of representative investigations employed the Leadership Practices 
Inventory and Multifactor Leadership Quotient when considering discriminate validity 
for transformational leadership characteristics: Carless, Wearing, and Mann (1994) said 
the LPI was a better tool and made a claim for the romance of a relationship between 
leader behaviors and follower performances; Crnkovish and Hesterly (1993) said the 
relationship romance was not significantly related but all five leadership practices had 
positive relationships between leader and follower behaviors; Avallone (1999) claimed 
when attempting to further improve college presidents’ leadership practices consideration 
should be given to an individual’s learning style preferences; Tarazi (1990) reported no 
significant differences among a sample of 250 managers with regard to positive or 
negative attitudes regarding visioning activities; Wunderley (1996) stated LPI scores 
were positively related to optimism, knowledge-sharing and leadership performance; and 
Mulligan (2001) reported high leadership scores were perceived among those with high 
knowledge-sharing scores. Perhaps what can be concluded from these representative 
studies is selected leader behaviors generally were preferred by followers but there was 
no universality with regard to predicting what was the best in a given context.  
Haggerty 
In a study on 77 managers from a Midwestern manufacturing, Haggerty (1989) 
claimed enabling others to act had the highest mean score on the LPI-Self and second 
highest score on the LPI-Other. Overall, managers claimed to engage in such practices 
significantly more than any of the other four practices, but Haggerty said his results were 
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inconclusive with respect to determining which of the five practices had the most impact 
on an organization. It is possible the research design did not allow for the analysis 
needed, or possibly the number of subjects in the various cells were insufficient for the 
planned analysis. Also of note is the findings from this study seemed to be in line with 
the earlier report by McNesse-Smith (1996) on the issue of managers presumably being 
more liberal on how they viewed themselves with regard to enabling. If accurate, it lays 
the foundation for suggesting managers need reality checks and then there should be a 
process for following up on findings. 
Cultural Values 
Organizational effectiveness and selected cultural values was studied in work 
teams from 12 small companies located in Northeast Ohio (Ridgway, 1998). A total of 
335 participants responded, and they included CEOs, managers, and non-managers. All 
companies had sales in excess of one million dollars annually. The objective was to learn 
if transformational leadership was influenced by one or more factors on the 
Organizational Culture Profile (O’Reilly et al., 1991, cited by Ridgway, 1998). Based on 
management responses (all managers completed the LPI-Self) no statistically significant 
differences were reported between high and mixed performing companies on the 
dimensions of leadership practices, cultural values, and organizational effectiveness.  
However, other analyses revealed the higher performing companies emphasized 
rewards to employees, while downplaying the significance of attention to detail, team 
orientation, and outcomes orientation. It seemed this author was saying it was important 
to praise employees for efforts and diminish the attention given to results. Presumably 
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favorable results would follow the efforts because in the absence of quality performances 
it was doubtful an organization would continue for any extended time period. It is 
questionable whether a similar philosophy could be applied to MLB, especially if a team 
was not winning. 
Krill 
 An earlier study by Krill (1993) looked at possible reasons why discrepancies 
existed in the Kouzes-Posner LPI (1995) on enabling others to act. Using a multiple case 
study design with embedded unit analysis, the author directly and indirectly observed and 
collected data from three sites, using three leaders and 21 subordinates. All completed the 
LPI-Self or LPI-Others and gave relevant demographic information prior to being 
interviewed. At one site the leader and others ranked the leadership practices identically. 
The second site yielded statistically significant differences between how the followers 
and leader viewed the practices of challenging, encouraging, and inspiring. Notably there 
were differences on the other two practices. The third site had almost similar rankings 
between the leader and constituents, but the latter scored higher than the leader on 
enabling and encouraging. 
Interestingly, this study reported lower scores on LPI-Self for modeling (site one), 
encouraging (site two), and enabling and encouraging (site three), but claimed “. . . this 
study produced evidence that the LPI can be used as an effective measurement device of 
a leader’s leadership practices” (p. 177). Krill (1996) said interpretation of the study 
results allowed for claiming it supported the transformational leadership theory of 
Kouzes and Posner (1995), and “. . . the LPI can be used as an effective measurement 
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device of a leader’s leadership practices” (p. 177). The manner by which the data was 
analyzed was not provided. Also of note was the limited number of participants (3 leaders 
and 21 subordinates), but in terms of the study design (multiple case study) the results 
were informative but did need to be viewed guardedly, because of the apparent variability 
in data reported and lack of specificity on methods.  
Biodata Characteristics 
This section on the Leadership Practices Inventory by Kouzes and Posner (1995) 
and related work ends with a report by McElreath (1999). The intent was to identify 
biodata characteristics of leadership using 50 managerial volunteers from a national, 
discount retail chain. All participants completed a life-history essay questionnaire. Senior 
management previously had identified 16 of the participants as poor performers. The data 
analysis yielded 157 background characteristics (biodata items), which were grouped into 
seven dimensions. A follow-up study secured participation from 56 additional managers 
and that analysis resulted in 60 items being identified. They were grouped into three 
categories: educational experiences, problem solving, and mentor relationships.  
A third sample of 734 different participants (66% were managers and 34% hourly 
workers) sought supervisory performance ratings on eight characteristics. All members in 
the third sample completed the LPI–Individual Contributor (LPI–IC) and the following 
instruments, all cited by McElreath (1999): Leadership Behavior Questionnaire (LBQ) 
(Sahkin & Fulmer, 1985), Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire (MLQ) (Bass, 1985), 
measures of Self-Efficacy (Sherer, Maddux, Mercandante, Prentice-Dunn, Jacobs, & 
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Rogers, 1982), and Impression Management (Paulhaus, 1988). The authors’ claimed 
internal validity for the LPI-IC was between .73 and .86, but  
Overall, the pattern of correlations between the biodata scales and other 
measures of leadership suggests that each of the measures is distinct from 
the others, but that they are sufficiently related to suggest that they are 
measuring somewhat similar constructs . . . None of the measures . . . 
suggest redundancy. (p. 111)  
 
It was reported the LBQ had the highest number of significant correlations with 
the 8 criterion indices (33%), followed by the Impression Management (30%), and then 
the LPI-IC (16%). Interestingly, neither the MLQ nor the Self Efficacy scales had any 
significant correlations with the 8 criterion indices. McElreath (1999) claimed none of the 
tools could be substituted for one of the others with expectation of finding comparable 
information. The statement raised suspicion regarding construct and predictive validity 
for the five tools used. The LPI-IC was said to reveal no differences for gender, age, 
marital status, but the issue of minority-majority reportedly showed the latter scored 
markedly higher on all five Kouzes and Posner (1995) leadership practices. 
Leadership style and characteristics were not an objective of this study. To pursue 
such issues would require a different methodology. The consideration given to such 
information in the previous paragraphs was prompted by the desire to ensure there was 
reasonable attention on issues related to the questions behind this study.  
Summary 
Leadership is an evasive concept. When present it is apparent. When absent it 
tends to not be readily acknowledged, but continued deficits in performance efficiency 
accumulate. Eventually the failure to be successful becomes too obvious to ignore and 
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action is required. The notion of leadership traits (Hollander & Offermann, 1990) 
surfacing when situations present themselves had surface appeal, but when carried to a 
reasonable conclusion it implied some people likely never would be in a position for 
exhibiting leadership behavior(s) regardless of circumstances and preparation. Instead, it 
implied only some people we born leaders; had the innate leadership traits (Stogdill, 
1974). But there were scientists who refuted such claims. Heresy and Blanchard (1988) 
claimed trait theory was too simplistic of an approach for explaining leadership 
dynamics. 
Attempting to use commercially available instruments, such as the Leadership 
Practices Inventory (LPI) by Kouzes and Posner (1995) revealed a disconnection between 
ratings from persons serving in supervisory roles (managers) and those in subordinate 
positions. McNeese-Smith (1996) reported that on the LPI managers considered their 
abilities to enable others as a special strength, but their followers had different opinions. 
Overall the managers reportedly had inflated impressions of their leadership capabilities 
when compared to the results on the LPI submitted by person whom they supervised. 
Dunn (1999) claimed personnel in so-called follower roles wee more inclined to be 
favorable toward an organization when supervisors/managers evidenced interest in them 
as individuals beyond the mentality of being just another worker. Dunn and Stonestreet 
(2002) said that when supervisory persons were rated favorably on the five leadership 
practices from the LPI (Kouzes & Posner, 1995) it translated into greater affinity toward 
an organization. 
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The selected literature reviewed on leadership practices was interpreted to mean 
the concept was not peculiar to certain persons. Instead, it was a way of behaving, which 
could be displayed by persons inclined toward recognizing how to best motivate others in 
the pursuit of a common goal. Furthermore, circumstances encouraged variations in 
leadership behaviors (i.e., transactional, transformational) and it was best for persons in 
leadership roles to be sensitive to conditions, environments, and persons when 
discharging their responsibilities. 
External Versus Internal 
Learning is what managers strive to foment among their followers (i.e., the team 
players). It is different from teaching, but generally predicated upon teaching. The former 
connotes a one-way interaction; like a transactional paradigm. Active learning is when a 
person takes responsibility for absorbing the information and associating it with personal 
concepts and beliefs. It implies a two-way interaction based upon mutual understanding 
and can be associated with a transformational model. The process of change between the 
two models can be influenced by events and needs; of followers and a manager.  
Bass 
Bass (1985) claimed transactional leadership encouraged leaders to refrain from 
providing directions or commentary to followers if the process seemed to be working as 
expected. Under this approach the only time interactions occurred was when there was a 
need to heighten awareness of the contingent reward issue (i.e., a player not performing 
as expected would be denied the opportunity to play, which prevented the player showing 
a better performance). The absence of interactions between leader and followers meant 
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opportunities for teaching, encouraging, counseling, advising, planning, and explaining 
were lacking. Discipline was presented as a punishment, regardless of whether something 
was withheld or required. 
Continuum 
Interestingly, Avolio (1999) claimed it was important to have transactional 
behaviors in place before moving toward a more transformational type of leadership; 
“transactions clearly in place form the base for more mature interactions between leaders 
over time” (p. 15). Following this thinking meant managers should move between 
transactional and transformational leadership styles depending upon the followers 
(Straub, 1991). If such versatility existed it negated earlier claims of personality trait-
based leadership being innate (Fiedler, 1967; Hersey & Blanchard, 1988; Stogdill, 1974) 
and unalterable. 
Transactional 
Analogous to the change between transactional and transformational styles of 
leadership was the discussion contrasting reinforcement and cognitive theories for 
learning. Transactional leadership and reinforcement theories of learning were similar 
because both were predicated upon how people reacted to an external reward. But, both 
were limited in how far they could move people toward become self-motivated and 
reflective learners. An illustration is both viewed people/followers as needing to be 
provided with models or instruction on what to do, and changes in behaviors were 
determined by more or less of a desired reward, or perhaps removal of an undesired 
stimulus (Keller, 1963).  
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Transformational 
Transformational leadership and cognitive learning were explanations for 
behaviors predicated upon participation of individuals. They involved activity, in the 
sense of leader-follower participation and a collegial/cooperative relationship, and 
internalization of rewards while engaging in so-called higher levels of mental activity. 
Illustrative of their application might be when a baseball team manager recognized an 
opponent intended to steal a base. Recognition of preceding events, ability to mobilize 
team resources, and have the resources execute the appropriate play involved a 
confluence of mental and physical actions. Sometimes a manager is able to thwart a base 
stealer. Sometimes nothing can be done to prevent the stolen base.  
No amount of direct training can create the ability to recognize, understand and 
plan for the future in the limited time generally provided during a game. But, the ability 
to make the correct determination requires a person be actively involved with 
understanding the rationale and have a willingness to become a participant in the activity. 
Similarly, a cognitive theory of learning allows a listener or reader to make a correct 
interpretation of the following statement; Asians eat more fish than Americans. Reliance 
upon a strict reinforcement theory for understanding likely would result in a belief it 
would be dangerous for Americans to be in proximity to Asians when it is known that 
Asians eat more fish than Americans. A literal interpretation could be that Asians 
eventually get around to eating Americans. As a consequence, baseball managers 
continuously need to work on conveying their thinking about game-related situations to 
their players and coaches so decisions can be implanted successfully. 
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Visioning 
Transformational leadership has been explained as “strong personal identification 
with the leader, joining in a shared vision of the future, and going beyond the 
self-interested exchange of rewards for compliance” (Hater & Bass, 1988, p. 695). 
Kouzes and Posner (1987) explained the process as recognizing important commonalities 
to an organizational culture and linking the group to the leader by establishing shared 
goals and ownership. Straub (1991) explained a successful baseball team manager 
demonstrated a vision for the future, and was able to place present activities into a 
perspective that would presumably lead to greater accomplishments in the future.  
Like a successful MLB manager, a transformational leader apparently was capable 
of operating efficiently in the present while effectively preparing for future undertakings. 
The concept of transformational leadership was to shift motivational stimulation, from 
task accomplishment to one bounded by ethical and moral conduct benefiting the group 
(Burns, 1978).  
Bass and Avolio (1994) explained transformational leadership as being composed 
of four intertwined but identifiable constructs: idealized influence, inspirational 
motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration. All were traits 
deemed essential for effective baseball managers. The difference between managers and 
others subscribing to transformational leadership practice rested with the need for 
managers to know the limits of their relationships with athletes (McNab, 1983) and be 
able to communicate such information to those followers (players, coaches, and the fans), 
while generating trust, commitment, satisfaction, and a willingness to put forth the extra 
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efforts needed (Avolio, 1999; Cratty, 1983). Parenthetically it bears noting that 
management is not considered as a part of the following of baseball team managers. 
In an unpublished manuscript, Cardinal and associates (1985) pointed out 
successful collegiate coaches were not consumed by their won and loss records but by 
creating cohesiveness within a team as it sought to achieve a common goal. Further, such 
coaches generally conducted themselves within parameters of a self-imposed ethical code 
reflecting their personal values. They had the technical knowledge and psychological 
know-how to do their jobs (Schmolinsky, 1983), and were ready to assume risks (Jensen, 
1988) when required for achieving their vision (Horine, 1985). Such philosophical 
approaches resonate well, but do not stand the test of reality. MLB managers know their 
job security is only as strong as their team’s won-lost record; a PI, which is tied to the 
productivity of resources. 
Corporate World 
Throughout the body of available information on leadership, an ever-present theme 
has been no one style was best suited for all people at all times. Instead, leaders needed to 
be flexible in how they worked with people and adjust according to existing situations 
(Buehler, 1998). The ability to project being knowledgeable about circumstances, having a 
valued sense of focus, and generating trust among followers were among the most 
commonly identified descriptors applied to effective leaders.  
An industry-based study on leadership and credibility (Campbell, 1993) reported 
a majority of corporate managers, in a company studied, were deemed as being more 
credible than average people. It should be noted those managers were open toward 
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supervisees and shared managerial decision-making processes. Additional information 
from Campbell’s work allowed for stating credibility could be improved by: revealing 
information leading to decision-making, behaving consistently and considerately toward 
all followers, and refraining from displays of temperament, cynicisms, and sarcasm. A 
reasonable interpretation of Campbell’s study was followers want to be treated with 
respect and in turn they accorded respect and trust to leaders evidencing such behaviors. 
The distinction between leaders who were viewed as transformational with those 
identified as being transactional was considered to be striking. Too often the latter ruled 
by fear and fostered divisiveness. Perhaps their insecurities encouraged such defensive 
behaviors, or they believed it was vital to achieve a specific objective within a limited 
time and held the belief the best, or only, way to reach that goal was by being directive 
and authoritarian. 
Another study from the corporate world, on 800 CEOs from multi-national 
organization (Bassiry & Dekemejian, 1993), determined the most desired characteristics 
of successful business leaders were loyalty, vision, and an ability to convey trust in the 
direction followed. A year later Quigley (1994) reported on a study of 1,500 senior 
leaders from 20 countries. The dominant trait identified by 98% of the participants was 
being able to display and convey a sense of vision. In the discussion, Quigley referred to 
an earlier study (Kotter & Heskett, 1992) on 10 firms in each of 20 different industries 
(10 X 20 = 200), which reported the most successful firms displayed a strong corporate 
culture predicated upon shared values. Kotter and Heskett (1992) said corporate 
performance followed a viable and acceptable vision. Buy-in to the vision and support of 
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the mission implied people were involved with the creation process. Involvement led to 
sharing of a culture and a belief of being valued, instead of being regarded as a cog in an 
operation.  
The available literature contained information presumably describing personality 
traits of successful leaders, but there is not a deep repository of information on how 
leaders and followers perceive a leader’s behaviors. Furthermore, there is not much 
information available about the nature of leader behavior by MLB managers (Case, 
1987), or whether expressed leadership style is materially relevant to a team’s 
performance indices. The literature contains reports of transformational leadership 
characteristics as being desirable qualities, but there has been no study done to determine 
whether such a relationship existed or if it was important for team success. As 
commented on earlier, traits and practices of leaders hold promise for interesting studies 
but neither topic was intimately related to the focus of this investigation. 
Initiating Structure and Consideration 
The Hollander and Offermann (1990) findings of leader behavior led to the 
description of two basic dimensions: initiating structure and consideration (Hersey & 
Blanchard, 1988). Initiating structure referred to a pattern of working relations with a 
group established by a leader. It included structure of organization, methods of 
communication, and line procedure. Important in the model was consideration for the 
working relationship between leader and follower. The premise was mutual trust, respect, 
and friendship were necessary patterns of general behavior between leader and follower. 
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Lacking such patterns or marginalization of one or both likely would erode the 
relationship to the point of it being inconsequential. 
Lee and Jablin (1995) claimed deterioration of relationships tended to have a 
profound impact upon dyads, even to the extent of precipitating events no longer being 
considered important. The disruptive character of such circumstances often was seen as 
having been unpredictable. But, the reality was that the responsibility for developing and 
preserving an effective social structure rested with a leader (Kouzes & Posner, 1995). 
Consequently, it seemed that except in highly unusual situations the inability of a 
follower to adapt to conventions could be considered a form of scapegoating. 
Baseball Expansion 
After completing 60 seasons, 1901-1960—with eight clubs in each of the 
American and National Leagues, MLB expanded to include ten teams in each League 
during the early 1960’s. It was a response to market-driven forces. Teams were located 
where there was a population base large enough to presumably make it a thriving 
business. In 1962 the New York Mets and Houston Colt .45s, which subsequently 
changed its name to the Houston Astros, entered the National League. The American 
League experienced MLB expansion in 1961 with the Los Angeles Angels and the 
Washington Senators. The Angels subsequently moved into Orange County, California, 
and became known as the California Angels, in 1965. In 1996 the team name was 
changed to the Anaheim Angels.  
The Washington Senators moved to Minneapolis-St. Paul after the 1960 season 
and became known as the Minnesota Twins. The Major League Team, which replaced 
101 
the Washington franchise in the American League later, moved to Arlington, Texas, and 
in 1972 became known as the Texas Rangers, remaining in the American League 
(http://baseballsbest.vze.com). 
Division Playoffs 
In 1962 each of the major leagues consisted of ten teams. By 1969 they were 
reconfigured so there was a western and eastern division in each league. Instead of a 
single pennant winner emerging from each league at the end of the season (best winning 
percentage) there were division play-offs within each league. The winner represented the 
League in the World Series. Consequently it was possible for a team with a won–loss 
record displaying less team efficiency to become the representative for either the 
American or National League in the World Series. Illustrative of team mobility was that 
in 1966 the Milwaukee Braves, a National League Team, moved to become the Atlanta 
Braves. Previously, in 1952, that team had moved from Boston to become the Milwaukee 
Braves. 
More Expansion 
In 1969 two more Major League Teams entered the American League (Kansas 
City Royals and Seattle Pilots) and another two entered the National League (San Diego 
Padres and Montreal Expos). The American League Seattle Pilots moved to Milwaukee 
in 1970 and were named the Milwaukee Brewers, while the Expos became the first Major 
League franchise to be housed and play outside of the United States. The 12 teams still 
afforded alignment of an eastern and western division, but the designation of teams to 
divisions sometimes was questioned because parity did not appear to be an issue. Instead 
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there were attempts to establish divisions favoring selected teams, a practice that 
continued until recently (Milwaukee Brewers, an American League expansion team being 
re-assigned from the American League Central Division to the National League Central 
Division in 1997).  
Still More Expansion 
 In 1977 the American League again expanded by adding the Toronto Blue Jays 
and Seattle Mariners. Fifteen year later (1993) the National League added the Colorado 
Rockies and Florida Marlins. Then, in 1998, the National League added the Arizona 
Diamondbacks, and the Tampa Bay Devil Rays joined the American League. As a 
consequence of expansion and moving to different cities and even changing leagues, 
there now are 14 teams in the American League and 16 teams making up the National 
League. Table 1 shows the present alignment. At the conclusion of the regular baseball 
season the team at the top of each division is selected to participate in a play-off, and the 
team with the next best winning percentage, from among the remaining teams, is 
designated as winning the wild card spot in the play-offs. The result is a team not 
winning its division might become the League representative in the World Series. Also it 
is possible that a team with a higher winning percentage than a division winner could be 
omitted from any post-season play. 
Participants 
Subsequent to joining MLB some teams moved to different locations or changed 
their names. In those instances their records were considered for this study using the  
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Table 1 
Alphabetic Alignment of Current MLB Teams 
American East National East 
Baltimore Orioles Atlanta Braves 
Boston Red Sox Florida Marlins * 
New York Yankees Montreal Expos 
Tampa Bay Devil Rays * New York Mets 
Toronto Blue Jays  Philadelphia Phillies 
  
American Central National Central 
Chicago White Sox Chicago Cubs 
Cleveland Indians Cincinnati Reds 
Detroit Tigers Houston Astros 
Kansas City Royals Milwaukee Brewers 
Minnesota Twins Pittsburgh Pirates 
 St. Louis Cardinals 
American West National West 
Anaheim Angeles Arizona Diamondbacks * 
Oakland Athletics Colorado Rockies * 
Texas Rangers Los Angeles Dodgers 
Seattle Mariners  San Diego Padres 
 San Francisco Giants 
 
*Notes teams not included in this study. 
 
In 1952 the Boston Braves moved to Milwaukee and became the Milwaukee Braves. In 1966 they moved 
and became the Atlanta Braves. In 1954 the St. Louis Browns moved to Baltimore as the Baltimore 
Orioles. In 1961 the Washington Senators moved to Minneapolis-St. Paul and became the Minnesota 
Twins. In 1954 the Philadelphia Athletics moved to Kansas City and became the Kansas City Athletics, and 
in 1968 they moved and became the Oakland Athletics. In 1958 the Brooklyn Dodgers moved to become 
the Los Angeles Dodgers. In 1972 the replacement Washington Senators moved to become the Texas 
Rangers. In 1958 the New York Giants moved to become the San Francisco Giants. 
(http://baseballsbest.vze.com) 
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names from their prior locations since the composition of such teams remained fairly 
constant. The result was 30-teams comprised the population, but four were excluded 
because they did not qualify on the basis of longevity. Table 1 shows the alphabetical 
composition of the two Baseball Major Leagues. The modification of the entire pool of 
30-teams (Table 1), to a final listing of 26, comprised of 13-teams from the American 
League and 13-teams from the National League, formed the sample used in this study. 
The affiliation of a team with a particular League was not an issue because the interest in 
this study was on respective teams’ efficiencies. 
Figure 2 is a geographic presentation of the 30-MLB Teams locations in the year 
2004. The issue of large population density tended to dictate respective locations and led 
to changes for 2005.  
 
Figure 2. Geographic representation of the 30 MLB Teams. 
(http://baseballsbest.vze.com) 
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Revenue Streams 
Simmons (2005), a sports commentator for the online journal AskMen.com 
explained there were four typical sources from which MLB teams secured money. The 
first, and perhaps most obvious, was fans attending games. This fact was commented 
upon in Chapter One under the commentary on Pedro Martinez’s signing by the New 
York Mets. A second origin point was the income from media (local and national 
networks including radio, TV, and cable, plus re-broadcasting rights. The third major 
source came from venue revenues (luxury suites, parking, concessions, advertising within 
the stadium, and even naming a stadium for a sponsor). The last major origin was the 
licensing and merchandising of a team’s logo (on caps, jerseys, bats, etc.). Simmons 
claimed MLB was an industry generating $3-billion-dollars annually, and it could be 
expected to increase each year. 
 Some often-hidden revenue streams reportedly came from new baseball stadiums, 
and Simmons claimed that the San Francisco Giants were expecting to receive an 
additional $86 million dollars just by moving into a new stadium. The Houston Astros 
were anticipating new revenues in the amount of $81 million, and the Seattle Mariners 
were planning on being the beneficiaries of an additional $97 million after each moved 
into a new a stadium. So-called small market teams (Montreal, Minnesota, Oakland) 
apparently were not small in the sense of lacking a population base from which to draw 
fans (estimated fan base for: Montreal = 2.5 million; Oakland and surrounding Alameda 
County = 1.5 million; Minnesota (Twins) in Hennepin County = 1.4 million), but it was 
the manner by which they were marketing themselves.  
106 
Simmons (2005) cited the fact the New York Yankees were receiving at least  
$42 million a year from their cable agreement but the Montreal Expos had no income 
from such sources. Consequently, players often sought to be with teams in selected 
locations, and frequently there was compatibility between a player’s desire to re-locate 
and the resources available to support bringing outstanding players to “big market” 
teams. Integral to all such negotiations and deliberations was the need for a team to be 
successful, and the apparent driver of a team was its manager. But the more important 
question was whether a team manager truly was just a driver or if that person had more 
than tangential influence on the fortunes of a team. 
Summary 
This chapter explained the origins of scapegoating and how it was applied in 
professional sports, with special emphasis on MLB. The second section of the chapter 
went into detail on studies deemed pivotal to the foundation for this constructive 
replication investigation (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Gordon & Becker, 1964; Grusky, 
1961, 1963; Kriesberg, 1962; Roberts, 1959). The third section of this chapter reported 
on selected and relevant literature that addressed issues of leadership, management, and 
organizations. The last major section was an explanation of MLB expansion and how 
revenue influenced the addition and movement of teams.  
The next chapter (Methods) explains the approach to the study, presents the 
research question and hypotheses, and presents information supporting the manner by 
which the data analysis was done. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODS 
This was a constructive replication of the work done by Gamson and Scotch 
(1964). The validity of their three explanations for MLB managerial succession were 
considered, but the focus was to determine if there were predictive baseball team indices 
serving as reliable explanations for team efficiency. The operational measures were a 
critical study of the won-loss records and managerial changes of MLB teams between 
1985 and 2003.  
Some disclaimers need to be stated at this point because not all of the major 
league teams have been in operation since 1985; four are relatively new. In some 
instances teams moved or changed names. In those cases their records were considered 
using the names from their prior locations since the composition of such teams remained 
fairly constant. The result was 30 teams formed the population. But four were excluded 
because they did not qualify on the basis of longevity, having been in existence for just 
ten-or-fewer-years. Twenty-six teams thus formed the sample. 
Sequence 
There are eight major sections in this chapter. The first is an introduction to the 
format of the chapter. The second presents the overriding research question followed by 
the eight subquestions. Immediately following (third section) is commentary on why 
there was not the need for a review of the research protocol by the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board.  
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The next section (fourth) explains the approach of the research design and 
justifies why a quantitative research design was chosen. The fifth section is an 
explanation of how the data was obtained, collated, and analyzed (order and sequence of 
data). The sixth section explains the source(s) for the data sample. Support for the manner 
of statistical treatment (seventh) is provided next. Issues related to reliability and validity 
are addressed in the section entitled replication and cross-validation (eighth), and the last 
part (ninth) of the chapter is a summary according to the major sections. 
Research Question 
The inquiry focus was whether persons commonly considered to be organizational 
leaders, in the case of this investigation the focus was on managers of MLB teams, made 
a sufficiently strong enough impact on organizational outcomes to warrant believing their 
contributions were vital to a team’s PI. The vehicle for answering that question, and the 
eight subquestions, was to critically study the impact of managerial succession on MLB 
team efficiency (won/loss records), and selected aspects of team efficiency (selected 
independent variables) across 26 MLB teams for the period of 1985–2003.  
Hypotheses 
The hypothesis, stated as a null, was no relationship or causal dependence existed 
between managerial change and team performance, as reflected by the PI (won-loss 
records). The eight sub-questions presented below are accompanied by justification for 
inclusion, and each is followed by a null hypotheses. The intent was to learn if the 
hypothesis could be disclaimed using statistical testing as the logic. If it was there might 
be support for the contention dismissal of a MLB manager was an action that did not 
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result in improving a team’s PI. Instead it was indicative of redirecting the blame for a 
poor performance and a means for scapegoating.  
Subquestion One  
1. How did the number of managerial changes impact team efficiency as 
measured by won–lost records? This question related to the issue of team 
efficiency and allowed for a comparison to the earlier studies on managerial 
succession by Grutsky (1961), Gamson and Scotch (1964), and Roberts 
(1959).  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team efficiency as a  
consequence of managerial changes. 
Subquestion Two 
2. How did managerial tenure impact team efficiency? Did the length of time a 
manager spent with a given team have an impact on team efficiency? 
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team efficiency as a 
result of the duration of a manager’s tenure with a team. 
Subquestion Three 
3. How did team OBP impact team efficiency? This statistic reported how often 
batters were able to reach base, as a result of getting a base hit, a walk, or 
being hit by a pitch. It was the relative worth of hitters versus pitchers. The 
higher the percentage for hitters the greater was the likelihood of a team’s 
efficiency being higher. Extending this to a meaningful conclusion resulted in 
the likelihood of a team winning more ballgames because of the higher team 
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efficiency rating. The logic behind the claim was more base runners would 
mean more opportunities for runners to score runs, and thus a team would be 
apt to outscore opponents. 
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team OBP as a 
consequence of managerial succession. 
Subquestion Four 
4. How did team on base plus slugging impact team efficiency (OBPS)? This 
statistic revealed how well players were able to get on base plus the extent of 
damage done to an opposing team by virtue of getting on base. The manner 
for getting on base was the issue with this statistic; base-on-balls, singles, 
doubles, triples, and homeruns. It was presumed that the higher the OBPS 
(more doubles, triples, and home runs) the greater was the likelihood of a 
team’s efficiency being higher.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team OBS percentage 
as a consequence of managerial succession. 
Subquestion Five 
5. How did S9I impact team efficiency (S9I)? It has been claimed that strikeouts 
were independent of a team’s ability to play defense, and good fortune, 
because they denied opponents the opportunity to put a ball into play. The 
higher the ratio of strikeouts by a team’s pitchers per nine innings the better 
was the chance for that team to win a ballgame, because it kept opponents off 
the base paths.  
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Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team strikeouts per 
nine-innings as a consequence of managerial succession. 
Subquestion Six 
6. How did walks plus hits allowed per inning pitched impact team efficiency 
(WHIP)? This was the number of times an opponent was able to put players 
on base. The lower the number, the fewer chances there were for another team 
to score runs. Conversely, the higher the ratio the greater was the likelihood 
for opponents to scores runs.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team WHIP as a 
consequence of managerial succession.  
Subquestion Seven 
7. How did SBP impact team efficiency (SBP)? This statistic was determined by 
comparing the number of attempts to steal a base with the degree of success 
attained. It was a statement of how successful a player or team had been with 
regard to their attempts. Importantly, it discounted the total number of steals 
because that number was apt to be a misleading figure if there were numerous 
unsuccessful attempts. Instead, it was approached as done by Verducci (2004, 
p. 58) who cited Joe Sheehan (2004) of Baseball Prospectus. Sheehan claimed 
a SBP ratio of fewer than 75% was not productive because so many present-
day teams relied extensively on power games (i.e., moving runners along the 
base paths by virtue of a base hit, preferably involving multiple bases, which 
was the antithesis to “little ball”).  
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Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team SBP as a 
consequence of managerial succession. 
Subquestion Eight 
8. How did total team salaries impact the win-loss records? MLB teams with 
extensive financial resources often used such resources in a bully pulpit 
manner. They sought, and often successfully secured or retained, ballplayers 
best able to help or ensure continued high team efficiency.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team performance as a 
consequence of total team salaries.  
Institutional Review Board 
There was no need to secure Institutional Review Board approval to conduct this 
study. All requisite information was available as public domain records and accessible to 
any and all interested parties. Furthermore, a telephone conversation with the Coordinator 
for the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Institutional Review Board (IRB), Ms. Shirley 
Horstman, reinforced the fact it was not necessary to submit an IRB application for the 
study, as described in this chapter. The uniqueness of this investigation was threefold: 
performing a constructive replication on an important and unresolved question; the 
testing the hypotheses postulated earlier by Gamson and Scotch (1964), but with 19-years 
of data (1985 through 2003); and studying selected independent variables for their 
predictive power on a team’s PI. 
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Design 
 This section explains the conduct by which the research was conducted. Salant 
and Dillman (1994) explained that a research design was synonymous with a plan for 
answering one or more questions. It was a strategy not limited to educational research 
activities but applicable to any task requiring a systematic approach to problem solving. 
A plan (research design) was expected to include an explanation for gathering data in 
support of the design, directions or a protocol on how the data would be organized so as 
to be amenable to analysis; application of appropriate methods for displaying the data in a 
meaningful manner, and an outcome termed the research findings. This chapter addresses 
each of those inclusions.  
Quantitative Design 
The quantitative model provides researchers with a means for explaining 
relationships in contrived relationships, or to test presumed relationship between and 
among events or conditions that occurred in the past. That was the research design chosen 
for this investigation, because the intent was to study and explain events that had 
occurred during a defined period of time. 
Scientific Method 
The impetus to quantitative research in education can be traced back, at least, to 
the time when a systematic procedure for investigating phenomena was described. 
Numerous authors have discussed the scientific method (Campbell & Stanley, 1966; 
Guilford, 1954; McReynold & Kearns, 1983; Ventry & Schiavetti, 1980; Wiener, 1962) 
and how its basic ideas (dependent and independent variables; reliability and validity) 
114 
were inherent in all forms of comparative, correlational, and/or experimental research. 
The key concept with such research was exercising control by the investigator(s) so 
others could employ the procedures and find similar or identical results. The more 
duplicative information resulted from such methods the greater was the credibility 
accorded to the findings of a study. In essence, it would provide for claiming reliability 
for the procedures and validity for the findings, which then could be generalized with a 
higher degree of confidence. Alternatively, it could set the stage for questioning reports if 
there were controversial data or inconsistent findings. 
Variable importance. Importantly, the focus for this investigation was to 
determine if selected team performance factors influenced MLB teams’ efficiency; their 
productivity indices (PI). Conventional thinking about poor baseball team performance 
has been to direct criticism toward a team manager. But it was postulated there were 
mitigating factors, acting in isolation or in concert, which were of equal or greater 
importance than the actions of a team manager. While this study sought evidence to 
support or refute whether poor team performance was directly related to managerial 
leadership, the research subquestions and null hypotheses addressed aspects of team 
efficiency during the tenure of a given manager.  
Instead of making claims about the performances of team managers, the interest 
was on learning if selected independent variables were predictive of team efficiency 
(dependent variable) with a given manager. The implications were that opportunities 
likely would exist for reflection by and upon individuals entrusted with similar positions 
of team leadership. To accomplish the stated objective of learning whether MLB team 
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efficiency was a consequence of selected performance factors necessitated a predictive 
study. The issue of data analysis is addressed later in this chapter. 
Causation, relationships and prediction. Creswell (1994) stated a quantitative 
research design would be the appropriate direction to follow when a researcher sought to 
study: (a) causation, (b) relationships between variables or comparative groups were 
being tested, (c) model testing, (d) generalizations from a sample to its population,  
(e) questionnaires with ratings scales, and (f) when an experiment was being conducted. 
This study fully satisfied the first point; to study causation. It addressed relationships 
between variables mentioned in the second point, and sought to provide a means for 
making generalizations, as indicated in the third point. Also it addressed the fourth point 
by virtue of including 87% of the population of MLB Teams (26 of the current 30 teams), 
and by so doing the results from the purposefully selected sample comfortably may be 
applied to the entire population. 
Ex post facto nonexperimental. Of note was the issue of generalizations 
warranted particular attention because the genesis of the study was predicated upon 
controversial findings from earlier research. In the fifth chapter (Discussion) the 
outcome(s) from this investigation are tied to the earlier and similar research. Since the 
information used for analysis in this study was created at earlier times, 1985–2003, it is 
legitimate to term this an ex post facto nonexperimental study. The information analyzed, 
even though it was transposed into different forms, occurred and there was no pretest 
(baseline) to accompany a posttest (data from after a treatment).  
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The following paragraphs address: experimenter bias, ensuring the order and 
sequence of data were recorded reliably; both for initial compilation and subsequent 
analysis, sources for securing data and their relative validity, handling of missing data if 
necessary, and selection of procedures for providing appropriate, reliable, and valid 
information to be analyzed. The clarity of the procedures followed enables other 
investigators to replicate and subsequently cross-validate this study. Chapter Five 
(Discussion) provides guidance related to this last issue.  
 Experimenter bias. Rosenthal (1966) pointed out experimenter bias was not a 
consequence of tampering with data in the hope of artificially manufacturing a desired 
outcome. Although experimenter bias certainly could be a consequence of malicious 
tampering. Instead, according to Rosenthal, experimenter bias occurred when an 
investigator unknowingly influenced how or what data was collected, recorded, and 
subjected to critical analysis. Presumably the bias occurred because of expectations as to 
what should be found, or because of an effort to satisfy requirements on the use of 
selected statistical protocols. The thrust of Rosenthal’s comments was such influences 
occurred benignly.  
 Barber and Silver. Barber and Silver (1968), in an article published in the 
Psychological Bulletin Monograph Supplement, contended issues of researcher bias, in a 
study such as this one, were not as pronounced as might be presumed by some 
researchers (Rosenthal, 1966). The latter author (Rosenthal) claimed there was a 
similarity between the kinds of biases apt to occur when engaged in parapsychology 
research and psychological research because of experimenter bias with parapsychology 
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work. Apparently the justification for the bias claim was based upon extrapolation. 
Moving from that position, it was postulated that a common-sense assumption led to the 
belief that what affected one form of research likely would impact another. But, others, 
such as Barber and Silver (1968), argued an experimenter effect was not as vivid, and 
would not be expected in studies seeking answers to questions in which the data was 
static. Data in this study were static.  
 Data handling. To avoid unintended errors it was incumbent upon the researcher 
to follow carefully the prescribed criteria for culling information and analyzing it, as 
approved by the Doctoral Supervisory Committee. Being cognizant of the potential for 
such error was an initial step toward obviating the problem. Since the information used 
for analysis was available in public domain records, the issue of collecting and 
transposing it did not qualify as a source for potential unintentional bias, except if it was 
recorded erroneously.  
There was no predisposition toward supporting or rejecting the research 
subquestions. Instead, the interest was in learning which of the stated subquestions 
enjoyed credibility and which of the null hypotheses should be rejected or accepted.  
Reliability. It was necessary for the researcher to engage in intra-investigator 
reliability checks with regard to the recording of raw data and also the transposition of 
such data onto a form appropriate for analysis. The reliability check included ten percent 
of all recorded raw information as well as the transposed data. That was done until there 
was 100% consistency, which required three verifications.  
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Additionally, an unsophisticated rater performed an inter-reliability check on both 
the raw data and transposed data to further ensure accuracy of recordings. The protocol 
was that if less than 100% accuracy was detected by either the intra or inter-rater checks 
it would trigger a careful review of all data recordings until such time as the 100% 
accuracy mark was reached. The inter-rater reliability check resulted in 100% agreement 
on the initial review on approximately 5% of randomly selected data that had been 
transposed from the public domain records, and on the material recorded for computer-
assisted data analysis. 
 Handling validity. There are multiple forms of validity (face, predictive, 
concurrent, content, construct) and it is incumbent upon a researcher to know what is 
being collected and evaluated, “. . . because interpretation of the research results hinges 
on the validity of the measures upon which these results are based” (Borg & Gall, 1989, 
p. 184). The safeguards for this study were adequate. The data collected was static, and it 
was amenable to constant verification because of its state of permanency. Parenthetically, 
the question of researcher bias was addressed earlier to provide evidence the issue has 
been considered and found not wanting. 
 Consultants. At the point when the idea for the investigation was being 
conceptualized, methodological advice was sought from two sources; a statistical consultant 
from the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL) Nebraska Evaluation and Research (NEAR) 
Center and an expert from the UNL Office for Qualitative and Mixed Methods Research. The 
objective was to discuss the most favorable plan for collecting, preparing, analyzing, and 
reporting the information.  
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After all of the information was recorded and configured for statistical analysis, 
assistance again was sought from three sources. The first consultant used was an expert in 
research design and analysis on the Graduate Faculty at the University of Alabama-
Birmingham, School of Education, and Department of Human Studies. That person was a 
professional expert in research methodology and analysis. The second person was a 
consultant in quantitative analysis from the UNL NEAR Center, and an advanced 
graduate student Pursing the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Quantitative and Qualitative 
Measurement and Evaluation. The third consultant also was associated with the NEAR 
Center. All consultants approached the data independently, ran similar statistical tests, 
and reported concordance on the procedures and analyses. The latter two had earned 
Doctor of Philosophy Degrees with emphases in Educational Research focusing on the 
design of studies and statistical analysis of data. Approaches used for the analysis are 
commented upon later in this chapter. All consultants provided explanations and 
documentation for their decisions regarding the design and analyses.  
Order and Sequence of Data 
The issues of data reliability validity were addressed earlier in the section on 
experimenter bias. As stated, an agreement of 100% accuracy on recordings were sought 
and obtained for both the investigator checks (intra) as well as those checks with the 
unsophisticated but objective other rater (inter). 
Data Sources 
Issues of sequence or order of data collection were of no consequence in this 
study. Instead the accuracy of noting the information was paramount. The data pool was 
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static and repeatedly accessible. Knowing where to find the data sources and how to 
access them was pivotal. Thus monitoring the research setting was important only to the 
extent of knowing where to find the requisite information and ensuring accuracy of 
recording data, analyzing it, and arriving at reasonable conclusions. Those latter points 
were addressed in the section on experimenter bias, and approach to analysis. They are 
repeated in this section, on order and sequence of data collection, to reinforce the fact it 
was an issue recognized and addressed on a conceptual level. 
Data 
The MLB team managers for each of the sample teams, between 1985–2003, were 
determined by critically studying public domain records for each team in sources such as: 
Elias Sports Bureau data (it claims to be The world’s foremost source for sports 
information), Statisticians and Historians STATS Inc., Inside Edge, Tendu Inc., Baseball 
Prospectus, plus reading the newspapers from respective cities where teams were or 
currently are located. All other needed information was available from: published 
almanacs and yearbooks of MLB, multiple online data repositories, and records 
maintained by the respective baseball teams.  
Approach to Investigation 
The rationale behind the method of inquiry selected, manner by which data was 
gathered, as well as the decision affecting how information was analyzed warrant 
justification. For this investigation it was necessary to explain those three steps and also 
buttress the information by showing how application of the selected method of inquiry, 
data gathering, and subsequent analysis were the most appropriate tools to support the 
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discussion and eventual recommendations. In following this process a reader is able to 
understand the decision-making processes that influenced the procedures. The following 
paragraphs address the deliberations surrounding the choice of a research paradigm. 
Paradigm 
When seeking to gain an understanding of the dynamics involved with the 
phenomena of how to find, hire, retain, or not retain MLB team managers it becomes 
apparent there are multiple complex interactions occurring simultaneously. Use of 
qualitative inquiry would have been appropriate if the circumstance studied were complex 
interactions among participants or if each participant had a story to relate and it was 
difficult to separate one from another. Such a process of acquiring information would have 
stressed the importance of objectivity with efforts to minimize a researcher’s influence on 
the phenomena being studied.  
Despite full awareness of participatory actions and best efforts to mitigate their 
impact, total objectivity likely would not occur because during recording, describing, and 
then reporting activities an investigator would have been a part of the on-going process. 
The process would allow a researcher to provide a record of reality and report those truths 
acknowledging limitations, delimitations, and assumptions. The outcome from such 
research would be to allow consumers of the information to gain a sense of the experiences 
and meanings through the researcher’s efforts to identify themes and meaning from the 
transcribed interviews. But this investigation was not interested in reporting and explaining 
personal perspectives. Furthermore it was deemed that such an approach would have been 
substantially beyond the scope of the planned investigation.  
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Two Approaches 
Conventional approaches to educational inquiry generally have followed either a 
quantitative or qualitative plan (Berelson, 1952; Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Creswell, 1994; 
Kaplan & Duchon, 1988; Lee, 1999; Smith & Heshusius, 1986), with each representing 
polar opposites of epistemological definitiveness. But recently there has been a growing 
interest in blending the two and engaging in mixed method research (Creswell, 2004). The 
former [quantitative method] emphasizes precision and seeks to differentially control 
dependent, moderator, and/or independent variables. The intent is to approach an issue 
from the perspective of what is known, and by a process of deductive reasoning arrive at 
generalizations or universals about what is objective reality. The conclusions tendered 
become a part of what is known or understood about the world in the presence or absence 
of selected variables. Again, it needs re-iteration that employing a form of qualitative 
research, while appealing was not accepted for this study and further discussion on the 
topic is not warranted.  
Inquiry Selection 
 The nature of this study required a quantitative paradigm. It was a 
constructive replication of earlier work (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Gordon & Becker, 
1964; Grusky, 1959; Roberts, 1959). Also it was a predictive study with selected 
independent variables that presumably had relevance to determining a MLB team’s 
PI (won-loss record).  
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Prediction 
Employing predictive statistical methods in this study was valuable because it 
allowed for determining whether some or all of the eight selected independent variables 
had a line of best fit with the dependent variable (team efficiency). It was anticipated 
some would be significant and others would have limited or no value. A step-wise 
regression analysis was planned for the purpose of learning which one or combination of 
independent variables made the greatest contribution to the identification of statistically 
significant predictors (Lomax, 1992; Streiner, 1986). But discussions with a Statistical 
Consultant from the UNL NEAR Center raised questions about the use of that procedure. 
The stability of the approach to data analyses was questioned in two journal articles 
(Huberty, 1989; Thompson, 1995), and so other options were explored. But the process 
for applying a step-wise regression is explained below, because it reflected the 
investigator’s second reason for doing the study; predicting which of the independent 
variables were most favorable indicators of team productivity indices. 
Step-Wise Regression 
A step-wise regression analysis was used when there was a need to learn which, if 
any, of the predictor variables (independent variables) best predicted the criterion 
variable (won-loss records). Thus it was a means for explaining or predicting 
relationships. The model introduced each of the predictor variables (independent 
variables) “. . . one at a time into the regression equation” (Steiner, 1986, p. 60) and 
determined how the multiple correlations change. There were two ways to approach that 
procedure. One was a researcher logically introduces independent variables in a specified 
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order. The second was to allow a computer program to determine the sequence. The latter 
was the planned approach. It was expected that the computer program would enter each 
of the dependent variables in “. . . an order of decreasing ability to account for additional 
variance” (p. 61).  
Lomax (1992) stated predictors (independent variables) could be entered into the 
model on the basis of whether contribution to the variance was statistically significant  
(F value). Also they (predictors) could be deleted if a previously identified significant 
predictor no longer displayed such value because of the addition of other predictors. It was 
the reversing process, Lomax said, that distinguished the step-wise regression from the 
forward selection procedure, and initially made it the choice of analysis for this study; 
deleting predictors when their value was not important because of the potency of other 
predictors. The criterion variable (Y) in this study was the won-loss record for respective 
managers. The eight independent variables were the predictors (X). 
Assumptions of a Multiple Step-Wise Regression Analysis 
The use of a multiple step-wise regression analysis was predicated upon satisfying 
seven assumptions, according to Lomax (1992). It required, first, linear regression 
between Y (criterion variable) on the X (predictor variables). In this study there were 
eight independent variables (X), and the dependent variable of won-loss records (Y) for 
respective managers could be plotted with a regression line for each of those predictors. 
A second assumption involved independence of the residual from the criterion 
variable. It would be a part of the equation unexplained by the independent variables 
(Vogt, 1993) and usually stated as the error term. In this study the independence of the 
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residual was to be considered when the data were being analyzed. Ideally it would be 
(third assumption) zero, (fourth assumption) reveal homogeneity, and (fifth assumption) 
reflect normality, which were three more assumptions to be satisfied then when using a 
step-wise regression.  
Additionally the independent variables were (sixth assumption) categorical 
(distinct entities) so there was no potential for two or more overlapping slopes. Each of 
the independent variables was a category of information (i.e., WHIP; SBP; OBP).  
The seventh and last assumption (Lomax, 1992) was nonmulticollinearity of the X 
variables. The idea of two or more independent variables not being highly correlated 
would not be known until after the data analysis. If none of the predictor variables were 
significant it would seriously limit the generalizability of the results. But, addressing 
those objectives by use of a regression formula reportedly had been suspect due to 
questions regarding the validity of variable selection by stepwise procedures.  
Concerns with Step-Wise Regression 
Olejnik, Mills, and Keselman (2000) stated the two primary uses for a multiple 
regression analysis were “(a) to explain variation in a response variable and (b) to predict 
future performance on a response variable” (p. 365). The intent of researchers using such 
statistical tools presumably was to reduce a list of predictor variables to those best 
(subset) able to identify/predict/explain the dependent variable(s). That was a goal of this 
investigation. In an earlier article, Huberty (1989) raised questions on the use of both the 
discriminant and regression analyses because of how variables were ordered or selected, 
especially when performed by computer programs.  
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Huberty 
His concerns (Huberty, 1989) revolved about the potential removal of an 
investigator from interactions with the data, because it was possible, using common 
sense, to select variables prior to making a determination on the order of their relative 
importance, especially when reported F values were similar. Huberty discussed 
alternatives to the stepwise analyses, but admitted there might be times when it was a 
reasonable approach, especially when the “. . . pool of response variables contained, say, 
some 40 to 60 or even more variables” (p. 66). It is worth noting the proposed study did 
not have such a large number of predictor variables. There were a huge number of data 
points in this study but only eight independent (predictor) variables. With a large number 
of variables the issue of data mining might have surfaced, which is commented upon later 
in this chapter. 
Thompson 
 Thompson (1995) claimed to have done a detailed study on limitations associated 
with stepwise applications, especially when using computer programs, and concluded: 
they failed to report correct degrees of freedom, which led to false statistical significance 
(Type I Error); they were not accurate when identifying a best set of variables; and they 
usually had sampling errors, which prevented others from replication of a study and 
determining similar findings. A step-wise discriminant analysis was not used.  
Olejnik et al. 
In the Olejnik et al. (2000) paper, it was pointed out “Selecting a subset of 
predictors from a pool of potential predictors continues to be a common problem 
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encountered by applied researchers in education” (p. 365), and it was advisable for 
researchers to give careful consideration to the potential array of predictor combinations 
prior to selecting a model from which to work. Their paper evaluated three approaches 
for determining the most favorable subset of predictors, and recommended use of two 
approaches (Mallow’s Cp statistic and Wherry’s adjusted R squared statistic) as tools to 
help in the selection of a tool for identifying true and extraneous predictors.  
Olejnk and colleagues concluded “The results of this study indicate that even with 
a small number of potential predictors, the success rate in identifying the authentic 
variables with these methods is not very good” (2000, p. 378). But later in the same 
manuscript the authors said, “If the pool of predictor variables is small and the potential 
predictors are not highly correlated, then either Cp or the stepwise method might provide 
a reliable solution to the variable selection problem” (p. 379). These issues were 
considered by the statistical consultants. 
Johnson and LeBreton 
Johnson and LeBreton (2004), in their article on the relative importance of 
prediction in studies using multiple regression analysis, presented another caution on the 
use of regression coefficients, particularly in organizational research. Those authors 
pointed out that during the past decade several methods (i.e., dominance analysis, and 
relative importance/weights) had converged to improve the predicting process between 
independent variables and a criterion variable. This material was viewed as yet another 
caution on how to approach the analysis, and it did not appear to be of imminent 
importance given the nature of the data collected.  
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Commentary 
On the basis of the stated reservations and a recommendation from the NEAR 
Center Statistical Consultant who provided those four critical articles, the expectation for 
using a reverse stepwise regression model for the analysis was questioned. Knowing that 
the number of potential predictor variables was small (eight independent variables) 
stimulated the concern. In so doing the researcher was seeking to mitigate the potential 
ambiguity (small number of potential predictors) mentioned by Oejnkl et al. (2000). Also 
the common sense approach to ordering the variables, advocated by Huberty (1989), had 
surface appeal but lacked the desired “rigor” found in identification of statistical 
significance. 
Other Tests 
 Logistical regression was an approach considered but it assumed a dichotomous 
dependent variable (i.e., scored as 0 or 1; present or absent) (Vogt, 1993). It was not 
applicable for this study because neither the dependent variable nor any of the 
independent variables were recorded on the basis of something being present or absent. 
Instead they were noted as continuous data. This study sought to determine relationships 
and make predictions based upon ordinal data. 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
 According to Vogt (1993) and Williams (1985) this statistical procedure was a 
method for studying a number of variables at the same time. The initial attraction rested 
with the fact it was appropriate for multiple independent variables, and this study had 
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eight of them. But a MANOVA typically required two or more dependent variables. This 
study had just one (team efficiency). 
Non-Linear Estimation 
 This approach was based upon the concept of using sample statistics to determine 
the probability of something occurring or being present in a population (Vogt, 1993). The 
idea of a non-linear relationship meant the resulting plotting of a regression/prediction 
line would not be straight. Regression analyses, usually linear models, were used to 
predict how the influence of one variable impacted another one; “. . . given a knowledge 
of the variable X and its relationship with variable Y, how can we take particular values 
of X and predict what corresponding values of Y would be?” (Williams, 1985, p. 141). 
With a belief that relationships would be found from the correlation coefficients, there 
was a strong appeal for this type of analysis in this study. 
Time Series Forecasting 
 Vogt (1993) explained it was a set of measures taken on a single variable over a 
period of time. This study would have such data, between 1985 and 2003, but it was 
unclear if it was amenable to a time-series analysis. Williams (1985) explained time 
series forecasting as a “. . . subtopic of multiple regression . . . often involves the use of 
related statistical methods in the assessment of effects or relationships observed among 
multiple observations taken across time” (p. 161).  
Williams (1985) also stated time-series analysis was applicable when there was a 
research hypothesis seeking to determine the before and after differences of an 
intervention over time. For this study the intervention would be the introduction of a new 
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manager to a team. But it was not clear if this was a legitimate approach to use because of 
the potential for the focus to be on team efficiency during the tenure of a single manager 
instead of comparing team efficiency across managers. Also this study was not an 
experiment, and according to Creswell (2002) time series was used with experimental 
designs when the intent was “. . . studying one group over time, with multiple pretest and 
posttest measures or observations made by a researcher” (p. 651). It was not clear how 
time series forecasting could have been used except as a variation of multiple regressions. 
Data Mining 
 The initial consideration of this approach led to the belief it might be a general 
term encompassing a number of procedures. Subsequent exploration revealed it was  
“. . . the automated extraction of hidden predictive information from databases” (retrieved 
from Kurt Thearling @ http://www.thearling.com). According to Thearling (2002), data 
mining was an approach for studying large amounts of data with the objective being to 
extract patterns or possible relationships normally hidden because of the difficulties 
associated with organizing huge amounts of information.  
The Statistic Glossary <http:www.stats.gls.ac.uk/steps/glossary> reported the 
process of data mining allowed for identifying and then validating apparently predictable 
sequences by application to new subsets of data, with a final objective being prediction. 
But it needs to be pointed out the proposed study had a well-defined set of eight-predictor 
variables and so it was questioned whether the data mining approach would be necessary 
or even appropriate. 
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Constructive Replication 
The notion of engaging in a constructive replication study was to use a  
“. . . statement of the empirical fact” (as reported earlier by Gamson & Scotch, 1964; 
Grusky, 1961; Roberts, 1959) “which the first author would have established, and then let 
the replicator formulate his own methods of sampling, measurement, and data analysis” 
(Borg & Gall, 1989, p. 362). This research acknowledged the potential deficiencies in the 
earlier work (Gamson & Scotch, 1964), sought to explore the validity of the stated 
recommendations, and to develop conclusions based upon current research. The three 
explanations those researchers (Gamson & Scotch) proposed for changing MLB team 
managers were considered, but the focus was not to determine if failure of leadership was 
a viable explanation for managerial succession. Instead, identification of selected data 
possibly related to team efficiency was sought. In that sense it was viewed as a predictive 
study.  
Justification to Replicate 
The reservations expressed by Gamson and Scotch (1964) regarding Grusky’s 
(1961, 1963) claims about MLB manager succession rates was justified from the 
perspective of scholarship; it was acceptable to question and replicate studies because 
knowledge is not always constant and should be tested until proven reliable. Furthermore, 
the questions raised by Gordon and Baker (1964) could be considered indicative of 
reservations presumably held by other researchers regarding the validity of Grusky’s 
(1963) and Kriesberg’s (1962) findings. Borg and Gall (1989, p. 361) pointed out  
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. . . researchers generally do not draw . . . extreme conclusions . . . One 
reason is that it is difficult to rule out all possible alternative explanations  
. . . Another reason is that flaws in research design and execution creep 
into most studies. Thus, many researchers do not reach final conclusions 
about the validity of a knowledge claim on the basis of a single study. . . .  
 
One-Way 
The Grusky (1963) claim was MLB teams with the poorest records (more losses 
than wins) would have the greatest number of managerial changes. Gamson and Scotch 
(1964) said a one-way causality explanation for such frequency of managerial succession 
was simply due to a manager having been fired because of poor performance by the team. 
It was termed a common sense explanation. But Grusky (1963) apparently was dubious 
about the substance of such an explanation, despite the availability of supporting data 
from the records reviewed. He claimed the one-way causality explanation did not 
sufficiently “stimulate careful empirical test” (cited by Gamson & Scotch, 1964, p. 69), 
which presumably was in accord with the position expressed by Borg and Gall (1989); 
needing replication studies to validate research claims.  
Three Options 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) said Grusky (1963) neglected to identify the empirical 
tests to use for such validation, and of the two options he had presented (one-way 
causality–poor team performance led to managerial firing; an undefined and presumably 
esoteric cause) they preferred the simpler one, one-way causality. They proceeded to offer 
the following three options for understanding the phenomenon of MLB manager succession 
(p. 69–70). 
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1. The common-sense one-way causality theory— . . . the field manager  
. . . is a major influence on a team’s performance. When the team is 
doing poorly, he is rightfully held responsible . . . A new manager 
typically will raise the performance of a team, since he can benefit by 
avoiding the errors that his predecessor made. 
2. The Grusky two-way causality theory—A managerial change inevitability 
upsets old patterns of behavior. New organizational policies . . . produce 
changes of great magnitude in the internal structure of the team. 
 Frequent managerial changes can produce important dysfunctional 
consequences within the team by affecting style of supervision and disturbing 
the informal network of interpersonal relationships . . . The resulting low 
primary group stability produces low morale and may thereby contribute to 
team ineffectiveness. Declining clientele support may encourage a greater 
decline in team morale and performance. 
 Clearly, a managerial change by the Grusky theory should produce a 
further deterioration in performance by an already faltering team. 
3. The ritual scapegoating no-way causality theory—Effect of the field manager 
on team performance is relatively unimportant. In the long run, the policies of 
the general manage and other front-office personnel are far more important  
. . . The field manager . . . has minimal responsibility for such . . . functions. 
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Talent 
Gamson and Scotch (1964) allowed for the fact baseball talent probably was the 
most important variable for team performance. They acknowledged the absence of 
reasonably competitive players likely would doom even the most talented manager to 
more failure than success, but pointed out the need to recognize the potential for the 
reverse situation. Absent a highly talented manager, a team composed of uncommonly 
gifted athletes would be expected to be successful more times than not, with the result 
being the person serving as the team manager would appear to be successful. Perhaps the 
time when a manager was most pivotal was when team talent was adequate to good. 
Strategic choices and decisions then became most revealing. This view was similar to the 
one reported earlier by Antonakis et al. (2004). There was an apparent dichotomy 
between leadership and management because many activities engaged in by high 
organizational officials likely involved concepts of leadership and management. But it 
encouraged moving in the other direction to allow for managers engaging in behaviors 
presumed to reflect leadership.  
Development 
Two issues identified by Gamson and Scotch (1964), during their discussion of 
the manager’s role, led to expanding the job description for a baseball team manager. 
First they claimed it was likely a highly competent manager could be entrusted with the 
development of talented but young players. In such an instance success had to be 
determined by means other than an immediate winning percentage on the playing field. In 
such instances the long-term objective took precedence and future success was sought in 
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lieu of an immediate winning percentage. Clearly such planning and visioning was a 
mark of leadership activity. The second issue was to reflect upon the fact there was 
somewhat of a finite pool from which managers were selected.  
Pool 
Earlier the issue of a relatively finite pool from which to select a new manager 
was addressed (Grusky’s quote from Brandmeyer, 1963, pp. 29-30). Some managers 
were people who had been fired by other teams. Others were coaches who moved up 
to the role of manager. The constant among all managers seemed to be people 
experienced with the sport, but the level of experience and extent of major league 
play apparently was not critical 
A Third Explanation 
Using the premise of there being relatively little difference among the talents of 
MLB managers, the Grusky (1963) claim of a correlation existing between managerial 
succession and team performance justifiably became suspect. Grusky’s (1961) earlier 
report on executive succession also was questioned by Gordon and Becker (1964), and 
shown to be wanting. Consequently, his conclusion about managerial changes was 
vulnerable especially given the critiques of Gamson and Scotch (1964), who claimed the 
firing of a manager exemplified the ritual termed scapegoating; an activity presumably 
engaged in to alleviate anxiety despite the realization, by some or many of the 
participants, the act was only a convenient way to place blame on a less fortunate or more 
convenient member of a tribe or social group. It was tantamount to offering a sacrifice in 
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hopes of appeasing mythical gods and at least temporarily deflecting attention from a 
need for internal improvement and/or re-organization. 
Sample 
This investigation was a critical study of the won-loss records and managerial 
changes of MLB teams from 1985 until the end of the 2003 baseball season. The 
rationale for using data from a period of 19-years was to negate possible questions about 
the stability of the information, such as were levied at Roberts’ (1959) work, which was 
criticized because of using a time frame of just three-years, and the study by Grusky 
(1961), which used a ten-year window of time. Additionally it was a constructive 
replication of work reported earlier (Gamson & Scotch, 1964), and responded to the 
admonitions from Gordon and Becker (1964) about the length of time needing to be 
adequate for including a reasonable sample of relevant data.  
Time Frame 
The decision to begin with the year 1985 was based upon the fact MLB started 
expanding the number of its teams two-decades before that date. It was believed there 
would be no difficulty in securing comparable data from all of those teams and thus 
justifies using the statistical analysis of a step-wise regression, or other appropriate 
statistic. An explanation of the expansion process as it impacted MLB was presented in 
the second chapter. 
Prospecting 
The detective work of locating the sources was accomplished with relative ease, 
excusing the labor involved. In fact, it went as anticipated. Contrary to possible claims of 
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the data gathering process serving as a vehicle for individuals to distort interpretations 
findings, the information used for analysis in this study was not subjected to any 
subjectivity. Once the procedures had been identified and agreed upon there was no 
bending of the rules by which information was collected and verified (see earlier 
comments under experimenter bias or handling reliability and validity). Intrusion of 
subjectivity would have moved the design away from a strictly quantitative paradigm. It 
would have introduced aspects of a qualitative approach, and that was not desired for this 
study. Instead, the adherence to pre-stated criteria allowed for use of appropriate 
quantitative statistical analysis, which then were juxtaposed against the eight hypotheses, 
as reported in Chapter Four (Results). Conclusions based upon acceptance or rejections 
of those hypotheses are presented in Chapter Five (Discussion).  
Won-Loss Ratio 
All requisite information was transposed onto computer spreadsheets with 
identical categories for each team studied. The won-loss ratio was calculated by dividing 
the total number of games during the total time a person served as the manager for a 
given team into the number of team wins. The resulting figure was a percentage based 
upon 100%. Illustrative of the process was a team presenting 90 wins and 72 losses in a 
162-game season. Dividing the 90 by the 162 yielded a percentage (team efficiency) of 
.555, which showed winning 56% of the time (upward rounding when the second number 
to the right of a decimal was five or higher). 
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Years Managed 
 The number of years managed was the number of completed seasons plus any 
partial season during when a person might have managed a team. Partial seasons were 
determined by the number of games managed divided by the total number played.  
Other Data 
The OBP, OPS, SBP, S9I, and WHIP were calculated by adding the team totals 
during the length of time a manager served. Once determined, each was divided by the 
computed years of tenure for a given manager. 
Missing Data  
The nature of the data pool was such it negated the potential problem of 
encountering missing data. If needed information was not available from one source it 
was secured from one or more of the other sources. A distinct advantage to this type of 
causal-comparative research was the permanency of the available data, as pointed out in 
the above section on sources for data. Of note was there was crosschecking on the 
accuracy of data reported in sources used. That means there were numerous instances 
when identical information was sought from other sources to ensue consistency.  
Variables 
 The one dependent variable was “team efficiency,” as determined by the won-loss 
records of the respective MLB Teams during the tenure of a given team manager. In this 
study eight factors affecting team efficiency, as measured by won-loss records, were 
treated as independent variables. They included: (a) the number of managers a team had 
(NM), (b) the length of time a manager was in tenure (LMT),  
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(c) OBP, (d) OBS, (e) S9I, (f) WHIP, (g) SBP, and (h) teams’ salaries (TS). Each number 
obtained was an average based on the longevity of a manager with a given team. Thus for 
any given team there were multiple data points coinciding with each manager. 
 An illustrative matrix for coding all relevant information is presented below as 
Table 2. Importantly, the number of entries in the first column, identification of Team 
Manager, was not a known fact at the time this study was developed. Ultimately it 
determined the number of rows in the table, which were used for the initial data 
recording. The legend for the matrix (see Table 2) notes the kinds of data recorded in 
each column. It is important to recognize the matrix does not reflect the independent 
variables stated above. Instead it is the means by which the data initially were recorded. 
From there the data were transferred to a spreadsheet according to the eight independent 
variables and prepared for input into the computer programs used for the analyses.  
A parenthetical comment needs mentioning before a reader goes to the matrix 
code. Team attendance records initially were considered as important indices of team 
performance. But the extreme variability in size of the stadiums introduced reservations 
about using such information. Alternatively considered was using only attendance figures  
Table 2 
Matrix for Recording Ten Items of Data Prior to Transfer to Spreadsheet 
(a) 
MN 
(b) 
TN 
(c) 
TE 
(d) 
LMT 
(e) 
OBP 
(f) 
OPS 
(g) 
S9I 
(h) 
WHIP 
(i) 
SBP 
(j) 
TTS 
          
          
 
140 
from a team’s home stadium. That too was discounted when it became evident many 
stadiums have undergone considerable renovation since 1985, and a number of teams 
have moved into new facilities, sometimes in the same city. Thus the potential value of 
attendance figures as a predictor of team efficiency was negated. By extension, use of 
earned revenues also was discounted because of the inflation factor and fact stadiums had 
changed and new items were being sold as a part of concessions. The matrix explanations 
are below and presented illustratively in Table 2. 
(a) Identification of a manager by name (MN) is in the first column. When a 
person managed more than one team the name appeared again with the 
relevant independent variables. 
(b) The second column presents the name of a team (TN). 
(c) The third column shows a manager’s won-loss record as a percentage (team 
efficiency) for the duration that person was managing a specific team (TE). It 
is necessary to note that a manager who worked with a specific MLB team 
and left but returned to that team at a later date has another row of entries, and 
the relevant statistical data for that second, or third, period. 
(d) Column four presents the length of time a manager served in a position 
(LMT). It is shown as months of tenure using the percentage of 0.5 as the 
mark for rounding upward. Thus any number between 0.0 and 0.4 was 
rounded downward, whereas from 0.5 to 0.9 were rounded up to the next 
whole number.  
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(e) The fifth column shows a respective team’s OBP during the entire time a 
given person served as its manger. It is an average of a team’s OBP during 
their tenure.  
(f) The sixth column shows the average on base plus slugging (OPS) percentage 
for a respective team during the entire time a given person served as its 
manager.  
(g) The seventh column presents the average S9I for a given team during the time 
when a person served as its manager 
(h) In the eighth column is information showing the average number of walks 
plus hits allowed per inning pitched (WHIP) for a team during the time a 
given person served as its manager.  
(i) The ninth column shows a team’s average SBP during the time a given person 
served as its manager.  
(j) The tenth, and final, column is the average player team salary (TTS) for the 
time a given person managed it.  
Approaches to Analyses 
Initially the statistical approach was planned as a step-wise regression analysis 
(Lomax, 1992; Streiner, 1986), and an explanation for such an analysis was presented 
earlier in this chapter. Subsequently it was learned that statistical procedure had been 
criticized, especially when a computer program was used. The intent was to apply such a 
program to the data analysis, but reportedly three possible problems existed: (a) incorrect 
degrees of freedom could be used by computer programs with the result being to display 
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false statistical significance, (b) stepwise methods apparently might fail to properly 
identify the best set of variables for given size, and (c) the procedure tended to exploit 
sampling error, which made replication unlikely or impossible (Thompson, 1995).  
Consultants Value 
Becoming aware of that potential limitation to the process for analysis was a 
distinct benefit of using multiple methodological and statistical consultants. 
Parenthetically it needs to be recognized all consultants were experts in their field and no 
denigration of abilities is imputed toward anyone. Instead, it showed the value of 
collaboration between and among like-minded persons with the goal being to further 
improve the manner by which the data were treated. It bears noting that all investigator 
interpretations of the data analyses were corroborated with one or two of the research 
experts, but the conclusions rendered at the end of this study are those of the investigator. 
Twofold Approach 
The plan was twofold. First relevant descriptive information was to be presented 
in Chapter Four. The central tendency information allows a reader to grasp general 
trends. 
Using data from 26-teams times the eight independent variables (items three 
through ten in Table 2) yielded 208 data points, but it needs to be noted the actual number 
of data points was substantially greater. Each of the 26-teams presented multiple 
managers.  
By way of illustration, assume each of the 26 MLB teams had at least five 
managerial changes during the period of time when the data were collected. A number 
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had more. Using that assumption meant the number of data points increased dramatically 
(8 independent variables X 26 teams = 208 data points; 26 teams X 5 managers = 130 
managers; 208 data points X 130 managers = 27,040 data points). The importance for 
acknowledging the potentially large number of raw scores rested with the kind(s) of 
parametric statistical analyses that were used for the analyses. A hypothetical team (Team 
A) presented average data for each of the eight independent variables according to the 
presumed five managers employed during the period of 19-years, as shown below as 
Table 3.  
Inferential Data Analysis 
There were five levels for the data analysis. All are presented in Chapter Four 
(Results) with accompanying commentary on the meaning for each set of data. The first  
 
Table 3 
Illustrative Matrix for Recording Average Managerial Raw Scores for Hypothetical Team 
A with Assumed Five Managers 
Managers 
by Name 
W/L 
% 
Tenure 
in Yrs. 
OBP 
Av. 
OBPS 
Av. 
S9I 
Av. 
WHIP 
Av. 
SBP 
Av. 
TS 
Av. 
Name 1         
Name 2         
Name 3         
Name 4         
Name 5         
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presentation is the descriptive presentation. Next is a process of correlational statistics. 
The objective was to look for possible relationships between each of the eight 
independent variables and the dependent variable (team efficiency), for each of the team 
managers with all 26-MLB teams. 
1. The descriptive data is presented in the form of tables, and bar graphs. 
2. There are correlational matrices for the managers with the eight independent 
variables. A potential hazard was completing so many correlations could result in some 
spurious findings (Type I Error).  
3. The next step (third level) was a correlational analysis of each team’s average 
efficiency with regard to the number of managers and the averages for a team’s eight 
independent variables during the period of 19-years.  
4. The fourth level was to make cross-team comparisons. It also involved a 
correlational analysis.  
5. Finally there was a regression analysis for the purpose of identifying the 
independent variable(s) best predicting team efficiency for each team and then for the 
entire set of 26-teams. The effort was to determine the values to be expected in the 
dependent variable given the known values of one or more independent variables (Vogt, 
1993). The result from the statistical computations was in F Ratios (a value or statistic), 
which in turn, was stated as being statistically significant or not significant.  
The F Ratio revealed the extent “. . . of explained to unexplained variance in an 
analysis of variance . . .” (Vogt, 1993, p. 94). The intent therefore was to learn if the 
means of the groups differed to the extent it was a result of chance sampling. If not then it 
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supported a null hypothesis (no difference). Interpretation of the ratio required use of a 
table of F values (Fisher, 1935) with consideration for the degrees of freedom and level 
of statistical confidence. The computer program handled all computations, and the 
investigator discussed the meaning of the findings with two of the statistical consultants 
before venturing forward with the reporting and subsequent discussion. 
The process for handling the information included transposing relevant data to 
spreadsheets, presenting the information to two of the statistical consultants who then 
performed the requisite analyses using SPSS programs. The level of statistical 
significance was set at .05; meaning a statistical finding could be believed to be true 95% 
of the time. 
Correlation 
It was the process for finding the extent to which two or more variables/things 
related to each other, and the number or index expressing that relationship was termed a 
correlation coefficient. This manner for studying the data was appropriate because 
correlational research does not involve subjecting subjects to different treatments. Instead 
it is a process for studying associations, in this instance the associations between and 
among scores or average scores. Of note was the fact the correlation coefficient did not 
allow for making any claim(s) about reasons for relationships (Williams, 1985).  
Illustration 
By way of illustration, one team manager’s high winning percentage might have a 
high relationship with the independent variable, on base percentage (OBP) but not with 
the independent variable strikeouts per nine-innings (S9I). Another manager’s high 
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wining percentage (team efficiency), with the same team but at a different time, might 
show a low correlation coefficient with the independent variable WHIP.  
In the first instance the interpretation would be the on base percentage was 
important because presumably it led to more runners scoring and thus enabled the team to 
win games. The lack of a high relationship to the independent variable S9I might be 
viewed as indicating the team’s pitchers did not strike out many batters during the course 
of a game and it was not an important factor for determining team efficiency. Possibly the 
winning team had an uncommonly high number of runs scored per game and so keeping 
opponents off the base paths was not important. Another option might be the opponents 
were unable to bring their base runners around to score needed runs. Thus the possible 
ineptitude of opponents might mitigate an impression of a manager being effective due to 
a favorable PI. Also it is possible that the winning team simply played much better 
defense and that was a major contributing factor to preventing the other team from 
scoring more runs. 
In the second instance (WHIP) the interpretation might be a high team efficiency 
was associated with pitchers not giving up many walks or hits to opposing teams. The 
result would be the other teams did not have opportunities to put players into scoring 
situations and so they did not score enough runs to win a ballgame. Such considerations 
supported the need for a careful selection of independent variables, especially those being 
viewed as of greater importance than the commonly held opinions on batting average, 
home runs, and pitchers won-loss records. For example, it was postulated that a high on 
base percentage (OBP) was a more important index than a high batting average. OBP 
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revealed both an individual and team’s ability to be in a position for scoring runs, while 
the batting average was predicated only on achieving a base hit. It did not account for any 
other means by which players managed to reach a base, such as by earning a  
base-on-balls. 
Clarification of Variables 
A correlation is interpreted as positive or negative, depending upon the nature of 
the variables. In the first illustration noted above, high team efficiency and low strikeouts 
per nine-innings could mean the team did not strikeout often and as a result had more 
chances for hitting the ball. Conversely, if the (S9I) was stated as representing the 
winning team’s pitchers’ efforts against opposing teams, it would be expected that a 
higher S9I ratio would be associated positively with a higher team efficiency rating, 
because the opponents would be denied opportunities for placing players on base. 
Describing the variables involved is important for making a correct interpretation of the 
correlation coefficient. That was done in consultation with the statistical consultants. 
Coefficient 
The coefficient is a number representing a characteristic of the variables in a 
formula. According to Creswell (2002) there are two approaches for using a coefficient. 
The coefficient alpha was a measure of internal consistency of items on an instrument 
when scored as continuous (i.e., strongly agree to strongly disagree). The coefficient of 
determination revealed the extent of variability in one variable that could be accounted 
for by another variable. 
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 For this study it was the latter coefficient that was expressed (coefficient of 
determination). The range of coefficients ranged from –1.0 to +1.0, and the closer a 
correlation was to the 1.0, regardless of direction, the greater was the value that the 
finding reflected a true relationship. Williams (1985) stated a null hypothesis (no 
difference) would anticipate a 0.0 (zero) correlation coefficient if truly there was no 
relationship between the variables. Citing Guilford (1956), Williams (1985, p. 132) 
presented the following guide for interpreting correlation coefficient (Table 4), with the 
caveat negative and positive values should be interpreted similarly, but with awareness of 
them being in opposite directions.  
Replication and Cross-Validation 
The quarreling among earlier researchers (Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Grusky, 
1961; Roberts, 1959) regarding the issues surrounding MLB managerial succession  
 
Table 4 
Correlation Coefficient Interpretation Guide from Guilford (1956) 
Level Degree of Significance 
< .20 Slight; almost negligible relationship 
.20 - .40 Low correlation; definite but small relationship 
.40 - .70 Moderate correlation; substantial correlation 
.70 - .90 High correlation; marked relationship 
> .90 Very high correlation; very dependable relationship 
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provided the impetus for this study. Expression of similar reservations, by other 
researchers, should be obviated with this investigation because all of the stated concerns 
of those earlier studies were addressed. Yet, the clarity of this study should allow other 
scientists to pursue work determining if the stated findings are repeatable. Furthermore, it 
is hoped such research would be done because it would lend credence to the findings 
reported. An ideal replication probably would take the form of a constructive-replication; 
such as this study was a constructive-replication of earlier work because of the ensuing 
controversy surrounding the reported findings. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine if MLB team efficiency, as measured 
by won-loss records, was affected by selected factors relevant to a manager’s tenure with 
the team. Overriding that issue was learning the effect managerial succession had on the 
performances of MLB teams. Re-stated, the issue was revealed as a question of whether 
apparent organizational leadership truly impacted organization outcomes. There was no 
intention to render judgments on decisions made by individual baseball clubs when 
managers were replaced. No value statements are presented endorsing a particular 
approach or course of action. Instead, the study analyzed eight selected teams’ statistics 
during respective managers’ tenure. A matrix of the eight sub-questions presented at the 
beginning of this chapter is provided below in Table 5. 
 This chapter presented an introduction that laid out the sequence of how the 
material was presented. The second section contained the overriding research question  
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Table 5 
Illustrative Matrix Showing Team Name and Number of Managers, Followed by the 
Eight Independent Variables. Identical Data was Recorded for Each Manager by Each 
Team 
Team 
Name 
Managers 
by Name 
W/L 
% 
Tenure 
in Yrs. 
OBP 
Av. 
OBPS 
Av. 
S9I 
Av. 
WHIP 
Av. 
SBP 
Av. 
TS 
Av. 
Team A          
Team B          
 
and eight subquestions, with associated null hypotheses. It was explained that the nature 
of this study was such it did not need to obtain approval from the UNL IRB  
(section three). 
Justification for following a quantitative research design was provided in section 
four, followed by a description (section five) of the kinds of data obtained (order and 
sequence of data). The sixth section explained the sample. The seventh section addressed 
the statistical analyses, plus some questions that surfaced regarding one commonly 
accepted approach (step-wise regression). That was followed by a short section on the 
topic of replication and cross-validation of the information from this study, and why such 
efforts would be worthy (section eight). The final part to Chapter Three is this summary. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS 
 The twofold goals of this study dictated that a quantitative design be used. The 
first of the two major objectives was to determine if there was justification for the firing 
of MLB managers, when a team displayed low efficiency or low indices of productivity. 
The alternative framing of that issue was whether such actions by the management of 
MLB teams were indicative of scapegoating. The second objective was to identify 
selected variables predictive of team efficiency.  
This chapter begins with a general description of the descriptive data. That is 
followed by the inferential analyses. The latter part of this chapter factually answers the 
research question and related eight subquestions. Reflections on the implications or 
relevance of the findings are reserved for the fifth chapter (Discussion). 
Descriptive Information 
 The relevance of central tendency data in this study served to introduce the I.V. in 
relation to the one dependent variable, PI. The number of MLB team managers serving 
with any given team during the 19-seasons studied varied considerably among the 26 
teams. Also there were appreciable differences with regard to average team efficiency 
ratings on the I.V.. Importantly such descriptive statistics obscured understanding the 
relationships between and among the variables because the picture was of only a single 
number. Those figures did not reveal changes in any of the variables, the extent of 
changes as a consequence of a manager, and did not illuminate if any valuable 
relationships materialized with a degree of consistency. To acquire such clarifying 
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information it was necessary to pursue a different type of data analysis, inferential 
statistics, which is reported in the second major section to this chapter.  
Central Tendencies 
Table 6 presents typical central tendency information for all of the variables 
studied during the period of 19-years. The vagueness of such information can be realized 
by looking into the third column labeled WL (won-loss). It was an indication of a 
manager’s winning percentage, but the percentages are not accurate indices because 
outliers (including managers with short-term assignments such as Luman Harris who 
took over the Baltimore Orioles in 1961 and posted a 17-win and 10-loss record = .630; 
PI = productivity index) were not discounted when making the calculations. Working 
down in the WL column, the mean, the third number from the top, is .95619. It conveys 
an average winning percentage for an average manager. Just below is the dispersion 
around that mean of .351674, which means the winning percentage for an average 
manager of the 26 teams, during the 19-years when the data was collected, was from a 
low of .6045 up to 1.3078. Exceeding a winning ratio of 1.0 was not possible because it 
implied that a team won more than every game played. Furthermore, a winning 
percentage of 96%, for every manager, was not realistic, especially since the highest 
winning percentage ever recorded was .741 by Fred Clark of the Pittsburgh Pirates in 
1902. The raw data inputted did not have any manager with a winning percentage beyond 
.704, which was accomplished by Joe Torre with the 1998 New York Yankees. This topic 
is addressed again later in chapter four during an explanation of histograms. 
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Table 6 
Central Tendency Information on the Independent Variables 
Statistics 
 TEAM Number of Managers W:L 
Years of 
Tenure OBP OPS SBP S9I WHIP 
Salary of 
Team 
N Valid 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 171 
 Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 12.29 7.53 .95619 2.7778 2.12467 .63576 .58740 5.26575 1.19762 3.0E+07 
Std. Deviation 7.036 2.377 .351674 2.84432 18.982846 .230295 .212118 1.971379 .434472 2.5E+07 
Variance 49.512 5.651 .123674 8.09017 360.3485 .053036 .044994 3.886337 .188766 6.4E+14 
Skewness .081 .737 3.686 1.856 11.557 -1.506 -1.570 -1.295 -1.419 1.202 
Std. Error of 
Skewness 
.186 .186 .186 .186 .186 .186 .186 .186 .186 .186 
Kurtosis -1.094 .077 32.616 3.562 139.567 1.828 1.608 1.300 1.917 1.144 
Std. Error of 
Kurtosis 
.369 .369 .369 .369 .369 .369 .369 .369 .369 .369 
Range 24 9 4.000 15.13 236.249 1.296 1.092 10.384 2.556 1.2E+08 
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In Table 6, excluding the data shown in the column under Team, the mean was 
the arithmetic average of all items entered into a given category divided by the total 
number of items. In the column for number of managers, the mean of 7.53 meant each of 
the 26 teams had an average of that many managers during the 19-year period. But at the 
bottom of that column the number nine indicated the range of managers varied 
considerably. The standard deviation of 2.377 conveyed that 50% of the variance around 
the mean was from a low of 5.15 up to 9.907. Thus the spread, plus and minus, one 
standard deviation from the mean was 4.757. Further evidence of dispersion around the 
mean was seen by the variance of 5.651, which also was reflected as a square root shown 
as the standard deviation (2.377). 
The skewness of .737 was interpreted as meaning there was considerable 
bunching of the number of mangers per team on both sides of the mean, but the sharpness 
of the spiking was modulated and presumably the mode and median scores were different 
from the mean. Again, the interpretation was that the scores, or data points, on the two 
sides of the mean probably were not symmetrical. The standard error of the skewness was 
.186, and the only inference was it indicated a variability equaling about 25% of the total 
asymmetrical profiles of the curves; fifty-percent of the curves were within .372 of the 
mean. That was viewed as further indication for the fact the mean, median, and mode 
were different for the number of managers per team. 
Sampling Error 
The kurtosis (degree of peakedness to a curve) of .077 was interpreted to mean 
the shape of the curve, on both sides of the mean, were more peaked (leptokurtic) than 
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spread out, and the standard error of the kurtosis (.369) was viewed as reflecting how 
much a single score on a curve varied from the mean of the sample. It was another way 
for reporting what was the apparent sampling error with the sample used for the study 
and the total population. With a sample of 171 the sampling error of .369 was considered 
small.  
But in the absence of more definitive information these central tendency data 
were estimates on the extent of relevance to each other, and they did not provide 
information adequate enough to address the research question and eight subquestions. 
The descriptive data provided an entry point for gaining an impression about how to 
possibly summarize the information. Inferential statistics, reported later in this chapter, 
augmented that information, and allowed for extrapolating to the general population of 
MLB managers. 
Another example of why it was important to have more information than just a 
single average can be found when looking in the fourth column, labeled years of tenure. 
The third number from the top showed an average tenure for MLB managers of 2.7778 
years. But the dispersion around that mean was 2.84432 and the range was 15.13 years. 
Again the issue of extreme scores needed to be addressed because of how they influenced 
a mean. Recognizing the limitations of such data encouraged looking at ways to analyze 
the information so interpretations would be more meaningful.  
Abbreviated Presentation 
Table 7 is an abbreviated presentation of the central tendency information using 
just the means and standard deviations for the respective independent and dependent 
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variables. But as stated above, the mean scores, even with accompanying standard 
deviations, did not reveal the necessary information for answering the research questions.  
 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for the Eight I.V. and One D.V. (Won-Loss) Using only Means and 
Standard Deviations 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Number of Managers 7.53 2.377 171 
W:L .95619 .351674 171 
Years of Tenure 2.7778 2.84432 171 
OBP 2.12467 18.982846 171 
OPS .63576 .230295 171 
SBP .58740 .212118 171 
S9I 5.26575 1.971379 171 
WHIP 1.19762 .434472 171 
Salary of Team 3.0E+7 25350879.61 171 
 
Table 7 shows the mean number of managers for each of the 26 MLB teams 
during the 19-years studied was 7.53, with a standard deviation of 2.377; 50% of the 
teams had between 9.907 and 5.153 managers. In some instances a person who managed 
one team later managed a different team, or perhaps even the same team. Consequently 
the 171 managers, shown under the column N, sometimes contained multiple entries for a 
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single person who was filling the role as team manager at a specific point in time and 
place. 
The third row in Table 7, years of tenure, shows each manager had an average of 
2.78 years of service in that capacity with a given team, but the variance (standard 
deviation) was 2.84 years. Thus 50% of the managers apparently served with a team 
between 5.62 and zero years. All that could be inferred from such a spread was instances 
occurred when a person perhaps had one game of tenure as a manager. Again it bears 
commenting that such information, while interesting for overview purposes, did not 
provide the kind(s) of information needed for answering the questions. 
Histograms 
 Another way for examining the descriptive data was to look at them as graphic 
presentations, which could be done because the data shown were ratios. Figures 3 
through 5 are histograms for the number of managers, won-loss percentages, and years of 
tenure per manager with a given team (the first, second, and third items in Table 7). 
Number of Managers 
 The explanation for Figure 3 was that determining the length of tenure for a 
manager with a given team could be accomplished by reading across the bottom axis 
(abscissa). The ordinate axis (frequency) shows the number of managers who served. 
Where the two lines intersected would be the point for a given person. The increments are 
in increments of two with the average of 7.5 at the highest point of the curve.  
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Figure 3. Number of Managers per MLB team. The abscissa (horizontal axis) reflects the 
number of managers and the ordinate (vertical axis) shows the frequency or duration of 
tenure for a Manager with a given team. 
 
Years of Tenure 
There are two points of interest with this histogram. First is the peak of the curve 
is reasonably symmetrical but the rise is slightly sharper than the run, which extends 
outward farther. The interpretation was fewer numbers of managers had short or long 
tenure with a team. Second, despite the number of managers equaling 171, the ordinate 
axis did not extend beyond the number 70. That can be interpreted as evidence for the 
fact many managers had modest terms of service. 
 Figure 4 was interpreted to mean a preponderance of the managers had short 
tenures with respective teams. The mean of 2.8 years (abscissa) and standard deviation of 
2.84 supported the fact during the 19-year period studied most of the MLB managers 
were fired from their job in less than four-years. The histogram shows  
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Figure 4. Histogram showing the years of tenure by the frequency or number of 
managers per MLB team.  
 
about 45 managers (ordinate) apparently served less than two-years, and perhaps another 
35 had less than three-years of service with a team. 
Won – Loss Ratios 
Figure 5 shows the won-loss ratios for managers are shown along the horizontal 
axis (abscissa) and the frequency or number of managers with respective ratios is 
reflected along the ordinate, or vertical, axis. As mentioned above, perusing the 
descriptive data can be misleading because of the tendency to believe a number of 
managers had highly successful terms of employment with a team, as reflected by the fact 
the mean win - loss ratio was .96 with a standard deviation of just .35. An alternative 
interpretation of such central tendency data could be that most managers approximated 
one win for each loss and that was the explanation for the ratio being in the mid 90s.  
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Figure 5. Won – loss ratios for respective MLB managers.  
 
With a season consisting of 162 games it means winning 81 games would enable 
a manager to claim a win-loss ration of 1.00, and when the standard deviation of .35 was 
factored into the mean score it showed that fully 50% of the managers had won–loss 
ratios between 1.31 and .61 (a high of 106 games and a low of 49). Such extremes 
included allowed many managers to fall within a standard deviation of the mean, which 
was deceiving in terms of presenting an accurate picture of differences. Also it was 
observed that at least one manager had a won–loss ration more than three standard 
deviations above the mean, but that data did not present any reasonable roadmap for 
interpretation of the aberrancy. 
 The next six figures show on base percentage (Figure 6), on base plus slugging 
percentage (Figure 7), SBP (Figure 8), S9I (Figure 9), WHIP (Figure 10), and the 
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reported total team salaries during the time when a manager was with a team (Figure 11). 
Each is related to one or more of the research questions.  
On Base Percentage 
 Figure 6 shows the expected frequency of reaching first base safely for each team, 
encompassing hits and walks, was 2.1 (mean score). The pronounced variability, as 
indicated by the standard deviation of 18.08, encouraged questioning the value for that 
statistic (OBP) despite claims it was highly regarded by baseball professionals. It was 
conjectured that a computer calculation error occurred. 
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Figure 6. On base percentage for respective MLB players per manager.  
 
On Base Plus Slugging 
 The on base plus slugging percentage (OBS) was a statistic that included the on 
base percentage (how often players reached base), mentioned under Figure 6, plus how 
they reached base; hitting a single, double, triple, or homerun. Conceivably some 
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managers were better able to communicate with their players in terms of helping them 
become more adept as productive hitters. Allowing for the fact the OBS ratio was a 
reflection of adding the on base percentage to the slugging percentage meant the number 
was expected to be appreciably higher than just the OBP. Figure 7 shows the mean OBPS 
was .64 with a one standard deviation variance of .23 (high of .87 to a low of .41).  
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Figure 7. On base plus slugging ratios for respective MLB managers.  
 
 What was most revealing from a study of Figure 7 was how disproportional the 
data were that led to the mean. Visual inspection led to the belief about 135 of the 171 
managers had teams with OBS percentages that were vastly superior to the percentages 
from the other managers. On that basis it would seem that there was considerable 
homogeneity in terms of resources (players able to produce) and it was more of an 
exception when a team manager worked with a low producing team. But, in the absence 
of inferential analyses all such comments had to be viewed as speculative. 
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Stolen Base Percentage 
Figure 8 shows how successful baseball teams were in their attempts to steal 
bases. It is important to recognize those figures represented the ratio of attempts to 
successful steals and had no relationship to the actual number of stolen bases. The ratio of 
attempts to successes was another index of productivity, and while sometimes players 
stole bases on their own volition most such attempts were by direction of a team 
manager. The mean of attempts to successes was .50 with a variance of .21 (upper bound 
of .71 and lower bound of .29). 
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Figure 8. SBPs for respective MLB managers. 
 
 Visual inspection of the figure allowed for conjecturing that some managers were 
more favorable toward base stealing and probably had players who were adept at the art. 
Again relying upon impressions made from observing the histogram, it appeared that 
about 140 of the 171 MLB managers included in this study encouraged such activity. 
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From such an impression it could be speculated that there were marked differences in the 
configuration of the teams; some relying more on base stealing and other means for 
manufacturing runs (small ball) while a smaller number of managers had teams that had 
been formed along lines of relying extensively upon other means for advancing runners 
and scoring runs. 
Strikeouts Per Nine Innings 
 As noted in the list of terms defined in Chapter One, the importance of this 
statistic rested with the fact it was not dependent upon team defense nor was it related to 
luck. It was an index of how effective a pitcher was at denying batters the opportunity to 
reach a base. The higher the ratio the more favorable was the situation for preventing an 
opponent from having players reach base and thus become a potential run to be scored. 
Preventing opponents from scoring runs was important because it meant a team needed 
fewer runs to become victorious, and thus resulted in a manager having a better win–loss 
ratio. Importantly, this statistic applied to all situations when a batter faced a pitcher, 
including pinch hitters. 
Figure 9 shows the mean S9I for the managers in this study were 5.27, with a 
standard deviation of 1.97 per nine innings (upper limit being 7.24 and lower being 3.3). 
Such an accomplishment was a consequence of the players, or more precisely the 
pitchers, and underscored the importance of resources made available to a manager. It 
was acknowledged that some managers might have sought pitchers able to provide higher 
strikeout ratios per nine innings but it had to be accepted that in most instances managers  
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Figure 9. S9I ratios for respective MLB managers.  
 
worked with the resources they were provided. Approximately 119 managers had teams 
with pitchers who struck out opponent players at a ratio exceeding the mean, but there 
were a number of managers with pitchers unable to manage more than a few S9I.  
Walks Plus Hits Per Inning 
Figure 10 showed the ratio of walks and hits per inning pitched. It was an 
indication of how effective a pitcher was at denying opponents the opportunity to reach 
base. The mean of 1.20 and standard deviation of .43 was interpreted to mean for the 
managers included in this study their respective teams allowed between 1.63 and .77 base 
runners per inning pitched. Lower ratios would be expected to be associated with more 
favorable productivity indices; higher won to loss ratio. What can be determined from the 
histogram is there were many managers with teams denying opponents opportunities for  
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Figure 10. WHIP ratios for MLB managers.  
 
reaching base, but also there were many managers, about 117, with teams that allowed 
opponents to reach base more than the average. How such information translated into a PI 
was indeterminable from this descriptive data. 
Team Salaries 
 The interest was in learning whether the amount of financial resources available 
and used by a team had any direct bearing on the PI, and indirectly the won – loss ratio 
presented by a manager. The logic underlying this topic was that more affluent teams 
would be able to acquire more of the outstanding players either by offering them greater 
financial incentives or possibly by virtue of having a more robust minor league system 
from which to draw exceptional players.  
It was recognized that total team salaries would be a difficult issue to resolve 
because during the 19-years studied the salaries of MLB players increased dramatically. 
 167
In some instances there were several exceptionally high-priced players on a team while 
on other teams there were almost none. Further confounding the salary issue was the fact 
many of the elite players were paid in different configurations; deferred compensation, 
escalating salary clauses, and even incentives for designated productivity. Thus the data 
shown in Figure 11 was viewed as just an average from the 19-years for the teams. For 
example, during the 19-year-period there were approximately 28 teams with total salaries 
in the 10 million dollar range. No interpretation could be made, and the only statement 
was that a given number of teams presented mean salaries of a stated amount during the 
period. 
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Figure 11.Average team salaries summarized over 19-years and unadjusted for inflation.  
 
 Most of the MLB teams reported average annual salaries of $30.2 million dollars 
during the 19-years of the study, with a standard deviation of slightly more than 25 
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million dollars. Obviously that average was heightened markedly during the more recent 
years. It was notable that three teams were above the mean, and one team was more than 
three standard deviations above the mean annual salary. How such data related to 
productivity indices and managers’ won–loss records could not be estimated from visual 
inspection.  
Summary of Descriptive Data 
 Information reported in this section indicated the I.V. clustered in two patterns. 
First, most teams did not have radically different profiles. Instead there seemed to be 
more commonality than dissimilarity. For example, Figure 8 (SBP) indicated some teams 
were less proficient but many seemed to be similar in such productivity. Other like 
examples were observed in Figure 9, which revealed most teams were reasonably similar 
in S9I, and Figure 10, which showed WHIP, also were not too different. The second 
impression created from observing the descriptive data was there were some notable 
differences, as revealed in Figure 11, the salaries. However it was not possible to make 
substantive comments that had bearing on the major research question or any of the 
subquestions. To do so required use of inferential analysis, as presented in the next 
section. 
Inferential Analysis 
Multiple Regression 
 A backward multiple regression analysis was done. All of the eight I.V. were 
entered at stage one with the objective being to predict the dependent variable of won-
loss efficiency (PI). The objective was to determine the degree of correlation with the 
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dependent variable (D.V.) by each of the I.V. (I.V.), and then by combinations of the I.V. 
The notion of a backward regression was the program allowed for removing each I.V., 
one at a time, based upon whether they met the stated criteria for significance of their F 
ratios. The program removed the variables on the basis of which had the lowest or 
smallest partial correlation to the D.V. (Table 8).  
 
Table 8 
Summary of Backward Multiple Regression comparing the Eight I.V. to the D.V. of Team 
Efficiency 
Model Variables entered (a) Variables removed (b) Method 
1 Total Salaries; OBP; Manager; 
OBS; MT; WHIP; S9I; SBP;  
 Entered 
2  On Base Percentage Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to-
remove > = 100) 
3  Manager Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to 
remove > = 100) 
4  Total Salaries Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to 
remove > = 100) 
5  Stolen Base Percentage Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to 
remove > = 100) 
6  Strikeouts per nine innings Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to 
remove > = 100) 
7  Managerial Tenure Backward (criterion: 
Probability of F – to 
remove > = 100) 
 
a = all requested variables entered; b = the D.V. of efficiency. 
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 The highest contribution to the prediction of the D.V. was removed first. The 
program reviewed the remaining I.V. and performed the same computations until the 
independent variable with the second smallest correlation was identified and removed. 
The process continued until no additional variables could be removed (Vogt, 1993). Step 
one shows all eight I.V. were entered. In step two the independent variable of OBS had 
been removed because it was determined that as a predictor criterion it exceeded the 
stated probability (.05) and could not have happened by chance alone. Also noted was 
that WHIP did not surface again in the model.  
The interpretation was those two I.V. were the most potent predictors of team 
efficiency. The next step in the model was to test the remaining I.V. against the D.V. of 
efficiency, or team efficiency (PI). It was observed that the next variable removed was 
OBP, followed by manager. The model continued testing the remaining I.V. and ended 
with the least influential being MT (manager’s tenure with a team).  
Attention is drawn to earlier presented Figures 6 (on base percentage), 10 
(WHIP), and especially 4 (tenure of managers with regard to winning efficiency). From a 
surface inspection of those data it was not possible to make a definitive statement about 
the relative importance of any of those I.V. with regard to being a potent predictor of 
team efficiency. But on the basis of the inferential analysis such a statement was made; 
managerial tenure was the least influential of the I.V. and on base plus slugging 
percentage (OBS) and WHIP were the most important.  
Table 9 is a summary of model one. It shows that the first step entered all eight 
I.V. (identified earlier as /a/ in Table 8) and the D.V. of team efficiency (identified earlier 
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as /b/). Because more than two variables were entered as predictors the R statistic was 
used (the R-squared statistic told that a coefficient of multiple determination was done 
between a D.V. and multiple I.V.). 
 
Table 9 
Model Summary for Multiple Regression Analysis 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .523a .273 .237 .307102 
2 .523b .273 .242 .306173 
3 .523c .273 .247 .305261 
4 .521d .271 .249 .304767 
5 .518e .269 .251 .304334 
6 .515f .265 .252 .304115 
7 .509g .259 .251 .304439 
a Predictors: (Constant), ts, managers, obp, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
b Predictors: (Constant), ts, managers, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
c Predictors: (Constant), ts, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
d Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
e Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, s9i, ops 
f Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, ops 
g Predictors: (Constant), whip, ops 
h D.V.: efficien 
 
Table 9 showed using all of the I.V. yielded a multiple correlation of .523, which 
resulted in the R square of .273 (row one for Model 1). That was interpreted to mean 
using all eight of the predictor variables, as shown in the legend below the table, resulted 
in correctly predicting efficiency 27% of the time (523 X 523). The adjusted R square of 
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.237 allowed for obtaining a better idea of how potent the eight variables were in 
predicting the criterion (subtracting the standard error of the estimate). According to Vogt 
(1993) the R-square was a statistic enabling researchers to gain a better understanding of 
the estimate by which the independent variable(s) explain the D.V.. Using that figure 
meant the eight predictors, in unison, were able to predict the D.V. 24% of the time. 
(third column in the first row). That left 76% unexplained and indicated a problem with 
the model used in the study.  
The final column in Table 9 showed the standard error of the estimate, which was 
related to the regression line. It told how far from the prediction line a given score might 
lie, or the extent of the variance around that line. Another way to interpret that statistic 
was to accept it as an estimate of the error rate when trying to predict a given score. 
Lower scores for the standard error of the estimate meant there was greater linear 
relationship between the criterion and predictor variables, and thus the possible extent of 
error due to sampling was smaller. The reported standard error of the estimate for step 
one was .307102. That was viewed as indicating at least a 30% error when using the I.V. 
in this model; hardly a robust prediction figure.  
 The next steps in the summary (Table 9) showed how the number of constants 
(predictor variables) was modified in the process of determining which were the best at 
predicting the D.V. of team efficiency. Step seven (legend /g/) showed that OPS (on base 
plus slugging) and WHIP (walks plus hits allowed per nine-innings) were the two most 
potent predictors of team efficiency; ratio of wins to losses. The R square statistic 
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reported those two variables were able to correctly estimate productivity indices almost 
26% of the time (.259).  
Using the adjusted R square of .251 allowed for believing those two predictor 
variables alone were effective at estimating team efficiency about 25% of the time. 
Allowing for the fact the use of all eight I.V. provided an adjusted R square of .237, or a 
predictive ability of almost 24%, it seemed best to use just the OPS and WHIP variables 
to predict team efficiency, but they were not viewed as being notable since at least 74% 
of the variance was unaccounted for, and an issue requiring further study. 
Analysis of Variance 
 Vogt (1993) explained the analysis of variance (ANOVA) was a procedure for 
determining the statistical significance of differences among mean scores of two or more 
groups when one or more factors were involved. Thus it was an extension of the more 
commonly used t-test, which was limited to use with just two groups. A caveat to use of 
the ANOVA was it allowed for determining how categorical I.V. (attributes that comprise 
distinct groups) related to a continuous D.V. (expressed as interval or ratio over a large 
range).  
In this study the D.V. was productivity or efficiency and the I.V. were: total salary 
for a team, manager tenure, on base percentage, number of managers per team, walks 
plus hits per nine innings, S9I, SBP, and on base percentage. In the following Table (10) 
is information on the seven-step model used to analyze the relationships between the 
D.V. (efficiency) and all of the predictors (I.V.). In the first model all of the independent 
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Table 10 
Analysis of Variance table for the criterion variable (efficiency) and predictor variables 
(I.V.) 
ANOVA 
Model  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.746 8 .718 6.616 .000a
 Residual 15.278 162 .094   
 Total 21.025 170    
2 Regression 5.745 7 .821 8.755 .000b
 Residual 15.280 163 .094   
 Total 21.025 170    
3 Regression 5.742 6 .957 10.271 .000c
 Residual 15.282 164 .093   
 Total 21.025 170    
4 Regression 5.699 5 1.140 12.271 .000d
 Residual 15.326 165 .093   
 Total 21.025 170    
5 Regression 5.650 4 1.412 15.250 .000e
 Residual 15.375 166 .093   
 Total 21.025 170    
6 Regression 5.580 3 1.860 20.109 .000f
 Residual 15.445 167 .092   
 Total 21.025 170    
7 Regression 5.454 2 2.727 29.422 .000g
 Residual 15.571 168 .093   
 Total 21.025 170    
a Predictors: (Constant), ts, managers, obp, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
b Predictors: (Constant), ts, managers, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
c Predictors: (Constant), ts, lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
d Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, s9i, sbp, ops 
e Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, s9i, ops 
f Predictors: (Constant), lmt, whip, ops 
g Predictors: (Constant), whip, ops 
h D.V.: efficien 
 
 175
variables were entered. Of note was model seven revealed the two most powerful 
predictors were WHIP and OBP. That point is addressed below. 
The explanation of Table 10 is as follows. The sum of the squares column 
represented the adding of the deviation scores from the mean after they were squared. 
Regression signified prediction, or how well a given variable could be predicted by one 
or more variables. The smaller the variance the stronger was the predictive power. The 
intent was to learn the extent to which there was regression toward a mean score; greater 
similarity implied better predictive ability. Residual was the part of the D.V. (efficiency) 
not accounted for by the predictor(s). Sometimes it could be presented as an error term 
because it was a part of the model unexplained by the I.V.. 
 The column identified as /df/ reflected the degrees of freedom. It was obtained by 
the computer program multiplying the number of columns in the table minus I times the 
number of rows minus 1. Since there were eight I.V. and one D.V. the formula for 
determining the degrees of freedom was: 
df = (R – 1) (C – 1) = (9 – 1) (2 – 1) = 8 X 1 = 8. 
 When using the ANOVA statistic the variance from the mean is termed the mean 
square (MS). It is the sum of the variance determined by adding together all of the square 
deviation scores and dividing by the degrees of freedom. The F ratio reflects the 
unexplained variances between what is known and not known in the ANOVA. Vogt 
(1993) explained it as the difference between “the ratio of between-group variance to the 
within-group variance” (p. 94). The higher the F ratio the lower the likelihood the 
observed differences occurred as a consequence of chance (type I error). Tracking each of 
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the seven models revealed that while levels of significance wee achieved with each, the 
one with the greatest statistical significance was the seventh (F = 29.422). Thus the I.V. 
of WHIP and OBP alone provided more than 26% of the predictive power toward 
determining efficiency; a fact consistent with the multiple regression analysis presented 
earlier in Table 8.  
Coefficients 
 Table 11 shows the unstandardized and standardized coefficients and the 
collinearity statistics for the eight independent variables as they related to the dependent 
variable of team efficiency. This table reported data for the discriminant functions; a form 
of regression analysis that allows a researcher to identify/discriminate which of the 
independent variables was most effective at predicting the dependent variable 
(efficiency), and to determine the relative importance of each predictor to the model. 
Again it bears mentioning there were seven models used by the computer program. Table 
11 follows the explanation of its contents. 
 Prior to explaining the contents in Table 11, it bears noting that the dependent 
variable (team efficiency) was identified as the constant in each level/model. It was the 
variable being predicted by the eight independent variables. The discriminant analysis 
was a form of regression with the objective being to classify the I.V. into categories 
related to the D.V. The categories revealed which of the eight independent variables 
made the strongest contribution(s) to the dependent variable category. In Table 11 the 
strength of predictor variables was revealed by the variable inflation factor (VIF); higher 
values meant greater affinity.  
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Table 11 
Coefficients and Collinearity Statistics for the Discriminant Analysis 
Coefficientsa
.848 .084 10.123 .000
.000 .001 -.012 -.162 .872 .798 1.252
.011 .009 .091 1.199 .232 .787 1.271
.000 .001 .008 .123 .903 .965 1.036
3.874 .847 2.537 4.574 .000 .015 68.590
.466 .528 .281 .882 .379 .044 22.639
-.055 .052 -.310 -1.069 .287 .053 18.742
-1.992 .297 -2.461 -6.710 .000 .033 29.984
.000 .000 .057 .662 .509 .595 1.681
.849 .083 10.192 .000
.000 .001 -.012 -.158 .875 .800 1.251
.011 .009 .090 1.200 .232 .787 1.270
3.872 .844 2.536 4.586 .000 .015 68.566
.461 .525 .278 .878 .381 .044 22.517
-.056 .052 -.311 -1.078 .283 .053 18.708
-1.988 .294 -2.456 -6.760 .000 .034 29.604
.000 .000 .057 .663 .508 .595 1.681
.842 .070 12.089 .000
.011 .009 .089 1.193 .235 .802 1.247
3.919 .788 2.566 4.972 .000 .017 60.113
.445 .514 .269 .867 .387 .046 21.677
-.058 .048 -.327 -1.202 .231 .060 16.643
-1.993 .291 -2.462 -6.839 .000 .034 29.244
.000 .000 .059 .683 .496 .600 1.667
.840 .069 12.092 .000
.011 .009 .085 1.149 .252 .806 1.240
3.975 .783 2.603 5.078 .000 .017 59.465
.363 .499 .219 .727 .468 .049 20.469
-.045 .044 -.253 -1.017 .311 .071 14.053
-2.016 .289 -2.491 -6.979 .000 .035 28.843
.845 .069 12.253 .000
.011 .009 .086 1.167 .245 .807 1.240
4.183 .727 2.739 5.753 .000 .019 51.478
-.038 .043 -.211 -.871 .385 .075 13.272
-1.988 .286 -2.455 -6.954 .000 .035 28.300
.842 .069 12.232 .000
.011 .009 .086 1.166 .245 .807 1.240
3.746 .526 2.453 7.121 .000 .037 26.980
-1.918 .274 -2.369 -6.995 .000 .038 26.082
.838 .069 12.174 .000
3.891 .512 2.548 7.602 .000 .039 25.481
-1.966 .271 -2.429 -7.248 .000 .039 25.481
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In the first model all eight independent variables were reported but the VIF values 
for OPS (68.590) and WHIP (29.984) were the highest. The second model deleted the on-
base percentage statistic. That meant it had the lowest relative contribution to predicting, 
the D.V. Again the OPS (68.566) and WHIP 29.604) were the two highest VIF values. Of 
interest was the SBP statistic was the third highest VIF value in the first two models, and 
also in the third and fourth models. But it disappeared in the fifth model. The following 
paragraphs explain the rest of Table 11. 
 The constant used in each of the models was team efficiency. Unstandardized 
coefficients were a means for computing the discriminant scores using just the raw scores 
(unstandardized). According to Williams and Monge (2001) such scores were not truly 
accurate indices for determining the relative contribution of variables to the prediction 
because measurement differences were inherent in the data. But the unstandardized 
coefficients were considered a practical approach for understanding the overall 
relationships, particularly when multiple discriminant analyses were done, as well as 
providing a means for estimating the extent of contribution made by each of the 
independent variables to the discriminant function. The standardized coefficients, on the 
other hand, were reflections of equalized measurement scales with a mean of zero. 
Under the column of unstandardized coefficients are /B/ and the standard error. 
The B coefficient in a multiple regression analysis is considered a partial, because all 
other predictors are kept constant. Thus it is a means for determining the extent of change 
in predictive power as a consequence of the variable(s) included. The standard error 
indicated the degree to which the unstandardized coefficient may be considered reliable. 
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It was the variance around the mean of /B/. An illustration is the /B/ value for OPS in 
model one was 3.874 with a standard error of .847. In essence the .847 was “the standard 
deviation of the sampling distribution. . . .” (Vogt, 1993, p. 218), which meant that it was 
the amount of error in the predictor variable (OPS) could be expected to be plus or minus 
.847 from the mean of 3.874 (4.721 – 3.027). Importantly, contributions from the other 
independent variables were kept constant when calculating the values for OPS, which is 
why it was viewed as a partial predictor (Williams & Monge, 2001). Allowing for the 
fact OPS had the highest /B/ value it also had a high variance (and that led to believing its 
predictive importance might be suspect if other independent variables were used). 
 Model one showed the /B/ value for OPS (on base percentage) and WHIP (walks 
plus hits per innings pitched) was markedly greater than any of the other independent 
variables (3.874 and –1.992 respectively). It could be anticipated those two factors would 
surface as being the most potent predictors, and in fact did so as revealed in the seventh 
model. OPS and WHIP consistently were the best predictors for the dependent variable, 
identified as the constant (team efficiency). 
 The Beta shown under the standardized coefficient heading indicated the 
standardized regression coefficient, and reports variances (increases or decreases) for 
independent variables in standard deviation scores. Notably all other I.V. are kept 
constant when determining each Beta. The next column identified is /t/. That shows what 
is considered to be the critical region for accepting or rejecting a sample statistic when 
using null hypotheses. If a sample mean falls within a defined critical region it is 
considered unlikely that “the difference between the sample mean and the population 
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mean is due to chance alone” (Vogt, 1993, p. 52), and in such instances it is reasonable to 
reject a null hypothesis.  
Accepting an alternate hypothesis would mean there was a statistically significant 
difference between the means. The next column shows the level of statistical significance 
for a given variable within a model. In model one it can be seen that both OBP and WHIP 
are significant at least at the .000 level of confidence. None of the other independent 
variables came close in terms of being statistically significant. 
 Under collinearity statistics are two columns indicating the tolerance, or margin of 
error allowable for given measurements. The premise of collinearity is to explain how 
two or more independent variables are correlated when performing a multiple regression 
analysis. Importantly the concept is restricted to the predictor variables (Vogt, 1993). As 
shown in prior tables, the two most potent predictor variables were on base percentage 
and walks plus hits per nine innings (see model seven in Table 11).  
Of particular interest was the column identified as VIF (variable inflation factor). 
That column indicated the extent to which a given variable potentially was inflated as a 
consequence of undetermined influence from other independent variables. Allowing for 
the fact it was not possible to precisely tease out the exact degree of contribution from a 
specific I.V., the VIF was a number that included the contribution of a given factor plus 
what might have been contributed by one or more factors. According to Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black (1992) when a VIF reached or exceed 10.0 it was to be considered as 
exceedingly significant. In the first model of Table 11 there were four independent 
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variables (on base plus slugging stolen base percentage, strikeouts per nine innings, and 
walks plus hits per nine innings) beyond that benchmark.  
As the backward regression progressed and eliminated the least influential 
variable for the next model, the same four independent variables surfaced. Progressing 
down the list of models in Table 11, the final level (model seven) shows the two most 
influential variables to the prediction of team efficiency were on base plus slugging and 
walks plus hits per nine innings; respectively they each showed a VIF of 25.481. That 
result was consistent with earlier reported statistical findings related to the importance of 
those two independent variables. 
Summary 
 This section on inferential analysis reported on three approaches to analyses; a 
multiple regression, analysis of variance, and coefficients and collinearity statistics for a 
discriminant analysis. It was revealing to learn two of the I.V. (on base plus slugging 
percentage and walks plus hits per innings pitched) emerged as being highly significant 
from all analyses. The next section of this chapter addresses the inferential statistics with 
regard to the overriding hypothesis and eight subquestions. 
Answering the Questions 
Hypothesis 
 Stated as a null, it claimed there was no causal dependence between managerial 
change and MLB team performance as reflected by the respective productivity indices. 
Allowing for the fact there were some extraordinary circumstances resulting in 
pronounced outliers (some managers served for short periods and had exceptional 
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efficiency records) it was determined managerial performance was not the overriding 
issue in team efficiency. But before accepting this null hypothesis claim it is necessary to 
address each of the eight subquestions with regard to specific facts culled from the 
inferential statistical analyses. 
Subquestion One  
1. How did the number of managerial changes impact team efficiency as 
measured by won—lost records? This question related to the issue of team 
efficiency and allowed for a comparison to the earlier studies on managerial 
succession by Grutsky (1961), Gamson and Scotch (1964), and Roberts 
(1959). Commentary was reserved for the fifth chapter (Discussion). 
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team efficiency as a 
consequence of managerial changes. 
The multiple regression analysis (Table 8) allowed for stating that managerial 
tenure contributed to the overall predictive power of team efficiency but it was among the 
earliest I.V. deleted from the model. Note it appeared as the entry in the seventh model, 
which indicated it made the least contribution to the criterion variable; managerial change 
influenced team efficiency. Based upon that observation it was decided the null 
hypothesis should be accepted. Supporting that observation was the fact Table 9 (model 
summary for the multiple regression analysis) showed that managerial tenure was among 
the I.V. deleted by the third step of the backward regression. It bears repeating that the 
process for the regression was to load all variables and remove those making the least 
contribution to the predictive power for team efficiency. 
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The ANOVA, as reported in Table 10 revealed whether statistical significance 
existed among mean scores. The legend below that table presents the variables included 
at each step of the analysis, and it was observed that the two variables related specifically 
to managers (managers tenure and number of managers per team) both were eliminated at 
the conclusion of the second model. 
The coefficients and collinearity statistics for the discriminant analysis (Table 11) 
show all I.V. entered into the first model. But neither of the two variables directly related 
to manager (length of tenure and number of managers) had a notable variable inflation 
factor (VIF).  
Based upon the data analyses it was concluded that managerial change was not 
related to team efficiency. Consequently the null hypothesis of there being no statistical 
difference in team efficiency as a consequence of managerial changes was accepted. 
Subquestion Two 
2. How did managerial tenure impact team efficiency? Did the length of time a 
manager spent with a given team have an impact on team efficiency? 
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team efficiency as a 
result of the duration of a manager’s tenure with a team. Commentary was 
reserved for the fifth chapter (Discussion). 
As commented upon in the results reported above for managerial changes, the 
issue of managerial tenure was among the earliest I.V. to be excluded from additional 
model analysis during the multiple regression, ANOVA, and coefficients and collinearity 
statistics for the discriminant analysis. On that basis it was determined to accept the null 
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hypothesis of there being no statistical difference in team efficiency as a result of the 
duration of a manager’s tenure with a team.  
Subquestion Three 
3. How did team OBP impact team efficiency? This statistic reported how often 
batters were able to reach base, as a result of getting a base hit, a walk, or 
being hit by a pitch. It was the relative worth of hitters versus pitchers. The 
higher the percentage for hitters the greater was the likelihood of a team’s 
efficiency being higher. Extending this to a meaningful conclusion resulted in 
the likelihood of a team winning more ballgames because of the higher team 
efficiency rating. The logic behind the claim was more base runners would 
mean more opportunities for runners to score runs, and thus a team would be 
apt to outscore opponents. 
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team OBP as a 
consequence of managerial succession. Commentary was reserved for the fifth 
chapter (Discussion). 
On base percentage was not an important predictor of team efficiency. Table 8 
(summary of the multiple regression) showed it was removed from the backward multiple 
regression analysis by the second model. The implication was while it contributed to the 
prediction of the criterion variable (team efficiency) its relative worth was masked by 
other variables with apparently greater value. The regression model summary (Table 9) 
shows on base percentage actually was eliminated after the first step. 
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Table 10 (ANOVA) also supported the belief on base percentage made a 
relatively negligible contribution to predicting the constant of team efficiency since it was 
removed after the first stage of the model. Table 11 (coefficients and collinearity statistics 
for the discriminant analysis) showed the VIF (variable inflation factor) in model one to 
be just 1.03, and by the second level it was absent.  
On the basis of managerial succession being equated with the constant of team 
efficiency, the independent variable of on base percentage did not appear to have enough 
support to refute the null hypothesis. Thus the null of there being no statistical difference 
in team OBP as a consequence of managerial succession was accepted.  
Subquestion Four 
4. How did team OBS impact team efficiency (OBS)? This statistic revealed 
how well players were able to get on base plus the extent of damage done to 
an opposing team by virtue of getting on base. The manner for getting on base 
was the issue with this statistic; base-on-balls, singles, doubles, triples, and 
homeruns. It was presumed that the higher the OBS (more singles, doubles, 
triples, and home runs) the greater was the likelihood of a team’s efficiency 
being higher.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team OBS percentage 
as a consequence of managerial succession. Commentary was reserved for the 
fifth chapter (Discussion). 
On base plus slugging was determined to be an important predictor of team 
efficiency. As noted in the commentary related to Table 8 (summary of multiple 
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regression) this variable, and also WHIP, were removed after the first stage of the 
analysis. The interpretation was they comprised the most potent predictors of the constant 
(team efficiency). In Table 9 (model summary for the multiple regression analysis) it is 
seen those two variables together contributed 26% of the predictive power, and when all 
of the eight I.V. were used the value was slightly over 27%. 
The ANOVA results (Table 10) supported the results from the multiple regression 
analysis. It was observed that OPS, and WHIP, were the two I.V. surfacing in the seventh 
model. That meant they had mean scores most closely resembling that of team efficiency 
and were the best indicators of the constant. 
Table 11 (coefficients and collinearity statistics for the discriminant analysis) 
supported the findings reported above for on base plus slugging (OPS), and for WHIP. 
Both emerged as the most potent predictors, as shown in the seventh model. Earlier in 
this chapter it was mentioned that a VIF of ten or higher was considered to be highly 
significant. Attention is called to the fact OBPS and WHIP consistently evidenced high 
scores during the model evolution and both ended with a score of 25.48. 
On the basis of the results reported under subquestion four, the null hypothesis of 
no statistical difference in team OBS percentage as a consequence of managerial 
succession was rejected. That allowed for accepting the alternate hypothesis. The 
implication of this finding is addressed carefully in the next chapter because of its 
disassociation to managerial succession. 
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Subquestion Five 
5. How did S9I impact team efficiency? It has been claimed that strikeouts were 
independent of a team’s ability to play defense, and good fortune, because 
they denied opponents the opportunity to put a ball into play. The higher the 
ratio of strikeouts by a team’s pitchers per nine innings the better was the 
chance for that team to win a ballgame, because it kept opponents off the base 
paths.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team PI as a 
consequence of strikeouts per nine-innings. Commentary was reserved for the 
fifth chapter (Discussion). 
The impression created by viewing the Figure (9) depicting S9I was that a number 
of teams, and their respective managers, had pitchers who stuck out opponents at a rate 
higher than the average (slightly more than 5 per nine innings). In fact, a superficial 
examination of the central tendency data indicated about 120 of the 171 managers had 
pitchers who were able to deny opponents the chance for reaching a base because of 
strikeouts. But at the same time it appeared there were a notable number of managers 
whose teams did not have pitching resources capable of striking out opponents, as shown 
by the bars to the left of the mean. Coming to a reasonable decision on the apparent value 
of such information with regard to team efficiency was difficult and so the use of 
inferential statistics was employed.  
The multiple regression analysis (Table 8) showed that S9I actually were not a 
strong indicator of team efficiency. It emerged at the sixth level of the model and by 
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doing so was interpreted as being among the least influential of the I.V.. Table 9 
(summary for the multiple regression) allowed for identifying S9I as an I.V. deleted at the 
point of the fifth level. The interpretation was that when it was combined with the other 
I.V. it allowed for predicting team efficiency at a rate of about 27%. But determining the 
contributing of that specific I.V. was difficult because at the next stage of the model it 
was removed and the predictive potency of the remaining three I.V. was 27%. The final 
model level, stage seven, showed the most influential predictors to be WHIP and OBS, 
which has been commented upon above. 
The ANOVA (Table 10) supported the relative questionable contribution of S9I 
because its final appearance was at stage five, along with a number of other I.V.. An 
important issue was that collectively the I.V. were statistically significant at better than 
the .000 level of confidence at each stage of the model. But the most potent predictors 
were revealed at the final stage, when the contributions from the other I.V. had been 
removed from the model. 
The coefficients and collinearity statistics for the discriminant analysis (Table 11) 
were consistent with earlier reported information on the value of the S9I. But it was 
notable that the VIF for the S9I I.V. was above 13 at stage five, and at each of the 
preceding stages it ranged upward to almost 19. Yet at the sixth level it was deleted from 
the model. The interpretation was that S9I, an indication of pitchers’ ability to prevent 
opponents from reaching base, was influential but not one of the most important criteria 
for enhancing team efficiency. 
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On the basis of the results reported under subquestion five, the null hypothesis of 
there being no statistical difference in team S9I as a consequence of managerial 
succession was accepted. The implication of this finding is addressed in the next chapter.  
Subquestion Six 
6. How did walks plus hits allowed per inning pitched impact team efficiency 
(WHIP)? This was the number of times an opponent was able to put players 
on base. The lower the number, the fewer chances there were for another team 
to score runs. Conversely, the higher the ratio the greater was the likelihood 
for opponents to scores runs.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team WHIP as a 
consequence of managerial succession. Commentary was reserved for the fifth 
chapter (Discussion). 
Commentary on the WHIP independent variable was given above when 
explaining the results for the on base plus slugging percentage. It was stated that WHIP 
was one of the two most important predictors of team efficiency, and that is borne out by 
data presented in Table 8 (summary of the multiple regression), which shows it and OPS 
(on base plus slugging) do not appear beyond the first stage of the model. Next in Table 9 
(model summary for the multiple regression analysis) WHIP is one of just two predictors 
to emerge in the seventh and final stage of the model, along with OPS. Those two I.V. 
comprise 26% of the predictive power for team efficiency, and it bears pointing out that 
all of the eight I.V. combined yielded slightly more than 27% of the predictive power.  
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The ANOVA (Table 10) also agreed with the results on the potency of WHIP. 
When combined with OPS the F value of 29.422 (explained to unexplained variance from 
between group to within group variance) was higher than for any prior level and 
statistically significant beyond the .000 level of confidence. In Table 11 (coefficient and 
collinearity statistics for the discriminant analysis) both WHIP and OPS showed variable 
inflation factors of 25.481, and were the only I.V. to emerge at that level. 
The null hypothesis of no statistical difference in team WHIP as a consequence of 
managerial succession was rejected. The alternate interpretation was that a higher ratio of 
walks and hits per inning pitched by an opponent did result in enhanced team efficiency. 
The implication of this finding is addressed in the next chapter (Discussion).  
Subquestion Seven 
7. How did SBP impact team efficiency? This statistic was determined by 
comparing the number of attempts to steal a base with the degree of success 
attained. It was a statement of how successful a player or team had been with 
regard to their attempts. Importantly, it discounted the total number of steals 
because that number was apt to be a misleading figure if there were numerous 
unsuccessful attempts. Instead, it was approached as done by Sheehan of 
Baseball Prospectus. Sheehan (2004), who claimed a SBP ratio of fewer than 
75% was not productive because so many present-day teams relied 
extensively on power games (i.e., moving runners along the base paths by 
virtue of a base hit, preferably involving multiple bases, which was the 
antithesis to “little ball”).  
 191
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team SBP as a 
consequence of managerial succession. Commentary was reserved for the fifth 
chapter (Discussion). 
The lure of stealing bases was that it created opportunities for a team to advance 
runners without benefit of a base hit. Thus the stolen base was an offensive statistic but 
completely dependent upon a team having a base runner and one who was able to either 
outwit or outrun an opponents’ defense. Notably the issue of stolen bases required that a 
team be capable of placing a player on a base so the act could occur. In Table 8 it can be 
seen that the independent variable of SBP appeared at the fifth level, and presumably had 
some significance for team efficiency. But in Table 9 (model summary for the multiple 
regression) it is noted that SBP does not appear beyond the fourth level. Thus it was 
uncertain to what extent that I.V. was a valuable predictor for the constant of team 
efficiency. 
In Table 10 (ANOVA) it was determined that SBP was removed after the fourth 
level, where it had been combined with three other I.V.. The relative contribution from 
SBP was not determined until studying Table 11 (coefficients and collinearity for the 
discriminant analysis). There it was seen that at the fourth stage of the model OBP had a 
VIF in excess of 20, and presumably was an important predictor. But at the next level it 
was deleted, which led to the interpretation it did not make a major contribution to team 
efficiency. In Chapter Five (discussion) the issue of needing to have a player on base and 
talented enough to steal bases will be addressed. Thus the null hypothesis of there being 
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no statistical difference in team SBP as a consequence of managerial succession was 
accepted. 
Subquestion Eight 
8. How did total team salaries impact the win-loss records? MLB teams with 
extensive financial resources often used such resources in a bully pulpit 
manner. They sought, and often successfully secured or retained, ballplayers 
best able to help or ensure continued high team efficiency.  
Null Hypothesis: There was no statistical difference in team performance as a 
consequence of total team salaries. Commentary was reserved for the fifth 
chapter (Discussion). 
Figure 11 (team salaries) showed most teams were reasonably comparable, 
allowing for the fact some teams did have somewhat higher payrolls. But the glaring fact 
was some teams had appreciably higher annual payrolls, and with one apparently more 
than three standard deviations above the mean. How such information translated into 
team efficiency required use of inferential statistics. 
Table 8 showed total salaries emerging at the fourth level of the regression model 
but not beyond that point. Moving to the model summary for the multiple regression 
analysis (Table 9), team salaries was evident only up to the third level, where it was 
combined with a number of other I.V. to contribute 27% of the predictive power for the 
constant of team efficiency. 
In Table 10 (analysis of variance table) team salaries also had a final appearance 
at the third level. In Table 11 (coefficients and collinearity statistics for the discriminant 
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analysis) the third stage is where team salaries appeared for the final time. Those results 
were interpreted to mean that salaries alone did not have a strong impact on team 
efficiency; despite the belief the use of large sums of money would enable a team to 
obtain the services of the best players. Thus the null hypothesis of there being no 
statistical difference in team performance as a consequence of total team salaries was 
accepted. The implication of this finding is addressed in the next chapter. 
Summary 
Customarily researchers look at inferential analyses to find levels of statistical 
significance, and a common level is .05. In this study the inferential analyses showed 
many levels of statistical findings exceeding the 000 significance. Rather than accepting 
those findings as being indices reflective of intense predictive power by the I.V., the three 
forms of analyses were critically studied to learn if one or more I.V were best predictors. 
Following that line of decision making led to the realization that two of the I.V. made the 
major contributions to each level of significance and that it was necessary to judge the 
eight null hypotheses on whether those two I.V. were factored into the results.  
The multiple regression analysis pointed to the on base plus slugging percentage 
and WHIP as the two most important predictors. Table 8 level one of the models is the 
only point where they appeared. Table 10 (model summary for the backward multiple 
regression analysis) showed both at the final level. The ANOVA (Table 10) also showed 
them at the last level and Table 11 (coefficients and collinearity statistics for the 
discriminant analysis) showed both on base plus slugging and walks plus hits per nine 
innings as the most effective discriminating I.V.. Consequently the approach to accepting 
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or rejecting the null hypotheses was couched within an explanation that profiled those 
latter two I.V. Only the null hypotheses directly addressing on base plus slugging 
(number four) and walks plus hits per nine innings pitched (number six) were rejected. 
Chapter Five (Discussion) addresses the findings, provides commentary on their 
significance, and then relates the information back to the issue of whether managerial 
succession reflected scapegoating activity. Notably the next chapter begins by stating that 
six of the eight null hypotheses were accepted and so discussion on them is deferred. An 
explanation of how information is sequenced begins the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
The previous chapter reported the results in two forms; descriptively and 
inferentially. While providing an impression of variability and distinct a difference 
among teams with regard to managers, the descriptive data failed to answer the research 
question stated as a null hypothesis; there was no relationship or causal dependence 
existing between MLB managerial change and respective team performance, as reflected 
by productivity indices (won-loss records). Instead, that information encouraged 
believing most of the teams and their managers had performance indices that were more 
similar than dissimilar.  
Some notable discrepancies were observed, but a majority of teams seemed more 
homogeneous than heterogeneous when the eight independent variables were studied. 
Pronounced differences were noted in some instances (i.e., team salaries) but such 
surface examination prevented making statements beyond vague generalities, For 
example, about 135 of the 171 managers involved with the study had teams with OBS 
percentages vastly superior to percentages from other managers. Such observations, while 
interesting, left a void in terms of making statements of conclusion regarding this study’s 
questions.  
To learn whether team productivity indices were attributed to managerial wisdom 
and guidance or were artifacts of one or more of the independent variables required a 
critical study of the interdependence between and among the one dependent variable 
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(team efficiency) and the eight independent variables (predictors). To more deeply 
examine the data, three statistical treatments were performed: a backward multiple 
regression analysis, an analysis of variance, and a determination of coefficients and 
collinearity statistics for a discriminant analysis. Chapter Four provided clarification of 
these procedures.  
It was also necessary to address each of the study’s eight subquestions because 
they were so intertwined. Recognizing their interaction meant it was necessary to 
understand the nature and degree of impact from each predictor variable, and then 
determine the interplay between and among them with regard to a team’s PI.  
Working from that posture signaled accepting that no single factor was 
responsible for team efficiency. Encouraging such a claim was that the inferential 
statistically analyses provided information leading to the acceptance of six of the eight 
null hypotheses. The research questions associated with the two rejected nulls, four and 
six, were: (4) How did team on-base plus slugging impact team efficiency (OBPS), and 
(6) How did walks plus hits allowed per inning pitched impact team efficiency (WHIP)? 
The respective null hypotheses were: (4) There was no statistical difference in team  
OBS percentage as a consequence of managerial succession, and (6) There was no 
statistical difference in team WHIP as a consequence of managerial succession. 
Making the determination that there was a notable influence from one or both of 
the OBS and WHIP statistics meant there was no causal dependence between managerial 
changes in MLB team performance indices, as reflected by the independent variables 
used in this study. The implication was changing of managers could be viewed as 
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tantamount to placebo activity, presumably to entice spectators into believing a new 
manager would be able to create a more productive team. Extending this idea to the 
players meant the arrival of a new manager might be viewed as a stimulus for on field 
performances beyond the expected; analogous to an adrenaline rush. But like the sudden 
surge of energy the unexpectedly better performances deteriorated within a relatively 
short period. 
Chapter Sequence 
Surface examination of the descriptive information was not sufficient for 
supporting the idea that managerial succession improved a team’s PI; six of the eight null 
hypotheses were accepted. 
The remainder of this chapter addresses only the two rejected null hypotheses and 
the implications they hold for understanding the dynamics of MLB productivity indices. 
Concomitantly, rejection of null hypotheses four and six required rejecting the claim, 
expressed in the Grand Tour Question, that MLB manager succession reflected on-field 
success. Thus, impressions created by the changing of a team’s manager, be they 
favorable or unfavorable, really were transient impressions. Each of the two accepted 
nulls are addressed below. 
Null Hypothesis Four 
 There was no statistical difference in team OBS percentage as a consequence of 
managerial succession. The statistic of OBS included all means by which a batter reached 
base (walks, being hit by a pitch, successfully hitting the baseball into play, stealing a 
base, reaching base as a consequence of an error by the defense, etc.), and factored in was 
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the base a player reached as a result of a time at bat. Thus the OBS statistic was the sum 
of all ways a player reached base. Greater weight was given to a double than a single and 
likewise triples were more valuable than doubles and singles. Homeruns carried the 
greatest weight in the computations. The important issue with this statistic was a team 
manager had minimal influence on how a player responded to a situation, such as a ball 
pitched, if the ball were hit, and if the batter got a single or a homerun.  
When approached with the view it was the skill of a player and the fortuitousness 
of events which led to a player reaching base, regardless of how it was accomplished, it 
became obvious that team PI was not really under the total control of a manager. In fact 
the extent of a manager’s influence was to determine whether a batter was allowed to 
swing at a pitch, whether a given batter or pitcher played on a given day, and when to 
make player substitutions. Certainly each of those three issues, individually and 
collectively, impacted a team’s ability to perform, but once the dynamics of a pitcher and 
batter was set into motion the productivity rested with the ability of a batter and pitcher. 
Some batters were better than others in one or more of the categories of productivity. 
Having players with superior ability enhanced a team’s chances for improving its 
PI. Teams with more players possessing such skills generally were the ones with better 
team efficiency ratings (winning more games), and their managers typically were 
regarded as more capable. Ironically, a manager with a high PI one year might not be able 
to show a similar PI in a succeeding year because of not having all of the resources. 
Trades, retirements, free agency moving, and injuries markedly affected teams’ 
efficiency. Oftentimes such variables were disregarded in the effort to field a winning 
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team, and the apparent administrative antidote (placebo) was a change in team manager. 
Thus null hypothesis four was rejected. The on base plus slugging percentage revealed a 
statistically significant difference among teams with better performance indices, but it 
was important to recognize that the I.V. of managers did not make a notable contribution 
to those differences  
Null Hypothesis Six 
There was no statistical difference in team WHIP as a consequence of managerial 
succession. This variable reflected how often a team was able to place players on base. A 
higher WHIP value meant greater opportunities for players to advance and eventually 
score runs. As stated under the commentary for null hypothesis four, a manager’s 
capacity for influencing batters generally was limited by three factors: inserting players 
into a lineup for a game, allowing players to swing at pitches, and making (apparently 
strategic) substitutions during the course of a game. Managers had minimal-to-no-control 
over the effectiveness of opposing pitchers, or extraordinary defensive plays. A low 
WHIP statistic meant a team did not have many opportunities to score runs. Resources, in 
the form of talented players were a pivotal item to improving the WHIP statistic.  
Importantly, a team with pitchers able to show a favorable (low) WHIP was not 
always able to produce a favorable efficiency record. It was reported (Retrieved April 4, 
2005 <http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/player/85962>) that during the 2004 MLB season, 
Randy Johnson, while pitching for the Arizona Diamondbacks struck out 290 batters to 
lead the National League, won 16 games while losing 14, had the second best earned run 
average of 2.60 in the National League, and produced the lowest opponent batting 
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average. But his team, the Diamondbacks, scored “two or fewer runs in 17 of his 35 
starts” (Retrieved April 3, 2005 http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/player/85962). Clearly the 
WHIP statistic was a negative for the Diamondbacks; who won 51 and lost 111 games 
(PI of .315), scored 615 runs and allowed 899 (averaged 3.79 runs per game), finished 42 
games behind the West Division winner Los Angles Dodgers (averaged 4.69 runs per 
game and had a PI of .574). The irony to the 2004 Diamondbacks was just  
two-years earlier they won the World Series with the same manager, Bob Brenley. 
Brantley was fired before the 2004 season was concluded.  
Thus, when a team was able to increase its ratio of walks and hits per inning 
pitched by opponents, the likelihood were the PI would improve. Presumably a manager 
could influence players to be less aggressive or more aggressive when batting, and it 
could result in an increased WHIP, but still the actual change in such a statistic depended 
upon the ability of the players and not a manager. There is an adage about professional 
sports that says good defense will beat good offense. Results from this study dispute that 
adage over the long-term.  
Null Hypotheses Four and Six 
In Chapter Four it was reported that the statistic OBS and the WHIP were 
removed from the multiple regression model after the first stage (see Table 8). That was 
explained as a consequence of both variables making the greatest contribution to the 
prediction of team efficiency. Table 10 reported those variables combined to contribute 
26% of the predictive power for team efficiency, and when all eight independent 
variables were used the total value was only 27%.  
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The issue of a variable inflation factor (VIF) was commented upon in  
Chapter Four when the potency of OBS and WHIP were addressed. Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, and Black (1995), explained that the VIF was an indication of the impact 
predictor variables had on the variance of a regression coefficient, with large values, ten 
and above, indicating high collinearity or multicollinearity among the independent 
variables. The variance inflation factor was explained as being the reverse of the 
tolerance value, and both enable a researcher to determine  
the degree to which each independent variable is explained by the other 
independent variables . . . Tolerance is the amount of variability of the 
selected independent variable not explained by the other independent 
variables. Thus very small tolerance values (and large VIF values) denote 
high collinearity. A common cutoff threshold is a tolerance value of .10, 
which corresponds to VIF values above 10. (p. 127) 
 
Results from Chapter Four reported in the ANOVA Table 10 were a F value of 
29.422 when the OBPS was combined with the WHIP statistic. Thus, combining the two 
independent variables resulted in clarifying the unexplained variances between and 
within groups beyond the .000 level of confidence. 
Summary 
 Descriptive statistics are useful for gaining a general impression of conditions. In 
this study there was evidence of considerable overlap among MLB teams on each of the 
eight independent variables when they were compared to team efficiency during the 
tenure of a given manager. But also there was evidence of heterogeneity among teams on 
selected independent variables, and it caused confusion when trying to determine if true 
relationships existed between managerial tenure and the selected independent variables. 
Furthermore it was not clear which, if any, of the eight independent variables had value 
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as predictors for the dependent variable of team efficiency (PI). Resolving the dilemma 
required use of inferential statistics. 
 Six of the eight null hypotheses were accepted. They were not discussed in this 
chapter. The two rejected were addressed and their importance explained. Furthermore, 
the relevance of OBS and WHIP was commented upon and explained as having great 
importance for the level of a team’s PI. The following conclusions were made on the 
basis of the data analysis. 
Conclusions 
1. Managerial succession of many MLB managers may reflect scapegoating 
behavior, as expressed by Gamson and Scotch (1964) and Gordon and Becker 
(1964). The failure of a team to provide a favorable PI did not appear to be a 
reflection of managerial ineptitude as much as it was a reflection of players 
unable to achieve favorable OBS and WHIP statistics. 
2. The “honeymoon” period during when a new team a manger was able to show 
improved team efficiency probably was not a justified time frame for analysis 
of productivity. Using a period of two-weeks immediately prior and  
two-weeks subsequent to managerial succession, as advocated by Grusky 
(1963), was not a valid indicator of team efficiency.  
3. Player personnel made available to a team were the determining factors 
influencing productivity indices. But a cautionary word needs to be inserted 
because those resources need to be available consistently, and they (players) 
need to expend maximum efforts. By way of illustration, the Arizona 
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Diamondbacks won the 2002 World Series, but in 2004 the team was almost 
decimated by injuries. The result was a last place finish. Leshanski (2004) 
reported the team’s power hitters and key role players were unable to play for 
any extended period because of injuries and the team was forced to rely upon 
“youngsters and overachievers.” 
4. Conventional thinking on financial resources led to a belief that when more 
money was spent on the acquisition of star players it translated into better 
teams and improved productivity indices. Pursuing such logic means richer 
teams should win more consistently because they were able to acquire more of 
the star players. The descriptive data (see Figure 11) encouraged such 
thinking, but was not supported by the inferential analyses. The I.V. total team 
salaries (see Table 8) was removed from the analysis of variance model at the 
third stage, and in the discriminant analysis it did not emerge after the third 
stage. Consequently it must be considered that financial resources alone were 
not a significant criterion for enhancing a PI. 
Before departing from the issue of monetary issues, it bears noting that 
revenue generation was the driving force behind the efforts expended by MLB 
teams to have high productivity indices. Baseball salaries, investment yield, 
and baseball expansion explained some of the compelling issues related to 
team location and acquisition of baseball players. Altruism typically was not a 
descriptor that could be used to describe MLB management, and it bears 
emphasizing that management had a different meaning when applied to MLB. 
204 
A MLB team manager was a person responsible for determining which 
players would be competing and under what circumstances. Also there were 
opportunities for such managers to influence availability of certain players by 
recommending they be moved to a different team (minor leagues or perhaps 
traded to another major league team). But the critical decision-making 
impacting a team’s fortunes rested with the upper management and usually 
was vested with a team’s general manager. The G.M. could and did make 
player changes on the scope of adding or deleting members to a team, and by 
so doing the fortunes of a team hung in the balance.  
Praising or criticizing a team’s manger for effective or ineffective 
performance indices generally seemed to be a spurious claim. Horowtiz 
(1994) stated that said a MLB team manager’s job was similar to being the 
principal clerk for a large organization. Others within an organization did the 
hiring and firing. Based upon the interpretations made of this study’s results 
that claim seems to have considerable substance.  
5. The validity of the three explanations from Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
pertaining to MLB managerial succession were considered. Since this was a 
constructive replication of their earlier work, it also sought to learn if 
scapegoating was a reasonable explanation for managerial succession, and if 
there were important predictors for a team’s PI. Each of the Gamson and 
Scotch explanations is addressed below.  
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a. Claim: MLB managers could be entrusted to further the development 
of talented but young players. If accepted, this premise meant a 
manager was not expected to show a favorable or winning PI 
immediately. Doing so would be received well but the intent was for a 
manager to use the time for assisting immature players to acquire 
experience, and the vision was to subsequently surround such players 
with more experienced or highly talented players. An example in 
current baseball is the situation of the Detroit Tigers pitcher Mike 
Maroth, who won six games and lost ten during the 2002 season (ERA 
of 4.48). In 2003, he won nine games and lost 21 (ERA of 5.73), but 
during the 2004 season he had 11 wins and 13 losses with a 4.31 ERA. 
The team manager sought to use experience at the Major League level 
to help him develop. For the 2005 season, the Detroit Tigers 
apparently have surrounded Maroth with a number of highly 
competent players and have expectations he will be an important cog 
to the team’s resurgence. There was no reason to quarrel with that first 
claim, especially given the recent evidence presented above. 
b. Claim: There was a finite pool from which managers were selected. 
Grusky (1963) also commented on that point when he said that 
management probably made managerial changes to appease the fans. 
Gamson and Scotch said: 
. . . there is a pool of former managers, frequently 
employed as coaches by various teams, who are usually 
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called upon when changes are to be made. Most of 
these coaches we fired from their positions as 
managers, presumably because they failed to produce 
winning teams. Such recruiting practices strongly 
suggest the interchangeability of managers and the 
improbability of explaining variance in team 
performance by anything the field manager does.  
(p. 70)  
 
This claim was attractive. The information acquired during the process 
of this investigation encouraged believing the were few instances 
when a singular MLB team manager was so uniquely talented as to 
make the difference in a team’s PI. Instead, there were indications that 
longevity with a team might be more influential because it enabled a 
manager to better understand the nuances of the resources, and 
develop a tighter relationship with the management making the 
personnel decisions. Illustrative of this point was the relationship 
between the Atlanta Braves general manager (GM), John Schuerholz 
who has served longer than any other current GM the longest tenured, 
and the team manager, Bobby Cox, who also has served longer at his 
position with the team than any of the current MLB managers. The 
Braves have won their division each of the last 13-years despite having 
considerable player turnover.  
John Schuerholz is the longest-tenured GM in baseball and 
Cox is the longest-tenured manager. Ownership is 
increasingly budget-conscious, forcing the Braves to lose 
veteran talent every year. But the farm system still 
produces, and Schuerholz is savvy and creative at finding 
ways to stay competitive. (Retrieved from <www.SI.com> 
on April 3, 2005)  
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c. Claim: The issue of managerial succession was tantamount to 
scapegoating. In particular, they pointed out that analysis of the 
Grusky (1961) work did not support his contention about executive 
succession, and they were unable to endorse his 1963 manuscript on 
MLB manager succession and team performance being correlated. 
Gordon and Becker (1964) also had questioned the Grusky (1963) 
work. Brown (1982) later supported the Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
claim that managerial succession in professional sports was a form of 
ritual scapegoating. With recognition of the importance of the OBPS 
and WHIP statistics and apparent lack of evidence to support the 
singularly unique and critical contributions from a MLB team manager 
it was concluded that many instances of managerial succession likely 
were reflective of scapegoating behaviors. 
6. The research question of whether MLB manager succession reflected success 
on a playing field was answered affirmatively. Managers with winning teams, 
as revealed by team efficiency ratings, generally were secure with the jobs, 
but not always. The admonition of Leo Durocher (1975, p. 115), presented in 
Chapter One, was “Nobody can take a manager’s job while he’s winning, and 
nobody can save it if he’s not.” Evidence supporting that claim was the fact 
the Boston Red Sox manager, Grady Little, lost the final game of the 2003 
American League Playoff series to the New York Yankees. Despite having 
guided the Red Sox to two exceptional seasons (winning percentages for 2002 
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= .574 and 2003 = .586) he was fired soon after the end of that 2003 season. 
He did not win the “big game.” 
7. The issue of predictive indices for team efficiency was answered by pointing 
to the two most potent independent variables; OBPS and WHIP. Together 
they accounted for 26% of the predictive power revealed by the total of eight 
IV. Collectively the independent variables were effective 27% of the time in 
predicting the dependent variable of team productivity, the PI. 
8. Chapter one presented assumptions, delimitations, and limitations to this 
study. They were expressed carefully at that time and it is contended those 
comments continue to be justified. In particular, the points about the analysis 
employed and length of time studied, identified under delimitations, and the 
recommendation about continuing to study problems until sufficient evidence 
was accumulated to warrant accepting information as fact. (Blau, 1962; Borg 
& Gall, 1995). These points are commented on in the next section under 
recommendations for future research. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
1. It might be prudent to consider analyzing the data from this study by omitting 
some of the independent variables with high collinearity. Conventional 
approaches to statistical analysis argue that it would make sense to not use so 
many of those independent variables in an analysis. Presumably doing an 
analysis that removed some or most of those independent variables might 
result in the identification of variables different variables. This study initially 
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considered that approach and found the IV of team salaries emerged as being 
highly predictive. But it was determined that total financial resources made 
available to a team were not sufficient for determining “best predictors.” 
2. Eight independent variables were used in this study. Other variables might be 
of equal of perhaps greater importance, and it is recommended that future 
studies consider other offensive statistics as well as defensive statistics (i.e., 
number of double plays, percentage of attempted steals foiled, players picked 
off a base, and a statistic to explain exceptional defensive plays by a single 
player) . 
3. As with most predictive studies, it would be useful to replicate the procedures 
but use a longer time frame for gathering the data. This study addressed the 
concerns voiced about earlier studies by virtue of having a 19-year-period 
from which relevant data was secured versus the earlier studies which used 
time frames of three and ten-years. Perhaps a longer window would further 
extend this study. 
4. Examining the PI of MLB teams during distinct periods of a season might be 
of interest, especially if it included information of the availability of player 
resources during those times. The issue of using replacement players and 
trying to determine the value of a replacement player might give some insights 
on whether particular players were of extreme value or whether it was the 
confluence of all players. Also such an analysis might shed light on the issue 
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of manager talents, assuming a manager was the person who made the 
decisions about acquiring and replacing players. 
5. Extrapolating the idea of studying managerial succession to other professional 
sports teams would be a useful undertaking, especially if there were an 
opportunity for doing a correlational exercise between or among several sets 
of data. 
6. Modifying the nature of this study to focus on the possible relationship(s) 
between management and leadership in professional sports might reveal 
interesting facts, particularly if it was learned that the nature of an 
organization determined if there was distinctiveness or overlap among the 
two, or more, levels of an organization.  
7. Another suggestion is that future research might consider issues of leadership 
(i.e., transactional, transformational, liaise faire; traits; dyad relationships; 
etc.) as it applied to managerial succession. Perhaps it would be valuable to 
employ one or more of the currently available data collecting tools for 
studying leadership behaviors (i.e., Kouzes & Posner, 1995; The Leadership 
Practices Inventory) and possibly pursuing a mixed method study. To acquire 
qualitative data might mean it would be prudent to limit the scope of a study 
but the notion of acquiring rich and deep information could give researchers 
another dimension to reflect upon when labels, such as scapegoating are 
considered. 
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8. It was recognized that the model used for this study was incomplete in terms 
of identifying more and possibly stronger predictors of team efficiency: team 
culture, manager risk-behavior(s), selected defensive statistics, other offensive 
statistics, player attitude scales, team manager and individual player 
relationships, player availability on a consistent basis, media support, fiscal 
solidarity of an organization and its ability to retain ‘star’ players, and the 
philosophy of general managers and owners with regard to winning and 
financial solidarity.  
9. The information from this study should be considered as an important initial 
step into the critical exploration of team efficiency. The dynamics of human 
interactions cannot be ignored when trying to determine factors contributing 
to a winning productivity index, and efforts should be made to identify and 
study them under the varying conditions associated with a MLB team. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY 
This was an ex post facto, nonexperimental, constructive replication study. It 
revisited the earlier work Grusky (1961, 1963), Gamson and Scotch (1964), Gordon and 
Becker (1964), and was encouraged by urgings from Blau (1962) and Borg and Gall 
(1995) to continually pursue questions of scientific interest until sufficient information 
was obtained to justify a conclusion. The earlier publications conflicted on whether 
Major League Baseball managerial succession reflected scapegoating behaviors. 
Shedding more light on that issue was an interest of this study; also there was appeal in 
learning if selected independent variables were predictive of a team’s productivity index.  
Nineteen-years of relevant data were collected from 26 of the 30 MLB teams. The 
four teams excluded were relatively new expansion teams. The dependent variable was 
team efficiency (productivity index = PI) as reflected by won-loss records during the 
tenure of a specific manager with a given team. Eight independent variables were 
selected as predictors: on-base percentage, on-base plus slugging percentage, walks plus 
hits per nine-innings, stolen base efficiency, total team salaries, length of manager tenure, 
average strikeouts per nine-innings, and won-loss percentage. The study’s interest was in 
learning if one or more of the independent variables could predict the dependent variable 
of team efficiency. Conclusions were presented in Chapter Five and are repeated below..  
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Conclusions 
1. Managerial succession of many Major League Baseball managers may reflect 
scapegoating behavior, as expressed by Gordon and Becker (1964), and 
explained in Chapter One.  
2. It was noted that the OBS and WHIP statistics accounted for 26% of the 
variance when predicting the dependent variable of team efficiency. Player 
personnel available to a team apparently were the determining factors 
influencing productivity indices. But a cautionary word needed to be inserted 
because those players had to be available consistently, and they needed to 
expend maximum efforts. 
3. Conventional thinking on financial resources led to a belief that when more 
money was spent on the acquisition of star players it translated into better 
teams, and improved productivity indices. The descriptive data on total team 
salaries (Figure 11) encouraged such thinking, but was not supported by the 
inferential analyses. Consequently it must be considered that money spent on 
a team was not a significant criterion for enhancing a PI. 
4. The validity of the three explanations from Gamson and Scotch (1964) 
pertaining to MLB managerial succession were considered. Each is 
commented upon below.  
a. MLB managers could be entrusted to further the development of talented 
but young players. If accepted, this premise meant a manager was not 
expected to show a favorable, or winning PI immediately. 
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b. The second issue identified by Gamson and Scotch (1964) was there was a 
finite pool from which managers were selected. Grusky (1963) also 
supported that point when he said that management probably made 
managerial changes to appease the fans. That claim was attractive because 
there was no clear evidence of managers being the reason for improved 
productivity indices. 
c. With recognition of the importance of the OBS and WHIP statistics and 
apparent lack of evidence to support the singularly unique and critical 
contributions from a MLB team manager it was concluded that many 
instances of managerial succession likely were reflective of scapegoating 
behaviors. 
5. The research question of whether MLB manager succession reflected winning 
games on a playing field was answered by using a quote from Leo Durocher 
(1975, p. 115), “Nobody can take a manager’s job while he’s winning, and 
nobody can save it if he’s not.” Absent winning there was little that prevented 
a MLB manager from being fired.  
6. It was recognized that the model used for this study was incomplete in terms 
of identifying more and possibly stronger predictors of team efficiency: team 
culture, manager risk-behavior(s), selected defensive statistics, other offensive 
statistics, player attitude scales, team manager and individual player 
relationships, player availability on a consistent basis, media support, fiscal 
solidarity of an organization and its ability to retain ‘star’ players, and the 
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philosophy of general managers and owners with regard to winning and 
financial solidarity.  
7. The information from this study should be considered as an important initial 
step into the critical exploration of team efficiency. The dynamics of human 
interactions cannot be ignored when trying to determine factors contributing 
to a winning productivity index, and efforts should be made to identify and 
study them under the varying conditions associated with a Major League 
Baseball team. 
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